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The Supreme Court’s “Federalist Revival” is now a decade old.1 We have seen
neither the revolution that partisans of states’ rights might have wished nor the deluge
that many nationalists feared.2 What we have witnessed is the incremental expansion,
across a variety of fronts, of judicially-enforced limitations on national authority. While
it remains far too early to attempt a definitive assessment, we have enough decisions now
to evaluate the Court’s project as a developing stream of doctrine rather than as isolated
data points. We can fruitfully ask whether the Court’s federalism doctrine successfully
protects what is important about federalism or, more fundamentally, what “success”
would look like.
Much of the debate about federalism doctrine has centered on the text and history
of the Constitution.3 But it seems fair to say that while those sources of law have been
highly relevant to the Court’s enterprise, neither text nor history has dictated the resulting
doctrines. Consider, for example, the rule that the federal government may not
“commandeer” state legislatures or executive officers.4 Nothing in the constitutional text
mandates such a rule.5 And while the relevant history supports the notion that the
Framers intended the new national government to act directly on individuals rather than
through state governmental institutions, that history is hardly so clear as to be
dispositive.6 The more persuasive justifications for this and other rules, in my view, rest

1

Actually a little more or a little less old, depending on when you start counting. Most people noticed a
change in the Court’s direction in 1995, when the Court struck down an act of Congress as outside the
commerce power for the first time since 1937. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). But the
Court’s renewed interest in limited national power can be traced further back to New York v. United States,
505 U.S. 144 (1992), and Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991). For the term “federalist revival,” see
Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law: Printz and Principle? 111 HARV. L. REV.
2180, 2213 (1998); see also Kathleen M. Sullivan, Dueling Sovereignties: U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v.
Thornton, 109 HARV. L. REV. 78, 80 (1995) (preferring “antifederalist revival”).
2

Charles Ares, for example, opined that “Chief Justice Rehnquist in Lopez has . . . opened the floodgates
just by saying that there are limits on the commerce power, draping the opinion in references to things
traditionally local, and then leaving it to the lower courts to begin the process of dismantling what they
regard as offending intrusions on "our federalism." Charles E. Ares, Lopez and the Future Constitutional
Crisis, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 825, 825-26 (1996). The lower courts, perhaps not surprisingly, have done no
such thing. See Glenn H. Reynolds & Brandon P. Denning, Lower Court Readings of Lopez, or What if the
Supreme Court Held a Constitutional Revolution and Nobody Came? 2000 WIS. L. REV. 369.
3

See, e.g., U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995) (big textual and historical debate about
the meaning of the Qualifications Clauses in Article I, §§ 2 & 3); Gary Lawson & Patricia B. Granger, The
“Proper” Scope of Federal Power: A Jurisdictional Interpretation of the Sweeping Clause, 43 DUKE L. J.
267 (1993); Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 101
(2001).
4

See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); New York, 505 U.S. at ___.

5

See Printz, 521 U.S. at 905 (acknowledging as much).

6

See id. at 918 (“The constitutional practice we have examined . . . tends to negate the existence of the
congressional power asserted here, but is not conclusive.”). See generally Saikrishna Prakash, Field Office
Federalism, 79 VA. L. REV. 1957 (1993) (finding historical support for a rule barring commandeering of
state legislatures, but not for one barring commandeering state officers); Evan H. Caminker, State
Sovereignty and Subordinacy: May Congress Commandeer State Officers to Implement Federal Law?, 95
COLUM. L. REV. 1001, 1042-50 (___) (concluding that the historical record suggests the Framers intended
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on their functional roles in protecting state autonomy.7 In any event, the important point
is that the Court has been operating in a context where text and history suggest important
directions but do not mandate particular doctrinal formulations. Instead, the Court has
constructed doctrine to meet the needs of the federal system as it sees them. Federalism
doctrine has been made, not found.
Many of the Rehnquist majority’s critics, both on the Court and in the academy,
have taken the failure of text and history to compel particular federalism doctrines as
proof that the enterprise is illegitimate.8 This is a curious reaction – although perhaps not
a surprising one – given that many of the same people favor judicial creativity in other
contexts.9 My own view is that doctrinal creativity is essential if the Constitution’s
original mandate of a federal balance is to be maintained in a world where many of the
Founders’ presuppositions about the structure of society and government have profoundly
changed. Text and history tell us that our Constitution established a creative tension
between national and state governments. I will argue, however, that those same sources
can tell us relatively little about how that tension should be maintained in today’s world.
And while adaptation of the original structure to present circumstances is not exclusively,
or perhaps even primarily, a task for courts, I contend that they must nonetheless play an
important role.
If I am right that the Constitution both permits and requires substantial judicial
creativity in enforcing federalism, then the central task becomes to develop a coherent
vision of how such enforcement ought to proceed. Here, too, the Court’s critics have
been many and loud. Much of this criticism seems overblown; courts sit to decide cases,
not develop general theories – and certainly not to articulate them in broad dictum
unnecessary to the decision. But the Court’s emerging pattern of decisions does indicate
a certain vision of what is important about federalism and how it should be enforced.
There is, of course, the obvious pattern: Five justices are generally for imposing
constitutional limits on federal authority in a number of different contexts, while four
have consistently opposed such limits.10 Less obvious is the particular nature of the
to permit commandeering of state executive officers and that the record is too sparse to support a rule
against commandeering state legislatures).
7

Accord H. Jefferson Powell, The Oldest Question of Constitutional Law, 79 VA. L. REV. 633 (1993)
(rejecting the historical arguments against commandeering, but approving New York’s rule on “prudential”
grounds). I am not as skeptical of the historical justification for the rule as Professor Powell, but I agree
that the functional arguments are stronger.
8

See, e.g., Martin S. Flaherty, Are We To Be a Nation? Federal Power vs. States’ Rights in Foreign Affairs,
70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1277, 1286-96 (1999) (attacking the textual and historical bases for the anticommandeering doctrine).

9

Compare, e.g., Sylvia A. Law, In the Name of Federalism: The Supreme Court’s Assault on Democracy
and Civil Rights, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 367, 369-70 (2002) (comparing the Rehnquist Court’s federalism
jurisprudence to Lochner) with Sylvia A. Law, Physician-Assisted Death: An Essay on Constitutional
Rights and Remedies, 55 MD. L. REV. 292 (1996) (urging recognition of a substantive due process right to
physician-assisted suicide).
10

Because the current incarnation of the Rehnquist Court has served together for ___ years, the voting
blocs on most federalism issues have been remarkably stable over virtually the entire period of the
“federalist revival.” Five justices – Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and
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constraints imposed. Those constraints embody a rather narrow version of state
“sovereignty,” defined here as the notion that state governments should be unaccountable
for violations of federal norms. The many decisions upholding state sovereign immunity
in federal lawsuits are simply the most obvious manifestation of this trend. Not all of the
Court’s efforts have focused on the value of sovereignty, but it is fair to say that it has
received considerably greater emphasis than other aspects of federalism. The Court’s
dissenters, by contrast, have opposed these decisions with unusual vehemence11 and, on
several occasions, urged virtually complete judicial abdication of federalism
enforcement.12
The broader pattern, however, is more complicated. By expanding the universe of
what counts as a “federalism case” – in particular, by taking in cases about federal
statutory preemption of state law – one discovers that the supposedly anti-federalism
justices have their own theory of state autonomy, instead of simply favoring national
power at every turn. The dissenters in cases like Lopez or Seminole Tribe13 have often –
but not always – emphasized state “autonomy,” defined somewhat narrowly here as the
ability of states to govern, as opposed to simply their immunity from accountability.14
Thomas – have generally favored limits on federal power. Four – Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and
Breyer – have generally opposed such limits. Nonetheless, it is hard to know exactly what to call these two
groups. Many have dubbed them “conservative” and “liberal” factions, respectively, but attaching a strong
political valence to federalism issues is highly problematic. See, e.g., Lynn A. Baker & Ernest A. Young,
Federalism and the Double Standard of Judicial Review, 51 DUKE L. J. 75, ___ (2001); Ernest A. Young,
Welcome to the Dark Side: Liberals Rediscover Federalism in the Wake of the War on Terror, ___
BROOKLYN L. REV. ___ (forthcoming 2004). I will occasionally use “pro-states” and “nationalist,” but one
of the principal points of this essay is to say that the putatively nationalist four do, in fact, have their own
important vision of state autonomy. See infra Section ___. I will also occasionally refer to the Court’s
“majority” and “dissenting” factions on federalism, but it is important to understand that members of the
four have sometimes been able to form majorities around their own view of federalism.
11

See, e.g., Federal Maritime Comm’n v. South Carolina St. Ports Auth., 122 S. Ct. 1864, 1889 (2002)
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Today's decision reaffirms the need for continued dissent - unless the
consequences of the Court's approach prove anodyne, as I hope, rather than randomly destructive, as I
fear.”); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 98 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (asserting that “[t]he
kind of judicial activism manifested in [the Court’s 11th Amendment cases] represents such a radical
departure from the proper role of this Court that it should be opposed whenever the opportunity arises.”);
see also Charles Fried, Five to Four: Reflections on the School Voucher Case, 116 HARV. L. REV. 163, 178
(2002) (observing that “[s]uch explicit commitments to keep dissenting until the dissent becomes the
doctrine of the Court are rare”).
12

See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 649 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting) (“As with
"conflicts of economic interest," so with supposed conflicts of sovereign political interests implicated by
the Commerce Clause: the Constitution remits them to politics.”); Kimel, 528 U.S. at 96 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (“The importance of respecting the Framers' decision to assign the business of lawmaking to the
Congress dictates firm resistance to the present majority's repeated substitution of its own views of
federalism for those expressed in statutes enacted by the Congress and signed by the President.”).

13

Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Fla., 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (holding that Congress may not abrogate the sovereign
immunity of the states from private damages suits when it acts pursuant to its Article I powers).
14

See, e.g., Geier v. American Honda Motor Corp., 529 U.S. 861 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(complaining that by preempting state tort suits, the majority was “us[ing] federal law as a means of
imposing their own ideas of tort reform on the States”); AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Board, 525 U.S. 366,
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The dissenters, for example, vote to uphold state regulatory measures against claims of
federal preemption considerably more frequently than their colleagues.15 These cases
likewise reflect a different approach to judicial review of federalism issues, relying on
“softer” checks on Congress such as “clear statement” rules of statutory construction.
Comparing the two competing visions of federalism on the Rehnquist Court can,
in itself, tell us a great deal about the choices involved in making federalism doctrine. I
want to argue, however, that both these visions are incomplete. The majority’s view
neglects concerns for state regulatory autonomy and overlooks the potential of “process”
limits on federal authority. The dissenting vision, on the other hand, improperly
discounts the need for some substantive constraint on federal power while missing the
support in “process federalism” for more aggressive judicial doctrines. Instead, I argue
for a “strong autonomy” model of federalism doctrine that combines many of the features
of the other two.
The case for this model rests on two sets of arguments. The first has to do with
the preference for “autonomy” over “sovereignty.” I contend that virtually all the values
that federalism is supposed to promote – such as regulatory diversity, political
participation, or restraints on tyranny – turn on the capacity of the states to exercise selfgovernment, not on their institutional immunity from federal norms. This capacity for
self-government also turns out to be critical for the states’ ability to maintain their own
place in the federal balance without relying primarily on judicial protection.
The latter point moves toward a second set of arguments, revolving around the
nature of judicial enforcement for federalism issues. Such enforcement, I argue, ought to
be shaped by comparing the institutional competence of the courts with the other
branches of government, as informed by the courts’ historical experience in enforcing
federalism doctrine. That comparison argues for doctrines that focus on correcting
defects in the political process’s own protection for federalism, as well as doctrines that
avoid direct confrontations with the political branches. But because the Framers’ own
theory of self-enforcement rests on enduring areas of state regulatory autonomy, judicial
federalism doctrine cannot be entirely indifferent to substantive restrictions on federal
power.
At least one caveat is in order. This essay will not be of much use for those who
believe that legal doctrine has little or no bearing on the actual decision of cases.16 I have
never had much sympathy for that view, but addressing it would take this essay far afield
indeed. In any event, as long as doctrine has some purchase – and the extreme positions
427 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court’s decision to preempt state regulatory authority
over local telephone markets “deprive[d] the States of practically significant power”).
15

See Daniel J. Meltzer, The Supreme Court’s Judicial Passivity, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 343, 369-70
[hereinafter Meltzer, Judicial Passivity]; Ernest A. Young, “The Ordinary Diet of the Law”: Federal
Preemption and State Autonomy (forthcoming who knows when) [hereinafter Young, Preemption].
16

See, e.g., JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL
(1993); see also Charles Fried, Constitutional Doctrine, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1140, 1140 (1994) (observing
that the assumption “that there are rules of principles of constitutional law . . . that are capable of statement
and that generally guide the decisions of courts . . . . has been controversial at least since the advent of legal
realism”).
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that insist doctrine is either irrelevant or the whole ballgame seem unlikely to be true –
then it will make sense to inquire how to design and improve doctrinal rules.
Part I of this essay explores the use of judicial doctrine as a tool for resolving
disputes about federalism. I begin with the observation that doctrine and the Constitution
are not the same; hence, the use of doctrine requires justification beyond the traditional
arguments about judicial authority to interpret the Constitution itself. Doctrine also
presupposes that courts should have some role in federalism disputes, a question that
implicates an emerging literature on comparative institutional choice. I argue, however,
that courts are generally not free to ignore issues of federalism and that institutional
issues are best addressed in the context of interpretive choice – that is, the enterprise of
choosing particular federalism doctrines that are more or less deferential to other
institutional actors.
Part II identifies three different models of federalism doctrine: the “strong
sovereignty” model often followed by the Rehnquist Court majority; the “weak
autonomy” model sometimes advanced by the Court’s dissenters, and a “strong
autonomy” model developed and defended here. Part III turns to the role that text and
history play in defining and constraining federalism doctrine in the courts. My
conclusion is that these sources require us to have federalism doctrine – that is, they
impose an obligation on courts to enforce the federal balance – but that they tell us
relatively little about the precise balance to be struck or the forms that federalism doctrine
should take.
In Part IV, I consider how the underlying values of federalism bear on the choice
between “sovereignty” and “autonomy.” Those values, I contend, strongly support
emphasizing the regulatory autonomy of state governments rather than shielding them
from accountability for violations of federal norms. Parts V and VI then turn to the
structure of doctrine protecting state autonomy. Part V treats the notion that federalism
should be “self-enforcing,” advanced by Professor Herbert Wechsler’s theory of the
“political safeguards of federalism”17 as well as James Madison’s essays in the
Federalist.18 While both versions suggest that courts should focus on “process” failures
that undermine state representation at the federal level and institutional checks on federal
action, both Madison and Wechsler also – albeit in quite different ways – support a
continued judicial obligation to enforce the “substance” of enumerated limits on federal
action. Part VI then addresses the form that doctrinal limits should take, based on the
institutional experience of the Court in enforcing federalism during prior eras. That
experience preaches caution in assaying direct confrontations with Congress, avoidance
of categorical subject-matter distinctions, and exploration of “softer checks” – such as
“clear statement” rules of statutory interpretation – on federal authority.
Part VII, finally, offers a preliminary sketch of the doctrines that might make up a
“strong autonomy” approach. The most important is a strong emphasis on limiting
federal preemption of state regulatory authority. On this point, the present essay is a
17

Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and
Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954).

18

See Federalist No. 45 & 46 (Jacob E. Cooke, ed. 1961).
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companion to another work which undertakes a much more comprehensive look at
federal preemption.19 Part VII also discusses other process-forcing doctrines, such as the
various “clear statement” rules, the anti-commandeering principle, and stricter
enforcement of the constitutionally-prescribed procedures for making federal law. In the
end, I suggest that certain more substantive doctrines – such as enforcement of commerce
clause limits on federal authority – should retain a significant place in federalism
doctrine, while others – such as the constitutionalization of state sovereign immunity –
should not.
I.

Federalism and Doctrine

Take a look at any first-year casebook in constitutional law, and you will see the
importance of doctrine to the subject. The widely-used Sullivan and Gunther casebook20
places the Constitution itself – the text drafted at Philadelphia in 1787 and ratified in
1789, as well as its subsequent amendments – in an appendix at the end of the book,
immediately following page 1537. Much of the rest is doctrine, encompassing “not only
the holdings of cases, but also the analytical frameworks and tests that the Court’s cases
establish.”21
My subject is the creation of federalism doctrine, and that subject requires some
inquiry into the nature of doctrine per se and its relationship to other components of
constitutional law. I take up that inquiry in Section A of this Part. Because doctrine is
created by courts, moreover, the enterprise of doctrinal construction presupposes an
institutional choice allocating at least some authority over federalism questions to the
judiciary rather than to some other institution. Institutional choice cannot be taken for
granted, however, and I discuss why courts should have at least some authority over
federalism questions in Section B. The more difficult issues, however, concern the
interpretive choice of particular federalism doctrines that is the subject of Section C.
That Section sets out a series of issues that courts must confront in developing particular
doctrines that will help maintain our federal balance.
A.

Doctrine, Constitution, and Deep Structure

Doctrine is not the same as the Constitution.22 Sometimes it bears very little
relation to the document itself, such as when the Court holds that states may not
discriminate against interstate commerce23 or that Congress may not “commandeer” state
19

See Young, Preemption, supra note 15.

20

KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (14th ed. 2001).

21

Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1996 Term – Foreword: Implementing the Constitution, 111
HARV. L. REV. 54, 56 (1997) [hereinafter Fallon, Foreword]; see also McNollgast, Politics and the Courts:
A Positive Theory of Judicial Doctrine and the Rule of Law, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1631, 1639 (1995)
(defining doctrine as “the set of rules and methods to be used to decide a particular class of cases”).
22

See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Opinions as Binding Law and as Explanations for Judgments, 15
CARDOZO L. REV. 43, 62-65 (1993) (giving reasons why judicial decisions should not be read as
“incorporated” in the enactments they interpret); [others].
23

Compare, e.g., , U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (conferring power on Congress “to regulate Commerce . . .
among the several States”) with Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325, 330 (1996) (observing that courts
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legislatures or executive officials.24 Other times, the doctrine elaborates upon the text,
rendering its directives more specific in their application to particular cases. In
considering the scope of Congress’s affirmative commerce power, for instance, the Court
has held that the power extends to “channels” and “instrumentalities” of commerce, as
well as to activities that “substantially affect” interstate commerce.25 In either case,
however, the doctrine may permit or require things that the document, standing alone,
might not. Any account of the courts’ power to craft federalism doctrine must begin by
exploring the justifications for “supplementing” the Constitution in this way. Those
justifications play an important role in determining how far federalism doctrine can go.
1.

The Problem of Doctrine and Structure

We might initially define constitutional “doctrine” as the residue of interpretation
that accumulates over time. Constitutional interpretation is seldom easy. Judicial
interpretations of the document are often contestable and sometimes wrong. Yet we often
accept those interpretations as settled and move on, taking them as given and building
upon them in the resolution of future questions. Doctrine in this sense is equivalent to
precedent; it represents our unwillingness to reopen interpretive questions resolved in the
past.
Even taken in this comparatively narrow sense, doctrine is moderately
controversial in constitutional law. Gary Lawson, for example, has argued that it is
unconstitutional to subordinate the Constitution itself to what the judges have said about
it in the past.26 The argument has a strong intuitive appeal: If a judge deciding today’s
case truly thinks – using all the tools of interpretation at his disposal – that the
Constitution requires rule X, then by what authority does he discount that interpretation
and adhere to rule Y, simply because rule Y was adopted in a prior decision? Surely the
Constitution itself trumps any authority the prior court might have enjoyed.27

have long interpreted the Commerce Clause “as a limitation on state regulatory powers” that “‘prohibits
economic protectionism’”) (quoting Associated Industries of Mo. v. Lohman, 511 U.S. 641, 647 (1994)).
24

See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 905 (1997) (acknowledging that “there is no
constitutional text speaking to this precise question” whether state executive officers may be required to
implemen
t fe deral law).
25

United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995).

26

Gary Lawson, The Constitutional Case Against Precedent, 17 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 23, 23-24
(1994); see also [Paulsen?]. A counter-current holds that it is unconstitutional not to allow courts to
produce binding doctrine. See, e.g., Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d 898 (8th Cir. 2000) (striking
down circuit rule barring citation of unpublished opinions on the ground that the Article III “judicial
power” necessarily encompasses the power to create binding precedent), vacated as moot, 235 F.3d 1054
(8th Cir. 2000) (en banc); Lindh v. Murphy, 96 F.3d 856, 887 (7th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (Ripple, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)’s confinement of the grounds for federal habeas corpus
relief to situations where state courts have violated “clearly established law, as determined by the Supreme
Court of the United States” unconstitutionally denies lower courts authority to create binding precedent)
(emphasis added). That debate is well beyond the scope of my discussion here.
27

One might take John Marshall’s famous statement in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,
___ (1819), out of context to say that “we must never forget that it is a constitution we are expounding” –
not a set of legal precedents.
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As long as we take precedent and doctrine to entail simply deference to past
interpretations, however, two answers to the argument seem readily available. One is that
adherence to interpretive precedent simply represents humility on the part of present
interpreter – a recognition that his own interpretation may be wrong and, more
fundamentally, that prior readings are in fact one of the most important “tools of
interpretation” to be employed in resolving present controversies.28 A second answer
rests on the practical – but basic – impossibility of treating all interpretive questions as
open in resolving each new case. Some questions must be considered settled if we are to
move forward. As Charles Fried points out, “[w]e want to avoid being like the man who
cannot get to work in the morning because he must keep returning home to make quite
sure that he has turned off the gas.”29
Doctrine has an additional component, however.30 In many instances, the activity
of interpretation per se may not produce closure on a choice among doctrinal options,
leaving the choice to be made on other grounds. Those grounds may include independent
moral principle, pragmatic concerns about the workability of particular rules, or
institutional issues about the court’s legitimacy. As Richard Fallon has observed,
Frequently, a perfect correspondence could not, even in principle, exist
between the meaning of constitutional norms and the doctrinal tests by
which those norms are implemented. . . . [S]ome constitutional norms
may be too vague to serve directly as effective rules of law. In addition, in
shaping constitutional tests, the Supreme Court must take account of
empirical, predictive, and institutional considerations that may vary from
time to time.31
Doctrine thus entails the choices that judges must make “to implement the Constitutional
successfully. In service of this mission, the Court often must craft doctrine that is driven
by the Constitution, but does not reflect the Constitution’s meaning precisely.”32
This aspect of doctrine frankly acknowledges that it supplements the Constitution
rather than simply amounting to past interpretations of the document. As such, it seems
28

See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, The Importance of Humility in Judicial Review: A Comment on Ronald
Dworkin’s “Moral Reading” of the Constitution, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1269, 1292 (1997) (“[A]n essential
element of responsible judging is a respect for the opinions and judgments of others, and a willingness to
suspend belief, at least provisionally, in the correctness of one's own opinions, especially when they
conflict with the decisions of others who have, no less than judges, sworn an oath to uphold and defend the
Constitution.”).

29

Fried, Constitutional Doctrine, supra note 16, at 1144. See also Anthony Kronman, Precedent and
Tradition, 99 YALE L. J. 1029 (1990) (making a similar, but more foundational, argument for precedent).

30

See Fried, Constitutional Doctrine, supra note 16
, at 1141 (“Doctrine and precedent are related, not
identical. In civil law countries, doctrine plays a great role in giving the law its substance and texture, but
treatise writers and academic discourse, not the opinions nor even the decisions of courts, are the dominant
organs of the growth and statement of doctrine there.”).

31

Fallon, Foreword, supra note ___,at 62.

32
Id. at 57. See also LAURENCE H. TRIBE, 1 AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 1-16, at 81-82 (3d ed.
2000) (“[T]he bare words of the Constitution’s text, and the skeletal structure on which those words were
hung, only begin to fill out the Constitution as a mature, ongoing system of constitutional law.”).
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more vulnerable to Professor Lawson’s critique. Doctrine in this aspect is not simply
privileging one court’s interpretation (the earlier one) over another; it instead amounts to
the use of something not quite the same as the Constitution as a vehicle for implementing
the Constitution’s provisions. That still seems relatively unproblematic where doctrine
simply makes open-ended provisions more concrete, as with Lopez’s trichotomy of
“channels,” “instrumentalities,” and activities “substantially affecting” commerce.33 In
these instances, the doctrinalist can plead necessity: Courts simply cannot decide cases
under the Commerce Clause – and in particular the Supreme Court cannot guide future
decisions by lower courts – without specifying what “commerce among the several
states” means.34 The implementing doctrine is necessary in such instances to ensure that
like cases applying the constitutional provision in question are, in fact, treated alike.
Some doctrine, however, exists at a further remove from the implementation of
particular constitutional provisions. This is particularly true of much federalism doctrine.
The anti-commandeering principle, for example, does not implement any particular
constitutional provision;35 likewise, the dormant commerce notion hardly serves to
implement the Commerce Clause’s text, which quite plainly operates only to confer
power on Congress.36 These sorts of doctrine require a more elaborate justification than
the need to specify the meaning of particular constitutional text.
It may help to begin by adding a third category of constitutional “law” alongside
the text and the doctrine. That category would include fundamental structural principles,
33

See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995).

34

[cite Fallon] A related necessity occurs when a textual provision is relatively determinate but practically
unworkable in that form. The Free Speech Clause, for instance, could hardly be more specific: “Congress
shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.” U.S. CONST. amend. I. But aside from Justice
Black, we have never been able to live with a right of free speech in this absolute form. The provision thus
cannot be effectively implemented without doctrine specifying exceptions and qualifications, such as the
“clear and present danger” test for restrictions on incitement to unlawful activity. See, e.g., Brandenburg v.
Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, ___ (1969); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, ___ (1919) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
35

Language in New York suggests that the Court believes the anti-commandeering rule to be an implicit
limit on every enumerated power. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 159 (1992) (“[J]ust as a
cup may be half empty or half full, it makes no difference whether one views the question at issue in these
cases as one of ascertaining the limits of the power delegated to the Federal Government under the
affirmative provisions of the Constitution or one of discerning the core of sovereignty retained by the States
under the Tenth Amendment.”). But that limit is not necessary to implement these powers in the way, for
example, that some sort of doctrinal test of equality is necessary to implement the Equal Protection Clause.
One can imagine a Commerce Clause without an anti-commandeering limit; one cannot apply Equal
Protection without defining what is meant by equality.
36

See U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 796 n.12 (1995) (acknowledging that “the
Constitution is clearly silent on the subject of state legislation that discriminates against interstate
commerce”). Similarly, the broad sovereign immunity accorded to state governments in cases like
Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996), hardly implements the text of the Eleventh Amendment; on
the contrary, the Court often describes the rather narrow text of that Amendment as implementing a preexisting (and much broader) notion of sovereign immunity in a particular instance where Chisholm v.
Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793), had rejected such immunity. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 723
(1999). As I discuss further infra TAN ___, my own view is that current doctrine goes well beyond what is
necessary to implement the most plausible account of the Founders’ views on state sovereign immunity.
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like “federalism” or “separation of powers.” Those words do not appear in the
constitutional text, and yet they have long been understood as bedrock ideas undergirding
the textual provisions in the document and tying them together into a coherent structure.
Nor are these sorts of principles properly classified as “doctrine,” at least if we
understand that term to encompass relatively specific rules and principles that implement
the textual provisions. On the contrary, textual provisions such as the vesting clauses of
Articles I, II, and III and the Tenth Amendment “implement” broader ideas of separation
of powers and federalism, respectively. The text thus exists at an intermediate level of
generality, implementing broader ideas and yet requiring further implementation through
judicial doctrine.37
The critical question for present purposes is the relationship between these
fundamental structural principles and the doctrine made by courts. Sometimes, courts
will want to justify doctrine on the ground that it directly implements structural
principles, even though the doctrine has little support in the text itself. The anticommandeering doctrine is an example. Other times, courts will fashion doctrine to
implement text, yet recur to the text’s underlying principles to influence the form that the
implementing doctrine takes. In U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton,38 for example, both
Justice Stevens’s majority opinion and Justice Kennedy’s concurrence resorted to the
Founders’ underlying theory of representation to support a doctrine that the
Qualifications Clauses in Article I supply the exclusive limitations on who can be a
federal representative.39 In each case, it is hard to say that the text itself is doing the
work.
The power of judicial review itself is generally justified in terms of the
Constitution’s written-ness; John Marshall, for instance, wrote in Marbury that the theory
“that an act of the legislature, repugnant to the constitution, is void” is “essentially
attached to a written constitution.”40 Compared to more traditional forms of judicial
review, then, the argument that courts may formulate constitutional doctrine driven not so
much by text as by fundamental structural principles cannot be as easily grounded in the
judiciary’s obligation “to say what the law is.”41 I offer two justifications here for
doctrine derived from structure. The first is that the Constitution should not be taken as a
complete description of the federal system; that text is devoted to establishing and
empowering one component of that system – the national government – rather than with
comprehensively ordering the system as a whole. The second argument arises out of the

37

See generally Ernest A. Young, Alden v. Maine and the Jurisprudence of Structure, 41 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1601 (2000) [hereinafter Young, Jurisprudence of Structure] (discussing the role of the political
theory underlying structural provisions of the Constitution).

38

514 U.S. 779 (1995).

39

See id. at ___; id. at 838, 841 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also Young, Jurisprudence of Structure,
supra note 37, at 1644-45 (discussing this aspect of Term Limits).
40

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, ___ (1803); see also id. at ___ (“The powers of the
legislature are defined and limited; and that those limits may not be mistaken, or forgotten, the constitution
is written.”) (emphasis added).

41

Id. at ___.
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need to “translate” the text’s original strategies for maintaining the structure envisioned
by its Framers into a world much changed from the one those Framers knew.
2.

The Constitution’s Incompleteness on Federalism

Federalism has many meanings, but the basic one in our system is that we have
two levels of government – the Nation and the States – and that power is divided between
them as a matter of constitutional principle.42 Whether or not the States are “prior” to the
Federal Government as a matter of political theory – a question that tends to center on
whether the federal Constitution was ratified by the People as a whole or the People of
the States43 – there is no dispute that the original state governments were already up and
running when the Constitution was drafted in 1787. The new constitution thus had no
need to constitute them, but rather simply to carve out a place for a new, stronger central
government.44 As Chief Justice Marshall explained early on, “it was neither necessary
nor proper to define the powers retained by the States. These powers proceed, not from
the people of America, but from the people of the several States; and remain, after the
adoption of the constitution, what they were before, except so far as they may be
abridged by that instrument.”45
To be sure, this carving-out addressed many of the important and contested issues
of federalism. But others were left unaddressed, especially in the original, un-amended
document.
Most importantly, the federal Constitution did not empower state
governments; rather, it left to the state constitutions the task of constituting state
governments and delegating to them some portion of the popular sovereignty.46 The
Constitution’s agnosticism on the powers delegated to state governments initially went
unremarked in the text; it would later be made explicit by the Tenth Amendment’s
proclamation that powers “not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”47
In other words, the sovereign people were free to delegate particular reserved powers to
their state governments or simply not to empower their governments to act in those ways.
The original Constitution likewise did not address the question of sovereign
immunity, either for the new national government or its state counterparts. Debate at
Philadelphia and in the ratifying conventions focused on whether Article III would itself
override the traditional immunities of state governments, with the apparent resolution that

42

See Ernest A. Young, Protecting Member State Autonomy in the European Union: Some Cautionary
Tales from American Federalism, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1612, 1641-42 (2002) [hereinafter Young, European
Union] (discussing various definitions).
43

Compare, e.g., U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, ___ (1995), with id. at ___ (Thomas,
J., dissenting); see also FORREST MCDONALD, STATES’ RIGHTS AND THE UNION: IMPERIUM IN IMPERIO,
1776-1876 at 7-22 (2000).
44

Indeed, some states kept operating under their pre-1789 constitutions (or even their pre-revolutionary
royal charters) well into the Nineteenth Century. [cites]
45

Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U. S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 193 (1819).

46

See Term Limits, 514 U.S. at ___ (Thomas, J., dissenting).

47

U.S. CONST. amend. X (emphasis added).
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it would not.48 But whether one thinks that the states’ preexisting immunity itself had
constitutional status (the position of the Rehnquist Court majority) or that it was a form
of common law subject to statutory override (the view of the Court’s dissenters), the
present point is simply that the constitutional text did not address the question. This was
a significant omission given widespread concerns during the founding era about crippling
lawsuits against state governments.49 Sovereign immunity thus provides further evidence
of the Framers’ willingness to allow major issues of federal structure to be worked out
through processes – judicial development, statutory enactments, norms of practice – other
than constitutional drafting.50
Nor did the federal Constitution, for the most part, define the rights of individuals
vis-à-vis their state governments. This is true despite the fact that many of the Founders
in Philadelphia were strongly motivated by a perception that State governments needed to
be reined in.51 The Constitution did state that the national government would be
responsible for enforcing a basic commitment to republicanism,52 and it forbade the
States to do certain things, such as to grant titles of nobility or to impair the obligation of
contracts.53 But this handful of restrictions hardly purported to be a complete description
of the rights of citizens vis-à-vis their state governments, and when a more inclusive
catalog of individual liberties was added in the Bill of Rights, those liberties bound only
the national government.54 The scope of individual rights enforceable against the state
governments was left to rest on state constitutions. As cloudy as the meaning of the

48

See, e.g., Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Fla., 517 U.S. 44, 142-44 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting) (finding some
disagreement on the issue, but acknowledging that “James Madison, John Marshall, and Alexander
Hamilton all appear to have believed that the common-law immunity from suit would survive the
ratification of Article III”); THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 548-49 (J.E. Cooke ed. 1961) (Alexander
Hamilton); but see Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793) (reaching the opposite conclusion).
Chisholm was of course promptly overruled by the Eleventh Amendment.

49

See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 406 (1821) (“It is a part of our history, that, at the
adoption of the constitution, all the states were greatly indebted; and the apprehension that these debts
might be prosecuted in the federal courts, formed a very serious objection to that instrument.”).
50

One might think that the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment shortly after Chisholm was an attempt to
move the question of sovereign immunity back into the realm of constitutional text. But the Amendment’s
text could not have been intended as a complete statement on the subject: It left too many questions, like
the immunity of states in federal question or admiralty cases, unresolved. (It said nothing about federal
immunities, moreover.) And indeed the Amendment’s text has played a much less important role in the
development of our law of state sovereign immunity than one might have expected. See Young,
Jurisprudence of Structure, supra note 37, at ___.

51

See JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE
CONSTITUTION 47 (1996) (concluding that Madison intended for the Constitutional Convention “to seize
the occasion of reforming the national government to treat the internal defects of the states”); MCDONALD,
supra note 43, at 17-18.
52

See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (“The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a
Republican Form of Government . . . .”).

53

See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.

54

See Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
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Ninth Amendment is,55 it seems at the least to disavow any suggestion that the federal
Bill of Rights should be a complete description of a citizen’s rights against government.
As Forrest McDonald has observed, “[t]he Ninth was understood as integral to a system
of divided sovereignty. By refusing to nationalize unenumerated rights, the Ninth left the
question of the protection of such rights to the states or to the people of the states.”56
The national constitution thus did not establish a complete government. It
essayed neither a comprehensive list of governmental powers nor an exhaustive list of
individual rights. Sovereignty remained in the People, who gave life to their system of
federalism by delegating that sovereignty to their several governments.57 The system can
be fully appreciated only by viewing the whole, that is, the federal constitution, the state
constitutions, and – most important for present purposes – the web of practices that has
grown up to mediate potential conflicts between these two levels of government.
Each of our various institutions has contributed to this web. Congress, for
example, has enacted statutes staking an exclusive claim to some areas,58 denying the
existence of federal power in others,59 providing for cooperation in still others,60 and
occasionally regulating the lawmaking procedures themselves by which federal law
impacts the states.61 The President promulgates Executive Orders on federalism issues,62
consults with states and represents their interests in supranational organizations,63 and
issues interpretive rulings on the preemptive effect of federal statutes.64 State
55

See U.S. CONST. amend. IX (“The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.”).
56

MCDONALD, supra note 43, at 24.

57

See generally GORDON WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 530 (1969)
(discussing James Wilson’s influential theory of popular sovereignty).

58

See, e.g., Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (providing
that federal law “shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any
employee benefit plan”).

59

See, e.g., Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 152(b) (providing that “nothing in this chapter shall
be construed to apply or to give the [Federal Communications] Commission jurisdiction with respect to . . .
intrastate communication service”).

60

See, e.g., General Motors Corp. v. United States, 496 U.S. 530, 532 (1990) (observing that the Clean Air
Act makes “the States and the Federal Government partners in the struggle against air pollution”).

61

See, e.g., Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. 104-4, 109 Stat. 48 (codified in scattered
sections of 2 U.S.C.) (imposing certain procedural restrictions on the enactment of federal legislation
imposing financial burdens on the states).
62

See, e.g., Executive Order 13132, Federalism, 64 Fed. Reg. 43255 (Aug. 4, 1999) (“Agencies shall
construe . . . a Federal statute to preempt State law only where the statute contains an express preemption
provision or there is some other clear evidence that the Congress intended preemption of State law, or
where the exercise of State authority conflicts with the exercise of Federal authority under the Federal
statute.”).

63

See, e.g., Uruguay Round Agreements Act, 19 U.S.C. § 3512(b)(1)(C) (1997) (establishing a consultation
mechanism where state law is challenged before the World Trade Organization).

64

See, e.g., Environmental Protection Agency, Final Rule, Air Pollution Control; Preemption of State
Regulation for Nonroad Engine and Vehicle Standards, 59 Fed. Reg. 36969, 36974 (July 20, 1994)
(construing the preemptive effect of federal environmental law on state standards).
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governments implement some federal statutes,65 lobby Congress and the Executive on
structural issues,66 and work together on issues of shared concern through interstate
compacts,67 uniform state laws,68 and collective litigation.69 And courts, of course, have
contributed their own web of doctrine. It is important to understand, however, that
judicial doctrine implementing the federal system includes not only such familiar
constitutional issues as the scope of the affirmative and negative Commerce Clause or the
scope of state sovereign immunity, but also the whole corpus of conflict of laws,70 judgemade abstention doctrines,71 and interpretations of foundational statutes like the habeas
corpus statute,72 Section 1983,73 or laws governing the scope of federal jurisdiction.74

65

See, e.g., John P. Dwyer, The Role of State Law in an Era of Federal Preemption: Lessons from
Environmental Regulation, 60 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 203 (1997) (describing the states’ role in
implementing federal environmental laws).
66

See, e.g., National Governors’ Assn., Principles for State-Federal Relations (Feb. 4, 2000) (statement of
proposals
for
reform
on
structural
federalism
issues)
(available
at
http://www.nga.org/nga/legislativeUpdate/1,1169,C_ISSUE_BRIEF^D_3164,00.html) (visited Oct. 12,
2003); Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1557, 1566-67 (2003) (discussing the role
of the National Association of Attorneys General in lobbying for the Prison Litigation Reform Act, which
restricted the powers of federal courts to interfere with the administration of state prison systems).
67

See, e.g., United States Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm’n, 434 U.S. 452 (1978) (upholding compact
among 21 states coordinating taxation of businesses, notwithstanding failure to secure Congressional
consent); see generally 1 TRIBE, supra note 32, § 6-35, at 1238-42 (discussing interstate compacts).

68

See, e.g., Uniform Commercial Code [cite]; Model Business Corporation Act [cite].

69

See, e.g., Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993) (joint antitrust action against various
insurance companies by nineteen state attorneys general); Philip C. Patterson & Jennifer M. Philpott, Note,
In Search of a Smoking Gun: A Comparison of Public Entity Tobacco and Gun Litigation, 66 BROOKLYN
L. REV. 549, 552-55 (2000) (describing state cooperation in litigation against tobacco companies).
70

See, e.g., Philipps Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985) (holding that a forum state may not
constitutionally apply its own law to civil claims with which it has no significant contacts); Douglas
Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and Territorial States: The Constitutional Foundations of Choice of Law,
92 COLUM. L. REV. 249 (1992) (discussing the relation between choice of law rules and the federal
system).
71

See, e.g., Railroad Comm’n of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S.
37 (1971); Colorado River Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976).
72

28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-55. See, e.g., Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (holding that federal courts
generally may not grant habeas relief based on “new rules” that were announced after the petitioner’s state
conviction became final); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977) (restricting federal courts’ ability to
grant habeas relief where the petitioner has procedurally defaulted in state court).
73

42 U.S.C. § 1983 (providing a cause of action for violations of federal law by persons acting “under color
of state law”). See, e.g., Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972) (holding that § 1983 creates an exception
to the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283, which ordinarily bars injunctions against state court
proceedings); Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980) (holding that § 1983 provides a cause of action
against state officials for violations of at least some federal statutes).

74

See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question jurisdiction); Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc. v.
Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, ___ (1986) (holding that federal courts have significant discretion in determining
the scope of § 1331). See generally HENRY M. HART, JR. & HERBERT WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS
st
AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM ___ [preface] (1 ed. 1953) (suggesting that “[f]or every case in which a court
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This web of statute, practice, and doctrine is considerably more complicated than
anything the Founders could have envisioned in 1789. Their initial strategy for dividing
powers through enumeration and reservation gave rise to the regime of “dual federalism,”
predicated on the “maintenance of the independent integrity of federal powers and state
powers through separations of national and state spheres of action.”75 Dual federalism
seemed to promise a fairly straightforward role for courts, which could evaluate the
constitutionality of both state and federal measures simply by asking whether the right
government was acting in the right sphere. For most of the Nineteenth Century, this
chiefly entailed limiting state power under the judge-made doctrine of the negative
commerce power;76 later on, the Court also began to enforce the textual limits of the
Commerce Clause itself as a limit on national power.77 As I discuss further in Part VI,78
policing separate state and federal spheres ultimately turned out to be a highly complex
and ultimately unsustainable task. The important point for present purposes, however, is
that from the beginning courts have used not just the federal constitutional text but a
vision of the structure of the whole as a basis for constitutional federalism doctrine.
3.

Translating Federalism

The courts have always derived doctrine from both the text of the Constitution
and the underlying structure of our federal system, but the need to rely upon the latter
may have increased over time.79 This is not surprising: The critique of written
constitutions has long been that they incapable of foreseeing and adapting the future
circumstances and needs of the polities they constitute.80 Most acknowledge that our
own Constitution has accommodated this difficulty chiefly by being open to adaptation
without formal amendment, through the evolving practices of the political branches and
the incremental doctrinal development of courts.81 As Larry Lessig has explained, this
is asked to invalidate a square assertion of state or federal legislative authority, there are many more in
which the allocation of control does not involve questions of ultimate power”).
75

John Kincaid, From Dual to Coercive Federalism in American Intergovernmental Relations, in
GLOBALIZATION AND DECENTRALIZATION: INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXTS, POLICY ISSUES, AND
INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS IN JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES 29 (Jong S. Jun & Deil S. Wright
eds., 1996).
76

See, e.g., Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419 (1827) (holding that a state could not require a
foreign importer to be licensed by the state prior to selling imported goods).
77

See, e.g., Hammer v. Dagenhart, 246 U.S. 251 (1918) (striking down federal law restricting interstate
shipment of goods made by child labor as an effort to regulate labor conditions internal to a state).
78

See infra Section VI.B.

79

I say “may” because it is not clear that any foreseeable version of the modern Supreme Court would
develop structure-based doctrines to limit federal power that are comparable in aggressiveness to the
negative commerce jurisprudence that developed in the Nineteenth Century and survives to this day. In
other words, the most radical use of doctrine to order the federal relationship has existed without serious
jurisprudential challenge for over a century and a half.

80

See, e.g., Joseph de Maistre, Essay on the Generative Principle of Political Constitutions (1810), in THE
WORKS OF JOSEPH DE MAISTRE 147 (Jack Lively trans., 1971); see also Ernest Young, Rediscovering
Conservatism: Burkean Political Theory and Constitutional Interpretation, 72 N.C. L. REV. 619, 666-68
(1994) [hereinafter Young, Rediscovering Conservatism].
81

[Levinson?]
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adaptive enterprise can – and should – be a means of fidelity to the original document and
structure, rather than a departure from them.82 The “response of fidelity” to changed
circumstances, he argues, “is to articulate these previously understood conventions, and
apply them today to assure that the constitutional structure original[ly] established is, so
far as possible, preserved.”83 This effort – “to translate that original structure into the
context of today” – must at least in part be a judicial effort of “implying limits on the
growth of federal power.”84
Translation involves changed readings of the constitutional text and structure in
response to changes in the context in which the text and structure must operate. With
respect to federalism, three related sets of changes are central. The first involves changes
of fact – for example, the integration of the national economy, the explosion of
communication and transportation among the several states, changes in the Nation’s
external and internal security environment, and the advent of comparatively new
problems, such as environmental pollution, that often seem to defy state-by-state
solutions. These sorts of factual changes have been central to the evolution of federal
power in our system. As Professor Lessig observes, “[t]he scope of the [federal] power
clause is seen to turn upon facts in the world, and as these facts change, the scope of the
power too is seen to change.”85 To focus on just one example, the notion of what counts
as “commerce among the several states” cannot help but change in response to the
nationalization (and globalization) of the economy.
The question is not whether constitutional doctrine should change in response to
these factual changes in the world; it already has. Consider the “dormant Commerce
Clause” doctrine. That doctrine started out with at least some tie to the constitutional
text; it simply read Article I’s grant of power to Congress to regulate interstate commerce
as exclusive, thereby forbidding state regulation of commerce “among the several
States.”86 As the national economy became more integrated, however, it became
increasingly difficult to distinguish between interstate and intrastate commerce. That
made it impossible to enforce a rule that the states could not regulate in ways that
impacted interstate commerce, much as it made it equally difficult to enforce a rule that
Congress could not regulate in-state activities. The dormant commerce doctrine
accordingly morphed into a quite different rule that simply barred the states from
discriminating against out of staters.87

82

See generally Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEXAS L. REV. 1165 (1993) [hereinafter
Lessig, Fidelity]; Lawrence Lessig, Translating Federalism: United States v. Lopez, 1995 SUP. CT. REV.
125 [hereinafter Lessig, Translating Federalism].
83

Id. at 127.

84

Id. at 127, 145.

85

Lessig, Translating Federalism, supra note 82, at 132.

86

See, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 209 (1824).

87

[Cite Lessig] Vestiges of a second rule – that the states may not impose undue burdens on interstate
commerce, even if they are non-discriminatory – may also survive. [cite Pike] But like the antidiscrimination rule, the Pike balancing test bears almost no relation to the constitutional text. In any event,
the balancing test now seems all but abandoned. [cite]
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This rule makes a fair amount of functional sense, and it has a formal quality that
makes it relatively easy for courts to enforce.88 But the doctrine no longer bears any
recognizable relationship to constitutional text. Once one abandons the rule that at least
some Article I powers are simply exclusive, there is no longer any warrant to read the
Commerce Clause as limiting state powers. Certainly the Clause says nothing about
discrimination, and the presence of other constitutional provisions that do – the Privileges
and Immunities and Equal Protection Clauses – suggests that textualist attention is best
directed elsewhere. Better to understand modern dormant Commerce Clause as a
doctrinal construction meant to facilitate the structural needs of the federal system as a
whole.
A similar transition has occurred in “affirmative” Commerce Clause doctrine.
Prior to 1937, the courts focused on whether an act of Congress addressed inter- or
intrastate commerce. Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in Gibbons had insisted that “[t]he
enumeration presupposes something not enumerated; and that something, if we regard the
language or the subject of the sentence, must be the exclusively internal commerce of a
State.”89 Lopez and its progeny, however, focus simply on whether the regulated activity
is “commercial” at all. The Court has said that the effects of such “commercial”
activi ties will be aggregated across the range of similar activity occurring nationwide,
thus virtually guaranteeing a finding that the activity “substantially affects” interstate
commerce.90 This concession to the integrated national market arguably departs from the
text by effectively reading “among the several states” out of Article I. The new doctrine
thus represents a doctrinal compromise meant to balance the system’s need for some line
of demarcation between Congress’s broadest power and the States’ reserved authority
with the recognition that the old line – the textual line – simply didn’t prove coherent or
workable in actual application. Current doctrine nods to the text by carrying over the
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[consider critiques of DCC]

89

22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 195. See also [cites]

90

The classic “aggregation” case is Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, ___ (1942), which held that
Congress could regulate even the wheat crop of a single farmer on a substantial effects theory, because the
aggregate effects of the activities of all similarly-situated farmers would affect the national economy. But
Lopez made clear that the underlying activity must be commercial in nature to support this move:
Even Wickard, which is perhaps the most far reaching example of Commerce Clause authority
over intrastate activity, involved economic activity in a way that the possession of a gun in a
school zone does not. . . . Section 922(q) is a criminal statute that by its terms has nothing to do
with “commerce” or any sort of economic enterprise, however broadly one might define those
terms. n3 Section 922(q) is not an essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity, in
which the regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activity were regulated. It
cannot, therefore, be sustained under our cases upholding regulations of activities that arise out of
or are connected with a commercial transaction, which viewed in the aggregate, substantially
affects interstate commerce.
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560-61.
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insistence that regulated activity be “commercial,” but Lopez’s looser standard amounts
to “fidelity” only in the adaptive sense that Professor Lessig has described.91
As the examples just discussed suggest, changes in the factual context of
federalism have been accompanied by changes amounting to failure of the original
enforcement strategies. I have already described how the Constitution’s original strategy
for allocating and balancing federal and state powers relied on enumeration of federal
powers and reservation of the remainder to the States. “Dual federalism” was the most
natural form for this strategy to take, and it counted heavily on the feasibility of drawing
a sharp line between exclusive spheres of state and federal authority. That line-drawing
effort ultimately failed, both because of changes in the factual world – the increasing
integration of the economy, which blurred lines between inter- and intra-state commerce
– and because the Founders may simply have underestimated the indeterminacy of
Article I’s enumerative language and the doctrinal rules that courts developed to
implement it. I doubt whether the factual change can wholly account for the failure; after
all, it seems likely that the economy was sufficiently integrated to link inter- and intrastate markets (e.g., the price of wheat in New Jersey and the price of bread in New York)
even in the Founders’ day. Rather, I suspect that the failure was in substantial part a
failure of doctrine – the failure of courts to develop doctrinal tests that could command
widespread acceptance and support for separating state and federal power.92
Whatever the cause, the failure of the original enforcement strategy requires either
that we accept a basic alteration in the character of our federal system or that new
doctrines be constructed to preserve the original norm of balance. In reality, the choice is
probably between a stark version of the former and some combination of the two. No
doctrinal proposal on the table today would come close to restoring the particular balance
struck in 1789; an expanded federal role is simply a fact of modern life.93 By balance,
then, I mean simply that some meaningful measure of state autonomy is constitutionally
guaranteed. Fidelity to even this more modest objective, however, will require some
measure of doctrinal innovation in lieu of a strong doctrine of enumerated powers. That
is not to say that a reconstructed enumerated powers doctrine – one that does not depend
on defining mutually-exclusive state and federal spheres – cannot play some role.94 But
that sort of constraint seems likely to be relatively weak. If that is correct, then
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[cite] More rigorous fidelity to the text would no doubt look much like Justice Thomas’s concurrence in
Lopez, which recommended uprooting a much broader swath of jurisprudence and returning to a far
narrower view of federal power. [cites]
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See infra TAN ___ (discussing the “Frankfurter constraint”). Whether we should even call this a
“failure” is itself a question. After all, dual federalism endured for over a hundred years. It may be a
mistake to expect greater permanence from any doctrinal construct. Nor was the failure necessarily
unanticipated by at least some of the Founders. See RAKOVE, supra note 51, at 176-77; see also infra TAN
___ (discussing Madison’s misgivings about the enumerated powers strategy).

93

[Thomas acknowledgment of precedent in Lopez]

94

See, e.g., [Kramer, Understanding Federalism]; Ernest A. Young, Dual Federalism, Concurrent
Jurisdiction, and the Foreign Affairs Exception, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 139, 157-61 (2001) [hereinafter
Young, Dual Federalism
]. (arguing that post -Lopez commerce jurisprudence plays a useful role without
returning to the assumptions of dual federalism).
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“translation” of the federal balance will likely require doctrinal innovation that is less
directly grounded in constitutional text.
A third aspect of change in the Constitution’s institutional context has to do with
the maturation of the system itself. By “maturation,” I mean the tendency of successful
constitutional systems to outlive the immediate set of problems that gave rise to them.
Structural provisions are often drafted against a historical and institutional background in
which particular problems loom large. Gordon Wood has recounted, for example, how
the first wave of state constitutions after Independence were designed to compensate for
the experience of unchecked executive authority under George III and his royal
governors.95 By 1787, however, the powerful state legislatures that those initial
constitutions created had themselves come to be perceived as a threat to liberty – a threat
with which the original documents, with their focus on cabining executive power, were
ill-equipped to deal.96 This sort of change presents two obvious alternative responses:
The constitution can be amended again, reorienting its structural provisions against the
new threat, or the constitution’s current interpreters can work to adapt the structure more
incrementally. The latter option would include not only doctrinal innovation by courts
but also subconstitutional changes to statutory law or institutional practice by the political
branches.
Our own national constitution has moved in a number of ways beyond the original
set of problems that inspired the Philadelphia drafters, and these changes have important
implications for federalism. With good reason, the Founders perceived the central
problem in moving from the Articles of Confederation to the Constitution as one of reestablishing and strengthening the central government.97 James Madison insisted, for
example, “that the balance is much more likely to be disturbed by the preponderancy of
the [State Governments] than of the [federal Government].”98 The original document
thus includes a ringing statement of national supremacy in Article VI; the considerably
more ambiguous affirmation of state sovereignty in the Tenth Amendment comes in as a
response to post-Philadelphia criticism. And judicial review of federalism issues was
initially conceived99 – and implemented by the Marshall Court100 – primarily as a tool for
reining in centrifugal impulses in the States.101 As late as the early Twentieth Century,
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[cite Gordon Wood]
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Id. at ___.

97

[cites] I discuss this point further infra in Section ___.

98

Federalist No. 45, supra note ___, at 310 [Cooke].

99

See, e.g., RAKOVE, supra note 51, at 81-82 (recounting that judicial review was endorsed early on at
Philadelphia as an alternative to Madison’s proposal for a general congressional negative on state laws);
[others].

100

The Marshall Court struck down only one federal statute – the minor provision of the 1789 Judiciary Act
at issue in Marbury v. Madison. On the other side of the ledger, it invalidated ___ state laws.

101

See generally [Kramer, Politics].
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Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes could contemplate dispensing with judicial review of
Acts of Congress while insisting on the need to check state legislation.102
The pendulum of federalism has swung far indeed since then. The Federal
Government is here to stay, and its supremacy over the States is largely unquestioned.
This is not to say that centrifugal forces have disappeared. The Supreme Court still sees
a need to rein in state protectionism under the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine,103 and
it has increasingly asserted authority to close off state forays into foreign affairs.104 The
system has “matured,” however, in the sense that threats to the federal balance are at least
as likely to come from the national direction. These threats take any number of forms,
including federal forays into traditional fields of state regulation like education105 or local
telephone service,106 congressional imposition of unfunded mandates107 and the
increasing dependence of state governments on federal funding grants,108 the
federalization of crime,109 and federal efforts to quash state positions on social and moral
issues that differ from the national majority view.110 The extent to which any of these
developments is a bad thing is, not surprisingly, both contestable and contested; what
seems clear, however, is that centralizing pressures are considerably stronger now than
they were in the early Republic.
The constitutional structure was created with a second problem in mind alongside
the weakness of the central authority. That problem was the “tyranny of the majority,”
102

See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 295-96 (Harcourt 1920) (“I do not think the
United States would come to an end if we lost our power to declare an Act of Congress void. I do think the
Union would be imperiled if we could not make that declaration as to the laws of the several States.”).
103

[Camps Newfound; Fulton v. Faulkner]

104

See American Ins. Assn. v. Garamendi, 123 S. Ct. 2374 (2003) (invalidating California’s Holocaust
Vic tim Insurance Relief Act on the ground it interfered with national foreign policy); Crosby v. Nat’l
Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000) (finding Massachusetts’ program disadvantaging would-be
state contractors that did business in Burma to be impliedly preempted by federal legislation); see generally
Young, Dual Federalism, supra note 94, at 177-85 (arguing that Crosby was overly aggressive in
squelching state policy bearing on foreign affairs).
105

[No Child Left Behind Act]; Kate Zernike, Attacks on Education Law Leave Democrats in a Bind,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2004, at ___ (reporting Democratic presidential candidates’ criticism of the Act, in
part on grounds that it usurps local control of education); Political Battle Surges over Bush Education
Policy, CNN.com, Jan. 8, 2004 (reporting criticisms that federal law imposes mandates without adequate
funding)
(available
at
http://www.cnn.com/2004/ALLPOLITICS/01/08/elec.04.prez.bush.education/index.html) (last visited Jan.
11, 2004).
106

[Breyer dissent in Iowa Utilities Bd.]
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[cite on problem of mandates] The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act, [cite], was supposed to alleviate
this problem, but the Act simply imposes a fairly loose procedural constraint on such mandates. [cite
Harvard Law Rev recent legislation piece]. Since UMRA’s enactment, at least ___ additional mandates
have been enacted. [cite] One of the most important is the No Child Left Behind Act, see supra note 105.
108

[cites]

109

[cites]

110

[medical mariujuana in CA (Kozinski concurrence); right to die in OR (Alex Kaplan note); gay
marriage in VT]
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which plays a central role in the Founders’ analysis of the problem of faction. In
Federalist 10, for example, Madison rather blithely states that “[i]f a faction consists of
less than a majority, relief is supplied by the republican principle, which enables the
majority to defeat its sinister views by regular vote”; the difficult problem arises “[w]hen
a majority is included in a faction.”111 This focus on majority tyranny colors some of the
Founders’ most important views on federalism; in particular, it gives rise to their
assumption that the national government will be less vulnerable to faction than the
governments of the several states.112
Here, too, the passage of time requires us to expand the universe of potential
threats to the integrity of the system. Certainly there are areas and issues concerning
which Madison’s analysis still seems to hold true, and the national government may
enjoy significant advantages over state governments in protecting local minorities from
local majorities.113 But as the scope, institutions, and responsibilities of government at all
levels has expanded over time, more recent political science has also produced a strong
counter-current critical of Madison’s “failure to appreciate the disproportionate influence
that can be wielded on a national level by certain groups that may be relatively small in
numbers but that are cohesive and can avoid the problem of too many free riders.”114
This literature suggests that “the diffusion of power among a multiplicity of governments
may increase the difficulties such groups experience in realizing their objectives.”115 Our
contemporary structure must thus guard against two kinds of factions – majorities and
cohesive minorities – and Madison’s assumption of national superiority at combating
faction can no longer be taken for granted.116
The third and possibly most basic way in which our institutions have “matured”
involves a transformation in the range of functions and responsibilities ascribed to
government. The Founders seem to have presupposed a rather minimalist vision of
government responsibilities. This vision enabled them to rest much of the vertical and
horizontal separation of powers on institutional mechanisms that also tended to hamstring
111

Federalist No. 10, supra note ___, at 60 [Cooke].

112

See, e.g., id. at 64 (“Extend the sphere, and you take in a greater variety of parties and interests; you
make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other
citizens; or if such a common motive exists, it will be more difficult for all who feel it to discover their own
strength, and to act in unison with each other.”) (emphasis added); id. (asserting that “the same advantage,
which a Republic has over a Democracy, in controlling the effects of faction, is enjoyed by a large over a
small Republic – is enjoyed by the Union over the States composing it”).
113

See, e.g., DAVID L. SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE 45 (1995); [others]
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SHAPIRO, supra note 113, at 79; see also [others].
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SHAPIRO, supra note 113, at 80; see also [others].
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Madison’s argument has also been undermined by the maturation of the States themselves into large
political communities by the standards of Madison’s day. The total United States population in 1790 was
around 3.9 million. See TIME ALMANAC 2003, at 120. In 2000, the State of California alone boasted 33.8
million inhabitants. Id. The United States in 1790 had slightly more people than the State of Oregon (the
28th most populous state) today. Id. The largest state in 1790 – Madison’s own Virginia, with
approximately three-quarters of a million people – was about the size of the city of San Francisco or
Indianapolis today. See 2000 Census: US Municipalities Over 50,000: Ranked by 2000 (available at
http://www.demographia.com/db-uscity98.htm) (visited Oct. 12, 2003).
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governmental action. The division of the legislature through bicameralism, for example,
as well as the provision for Presidential veto, makes federal statutes hard to enact. Brad
Clark and others have demonstrated that the proliferation of “veto gates” throughout our
national lawmaking institutions – that is, mechanisms that allow particular actors to derail
or delay national action – is central not only to the separation of powers but also to
federalism.117 A national government that can act only with difficulty, after all, will tend
to leave considerable scope for state autonomy.118
Over time, however, the People have demanded that government take on a wider
and more activist role, and the constitutional separation of powers has come under
pressure as a result. In particular, the nondelegation doctrine has slipped from being a
potentially important constitutional rule assigning lawmaking authority outside the
constitutionally-prescribed process to a less pervasive canon of construction limiting
delegations that implicate particular constitutional values.119 It is now fair to say that
most federal law is made not through the cumbersome method prescribed by Article I but
through administrative procedures in executive agencies.120 The effect of this shift – and
the resulting vast expansion in federal lawmaking capacity and output – on federalism
has only recently become a subject of study.121 It is true that state governments have also
become far more activist governments than their early Republic counterparts.122
Nonetheless, it would be surprising if the small-government mechanisms that the
Founders assumed would protect state autonomy work as well in a big-government age.
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See Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1321,
1341-42 (2001) [hereinafter Clark, Separation of Powers]; see also [others?].
118

See Clark, Separation of Powers, supra note 117, at 1325 (“[E]ven when national power is quite
unquestioned in a given situation, constitutionally prescribed lawmaking procedures frequently operate to
screen out attempts by the federal government to exercise such authority. The states are the direct
beneficiaries of this screening mechanism because the federal government's inability to adopt ‘the supreme
Law of the Land’ leaves states free to govern.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Young, Two Cheers,
supra note ___, at 1361-64 (making a similar argument).
119

See Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 316 (2000) (“Federal courts
commonly vindicate not a general nondelegation doctrine, but a series of more specific and smaller, though
quite important, nondelegation doctrines. Rather than invalidating federal legislation as excessively openended, courts hold that federal administrative agencies may not engage in certain activities unless and until
Congress has expressly authorized them to do so.”). Professor Sunstein appears to view these canons as
more pervasive and effective limits on the federal regulatory state than I do, but that disagreement is a
subject for another article. We share the view that the delegation doctrine has not disappeared but has
changed in form.
120

See, e.g., INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 985-86 (1983) (White, J., dissenting) (“For some time, the sheer
amount of law -- the substantive rules that regulate private conduct and direct the operation of government - made by the agencies has far outnumbered the lawmaking engaged in by Congress through the traditional
process.”); FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 487 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (“The rise of
administrative bodies probably has been the most significant legal trend of the last century. . . . They have
become a veritable fourth branch of the Government, which has deranged our three-branch legal theories . .
. .”).
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See, e.g., Clark, Separation of Powers, supra note 117; [others].

122

See Stephen Gardbaum, New Deal Constitutionalism and the Unshackling of the States, 64 U. CHI. L.
REV. 483, ___ (1997) [hereinafter Gardbaum, New Deal].
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These sorts of changes, like the others I have discussed, require corresponding
changes in federalism doctrine if the original commitment to balance is to survive.
Indeed, one can understand a number of important doctrinal innovations as responsive to
the maturing of our institutions. For example, the Federal Constitution’s Bill of Rights
has evolved, through constitutional amendment and judicial interpretation, from a set of
provisions narrowly directed at the national government to a charter of basic guarantees
comprehensively directed at all American governments.123 Although this shift brought a
number of important changes, one was an expansion of the sort of federalism concerns
that courts must enforce. The potential of individual rights decisions to restrict the
autonomy of state governments is well understood.124 Prior to incorporation, this was not
a concern of the federal courts. While state courts might restrict the autonomy of state
governments by broadly construing individual rights provisions of their own state
constitutions, this raised no issue of federalism; these restrictions were imposed by the
states on themselves. The autonomy of state political systems in rights situations was
guaranteed by the federal structure itself, which simply did not apply federal rights
provisions to state governments. There was no need for judicially- created federalism
doctrines to add to that safeguard.
After incorporation, however, state policies (including, perhaps most importantly,
state criminal convictions) became subject to override by federal rights provisions. It is
now commonplace to think of a case like Lawrence v. Texas,125 which recognized a right
to engage in gay sex under the Due Process Clause, as raising significant issues of
federalism: In effect, Lawrence nationalized a core issue of gay rights by articulating a
federal right binding on the States.126 While the Supreme Court tended to reject
federalism-based opposition to the notion of incorporation per se,127 it responded to the
threat to state autonomy by crafting a number of doctrines that protected state autonomy
in other ways. In particular, it created a number of remedial doctrines, including the
abstention doctrines128 and judge-made limits on federal habeas corpus relief,129 which
limit the practical impact of federal rights on state autonomy.130 Incorporation brought
123

See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, ___ (1968) (noting that nearly all the provisions of the Bill
of Rights have now been incorporated into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment so as to
bind the States).
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[cites]; see also Baker & Young, supra note 10, at 157-59 (discussing how the Supreme Court’s
recognition of a broad right of association in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000),
constrained state autonomy to regulate discrimination).
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[cite]

126

Whether the Court will take the further step of nationalizing the related – but far more controversial –
question of gay marriage remains to be seen.
127

[cite Harlan dissents]
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[cites]

129

[cites]
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I do not claim that these doctrines were exclusively a response to incorporation. Some, such as Pullman
abstention, originated in response to claims under provisions like the Equal Protection Clause that had
always applied to the States. [cite] I do think, however, that incorporation gave substantial impetus to
these sorts of doctrines by proliferating the federal rights with potential to undermine state autonomy.
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the Federal Constitution close to being a complete charter of rights, with the consequence
that federalism safeguards against over-expansive interpretations of rights had to be
created within federal constitutional law.
Likewise, the fading of the doctrine of enumerated powers has brought the
Constitution much closer to describing a comprehensive government. In such a
comprehensive system, state autonomy cannot adequately be protected simply by relying
on the jurisdictional limitations of federal institutions. Instead, limits on federal power
must be developed within the purview of the federal constitution itself – despite the fact
that that constitution could not have originally been intended as a complete description of
the federal relationship. The Rehnquist Court has been struggling with this doctrinal task
since 1991, when it stepped back from the brink of total judicial abdication in Gregory v.
Ashcroft.131 Justifying that effort and suggesting how it ought to proceed is the principle
burden of this essay.
The notion that courts should formulate doctrinal constraints on federal power in
order to “translate” the Founders’ notion of a federal balance into modern circumstances
seems more controversial than many other contemporary instances of translation.132 The
controversy derives from a variety of sources, including the painful history of the Court’s
effort to impose similar limits prior to 1937133 and the perception of many current legal
academics, who came of age in the 1960s, that state governments are a retrograde force in
American society.134 The depth of this opposition requires careful consideration of the
appropriate role of courts in translating the federal balance. Section B of this Part
addresses this issue as a matter of institutional choice, comparing the suitability of the
judiciary to decide federalism questions with that of other institutions. Concluding that at
least some judicial role is warranted, I take up in Section C the question of interpretive
choice. That section sketches an approach to choosing federalism doctrines that I then
flesh out in the balance of the essay.
Throughout the course of the discussion that follows, however, it is important to
remember that “translating federalism” is not a proposal in a law review article – it is an
activity in which courts have been engaged, with varying degrees of success, since the
founding of the Republic. The relevant questions are whether they have done it
adequately, and what criteria they might employ to do it better.
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510 U.S. 452 (1991) (imposing a clear statement rule of statutory construction to limit Congress’s ability
to regulate state institutions). The Court had flirted with such abdication in Garcia v. San Antonio Metro.
Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 549 (1995).
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See, e.g., Lessig, Translating Federalism, supra note 82, at 132-35 (describing the evolution of Fourth
Amendment doctrine to cope with technological changes that threatened individual privacy).
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See, e.g., [Souter dissent in Lopez comparing majority opinion to Lochner]
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See, e.g., Seth Kreimer, Federalism and Freedom, 574 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 66, 67
(2001) (“In my formative years as a lawyer and legal scholar, during the late 1960s and 1970s, [federalism]
was regularly invoked as a bulwark against federal efforts to prevent racial oppression, political
persecution, and police misconduct.”); but see Baker & Young, supra note 10, at 133-62 (arguing that the
equation of federalism with a particular political orientation is a fundamental mistake).
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B.

Institutional Choice

A discussion of federalism doctrine necessarily assumes that courts should have a
role in federalism disputes. For some, the very notion of “federalism” presupposes a
judicial umpire to settle controversies between the center and the periphery. One oftquoted European formulation, for example, holds that “[f]ederalism is present whenever a
divided sovereign is guaranteed by a national or supranational constitution and umpired
by the supreme court of the common legal order.”135 But the proper role of courts in
disputes over allocation of authority in our own federal system has been deeply
controversial.136 Prominent commentators – and some Supreme Court justices – have
argued that courts should not “intervene” in federalism disputes; rather, those
controversies should be left entirely to politics.137 The participation of courts in
federalism disputes, and thus the relevance of judicial doctrine to such disputes, cannot
be taken for granted.
The question is, at bottom, one of institutional choice. Federalism posits a goal –
balancing national and state authority – but, as Neil Komesar has insisted, we must still
ask which institutions are best positioned to pursue that goal.138 This analysis, moreover,
135

Koen Lenaerts, Constitutionalism and the Many Faces of Federalism, 38 AM. J. COMP. L. 205, 263
(1990). See also Martin Shapiro, The European Court of Justice, in THE EVOLUTION OF EU LAW 321
(Paul Craig & Gráinne de Búrca eds., 1999) (observing that most divided power systems envision a
boun
d ary-policing role for courts); PAUL JACKSON & PATRICIA LEOPOLD, O. HOOD PHILLIPS AND
JACKSON: CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 7 (8th ed. 2001) (British textbook, observing that
judicial power to invalidate legislation “is comparatively rare . . . except in federal states . . . where some
check is necessary to preserve the rights of the federation and its component members”).
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Compare, e.g., Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism,
100 COLUM. L. REV. 215 (2000) (arguing for little or no judicial role), with Lynn A. Baker, Putting the
Safeguards Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 46 VILL. L. REV. 951 (2001) (responding to
Kramer); Marci A. Hamilton, Why Federalism Must Be Enforced: A Response to Professor Kramer, 46
VILL. L. REV. 1069 (2001) (same).
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See, e.g., JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS: A FUNCTIONAL
RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT ___ (1980); [Blackmun in Garcia; Souter in
Morrison]. Putting the question this way – and it usually is put this way, see, e.g., William Marshall,
American Political Culture and the Failures of Process Federalism, 22 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 139, 153
(1998) (describing the core debate as one over “judicial intervention to enforce federalism”) – is itself
somewhat misleading. Consider a case like United States v. Lopez, involving the constitutionality of the
federal Gun Free School Zones Act as an exercise of the Commerce Power. Refusing to “intervene” in that
dispute would have meant declaring Mr. Lopez’s defense to his criminal prosecution – that the law he was
charged with violating exceeded Congress’s power – nonjusticiable. While some commentators have
suggested that courts should do exactly that in federalism disputes, see [Choper]; it is not what the Federal
Government or the dissenters urged; rather, they asked the Court to validate the federal statute. The
question in most cases is thus not whether the courts will intervene – a decision on the merits either way
constitutes a (usually decisive) intervention – but rather whether the courts will second-guess the judgment
of the federal political branches that the action they have taken is valid and/or supersedes state policy.
As I discuss further in Part ___, I think the justices who are often read as urging courts to stay out of
federalism disputes are really making a much narrower argument.
138
See generally NEIL H. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW,
ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 5 (1994) (“Goal choice and institutional choice are both essential for law
and public policy. They are inextricably related.”).
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must be comparative in nature. It is not enough to say that this or that institution is wellor ill-suited to handle a certain set of questions. Instead, the likely performance of each
institution must be compared with that of the alternatives. “Issues at which an institution,
in the abstract, may be good may not need that institution because one of the alternative
institutions may be even better. In turn, tasks that strain the abilities of an institution may
wisely be assigned to it anyway if the alternatives are even worse.”139
Comparative institutional analysis is relevant to federalism questions in at least
two ways. There are what we might call “first order” questions that involve allocating
decisionmaking authority between federal and state institutions. For example, should we
entrust the states with primary responsibility to resolve the issues of physician-assisted
suicide or gay marriage, or should those questions be resolved at the federal level? Then
there are the “second order” questions, which involve choosing institutions to decide the
first order questions. In other words, should the allocation of authority over physicianassisted suicide or gay marriage be settled by Congress, the Executive, or a court
deciding the matter as a question of constitutional law? The first order questions are
important and interesting, but my concern here is with the second order issue: Which
institution should draw and police the boundary between state and federal authority?
This turns out to be a very complex question. I want to make two points about it
in this section. The first is that once we start thinking about the factors involved in
comparative institutional analysis, the “question” turns out be incredibly multifarious. It
seems highly unlikely that all the various incarnations of the boundary-drawing question
will have the same answer, or that the answer to many of them will involve a categorical
choice of one institution over all the others. The second point is that comparative
institutional analysis functions most comfortably at the level of institutional design.
Once we shift to the perspective of participants within the legal system as it is presently
constituted, opportunities to shift decisionmaking authority altogether in response to
comparative institutional analysis narrow considerably. Institutional analysis is more
likely to influence how decisions are made by the institutions involved; for courts, this
means that institutional analysis may be most important in shaping doctrine rather than in
determining whether courts may decide federalism issues at all.
1.

One Issue, Many Questions

The debate in the federalism literature – and in judicial opinions in federalism
cases – is whether courts should decide federalism issues. The same arguments are
routinely imported from one doctrinal context to another. For example, Herbert
Wechsler’s notion that the political process generally protects federalism better than
courts140 was transformed by Justice Blackmun into an argument for judicial abdication
in the Garcia case,141 which involved judge-made restraints on Congressional action that
admittedly fell within the commerce power. Then Justice Stevens invoked it in Kimel, a
case about state sovereign immunity from suits by private litigants.142 Finally, Justice
139
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Souter took up the same notion in Morrison, a case about whether courts should enforce
the limits of the commerce power itself.143 We frequently treat the who-should-draw-theboundary issue, in other words, as a unitary question.
That strikes me as a mistake. Thinking about the question from the perspective of
comparative institutional analysis can help us start to see why. This perspective typically
considers such factors as the distribution of stakes that various actors have in an issue, the
costs of information about the issue, the costs of participating in the alternative
institutions, and the expertise and scale of those institutions.144 But surely these factors
will vary considerably depending on the particular aspect of federalism under discussion.
The costs of information about issues of basic legislative power, such as the scope of the
Commerce Clause, may be quite different from the costs of understanding the ins and
outs of the relationships between state and federal courts. Likewise, the likelihood that
state institutional actors will intervene to protect their own structural interests may be
considerably greater when we are talking about suits by private actors than limits on
Congress’s spending power. The point is simply that if we run the comparative
institutional analysis on each of the various federalism questions currently in dispute, we
have little reason to think that the results will point uniformly in one direction.
A second problem is that issues of federalism generally arise in the context of a
particular policy that either the federal or a state government seeks to implement.
Congress, for example, may wish to ban possession of a gun within 1000 feet of a school,
thereby raising an issue whether such legislation falls within the scope of the Commerce
Clause.145 The participation of and positions taken by various actors are likely to be
driven at least as much by the particular policy at stake (How do you feel about gun
control?) as by the issue of allocating authority between the Nation and the States. Even
a casual observer of recent debates about federalism in Congress will recall instances in
which one political party or the other has championed state autonomy depending on its
views on the underlying policy issue. Republicans – the supposed party of state
autonomy – have pressed for national uniformity on physician-assisted suicide and
partial-birth abortions;146 Democrats have rediscovered the virtues of state autonomy on
tort reform and regulation of Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs).147
A really sound comparative institutional analysis would have to assess the various
key factors in terms of both the federalism issue and the underlying policy issue. That
would likely be awfully hard to do, and the results would not be broadly applicable to all
cases of the same federalism question. After all, the dynamics of institutional
participation on the basic federalism question (Who decides how broad the Commerce
Clause is?) might be quite different in a context involving a different underlying policy
issue. All of the factors crucial to comparative institutional analysis – the distribution of
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stakes, the costs of information, etc. – are likely to vary depending on whether the
question is Congress’s authority to legislate on, for instance, tort reform, abortion, or
physician-assisted suicide.
There may well be an important place for comparative institutional analysis of
federalism questions, but it will have to be done retail rather than wholesale. That
suggests that categorical polar positions on judicial review – courts should always have
the final say on federalism issues, or courts should stay away from such questions
entirely – are misguided, at least from the pragmatic perspective of institutional analysis.
My argument here would not answer the quite different claim that the Constitution itself
mandates a categorical institutional choice.148
But to the extent that functional
considerations guide the choice of institutions, a categorical choice of either judicial or
political channels for resolution of federalism disputes seems out of place.
2.

The Obligation to Decide

As Neil Komesar has observed, institutional choice “is about deciding who
decides.”149 Institutional analysts generally seem to assume that the institutions being
compared – say, courts and legislatures – are equally free to decide or not to decide the
issue in question. Critics of a judicial role on federalism questions often seem to make
the same assumption that courts are free not to decide when such questions are put to
them. But the issue of when a court may decide not to decide an issue presented to it is
itself a complicated, doctrine-intensive question, and I argue that this question severely
limits the ability of courts to forego decision simply because another institution might
have comparative advantages relevant to the issue. This does not make institutional
choice considerations irrelevant to courts; rather, those considerations are chiefly relevant
to the types of doctrines that courts should employ in particular kinds of cases, which will
in turn control the extent of judicial involvement with particular sorts of issues.
Practitioners of institutional choice must distinguish between two perspectives:
the perspective of institutional design, and the perspective of participants in the system
that exists. Institutional analyses seem generally to proceed from the former perspective;
they ask, If we were setting up a system to resolve a particular kind of issue, what sort of
institutions would we choose?150 My primary interest here, by contrast, is in what real
courts should do when confronted with real federalism cases. Comparative institutional
analysis thus ought to inform their choice among the options that the legal system
provides but cannot supply a basis for radical alterations in the system itself.
The most obvious instance of institutional design occurs in the drafting or
amendment of the Constitution. But other opportunities exist outside the confines of
explicit constitutional change. If Congress is convinced that federal courts are not wellsuited to decide particular federalism questions, for example, it may be able to restrict
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their jurisdiction over such questions.151 Likewise, courts have some occasion to make
design decisions by defining the contours of the political question doctrine, which might
take certain federalism issues out of the judicial purview altogether.152 Neither of these
approaches, however, has played a major role with respect to federalism. Congress did
strip the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction to decide a case involving the constitutionality of
Reconstruction – certainly a federalism issue of the first magnitude.153 But since that
time there has been no significant effort to confine the Court’s jurisdiction over
federalism questions.154
Nor has the political question doctrine played a significant role in federalism
disputes, at least since the Court declared a Guaranty Clause claim non-justiciable in
1849.155 Prior to Baker v. Carr,156 the Court might have chosen to make the political
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The issue of constitutional limitations on Congress’s power to restrict federal jurisdiction is one of the
most famously murky issues in constitutional law. See, e.g., Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to
Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362 (1953);
Lawrence G. Sager, Foreword: Constitutional Limitations on Congress’ Authority to Regulate the
Jurisdiction of the federal Courts, 95 HARV. L. REV. 17 (1981). The most important practical limit is that
wherever Congress seeks to use federal courts to enforce federal law, see, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514
U.S. 549 (1995) (federal criminal prosecution in federal court), the federal courts necessarily will have the
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question doctrine into a general vehicle for comparative institutional analysis. But Baker
began a process of transforming a general prudential inquiry into a basically rule-bound,
narrow exception to a general principle of judicial review.157 The Court’s most recent
pronouncement, in Nixon v. United States,158 makes clear that non-justiciability turns on
two of the factors identified in Baker: a textual commitment of the issue in question to
the political branches, and a lack of judicially manageable standards for deciding the
issue.159 Neither of these factors fit comfortably with the notion that courts may decline
to decide federalism issues if, based on a comparative institutional analysis, they find
some other institution better suited to the task. The first factor – textual commitment –
obviously substitutes a text-based inquiry for institutional analysis.160 The second –
judicially manageable standards – does seem more consonant with an inquiry into judicial
competence.161 It is, however, single-institutional in that so long as courts have
manageable standards to decide, we do not ask whether some other institution could
decide even better. More important, it makes institutional analysis subservient to
doctrine; only if doctrinal tools are wholly lacking can a court choose some other
institution to decide.162
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369 U.S. 186 (1962) (holding that equal protection claims for equal apportionment of state legislative
districts are justiciable).
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I am unaware of any serious argument that the text of the Constitution commits
federalism issues generally to Congress, and few even seem to argue more narrowly that
particular federalism questions can meet the high standard for non-justiciability set out in
Baker and Nixon.163 Jesse Choper has called for courts to hold federalism issues nonjusticiable, but he relies on a prudential notion of non-justiciability that has little
connection to the political question doctrine in its present form.164 The problem with that
proposal, however, is that the political question doctrine exhausts the set of circumstances
in which federal courts may refuse to decide a constitutional issue based on the
characteristics of the issue itself. Courts may decline decision on grounds of standing or
ripeness or abstention, for example, but these principles turn on the characteristics of the
parties, the timing of the claim, or the equitable nature of the relief requested.165 There is
no general “out” for courts on the ground that some other institution may do a better
job.166
From the perspective of institutional design, of course, we might choose to have a
broader political question doctrine.167 At the level of ordinary practice, however, courts
will generally be bound by John Marshall’s insistence that “[w]e have no more right to
decline the exercise of a jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given.
The one or the other would be treason to the Constitution.”168 That is emphatically not to
say, however, that comparative institutional questions are irrelevant to issues of
federalism. Rather, they remain highly relevant – even central – to the decisions that
particular institutions make as to how to handle these issues. Institutions frequently
decide, after all, to defer to other institutions in the decision of particular questions.

unmanageable. It seems likely that textual commitment is a necessary – although probably not sufficient –
condition for nonjusticiability under current law.
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Congress, for example, ordinarily has the power to draw some boundaries between state
and federal authority by deciding when to preempt state law. It may decide, however,
that an executive agency could perform this task better in certain circumstances and
delegate its preemptive power to the agency.169 Likewise, courts may adopt highly
deferential federalism doctrine based on the comparative institutional judgment that the
boundary between state and national authority ought ordinarily to be drawn by the
political process.
The argument that courts should not enforce federalism principles has generally
been part and parcel of the “double standard” in constitutional law that grew up after the
Supreme Court’s “switch in time” in 1937.170 Just as the courts have generally been
unwilling to enforce notions of economic substantive due process after 1937, so too they
have been reluctant to enforce principles of federalism, such as limits on the national
commerce power.171 This notion of a “double standard” has been criticized in general172
and with particular regard to federalism.173 The important point for present purposes,
however, is that the double standard has not generally taken the form of a categorical rule
that courts may not decide economic substantive due process or federalism cases.174
Rather, the courts have simply fashioned doctrines on the merits that defer in most cases
to judgments by political actors.
We might term these sorts of decisions “second order” institutional choices
because the delegations in question are subject to recall by the delegating institution;
Congress, for example, can always reassume its control over preemption decisions
169
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notwithstanding its prior delegation to an executive agency. That, however, hardly
makes these choices unimportant. The balance of this essay is concerned with the sorts
of doctrine that courts should employ when called upon to draw lines between state and
federal authority. The institutional capacities of courts and other actors in the system are
critical to that issue. Institutional choice thus folds into the interpretive choices required
in making federalism doctrine.
C.

Interpretive Choice

If we can establish that courts must play at least some role in the enforcement of
federalism, then how do courts choose doctrine to fulfill that role? The problem is one of
interpretive choice, and I explore it in the remainder of this essay. This Section simply
introduces the problem and proposes some criteria which are then defended in succeeding
pages.
Adrian Vermeule has explained that interpretive choice typically involves “the
selection of one interpretive doctrine, from a group of candidate doctrines, in the service
of a goal specified by a higher-level theory of interpretation.”175 For present purposes,
however, that description must be qualified in three ways. First, choosing federalism
doctrine does not truly involve “a choice among possible means to attain stipulated
ends.”176 We may agree on a very general end – preservation of some notion of balance
between national and state authority – and yet have very different notions of what
elements of that balance are actually important. Part II distinguishes between state
“sovereignty,” defined as the unaccountability of state governmental institutions to
federal actors and to their citizens, and state “autonomy,” by which I mean the state
government’s right to make certain decisions and perform certain functions for its
citizens. These concepts overlap to some extent but differ widely in emphasis, and the
choice of which sort of federalism “end” to pursue has important implications for
doctrine. I argue in Part III that we ought to consider state autonomy more important, but
the primary point for present purposes is that the ends of federalism doctrine are
contested.
The second qualification is that we are not choosing “one interpretive doctrine”
for federalism questions. As I have already discussed, issues of federalism arise in a vast
array of different contexts, and it would be highly surprising if one interpretive doctrine
could address them all. My aim is rather to propose a set of more general doctrinal
strategies to help guide the development of doctrine in particular contexts. Part VII
provides some examples of the sorts of doctrines that these strategies would favor, but it
is far from an exhaustive list.
Finally, the exercise of interpretive choice generally presupposes that the
institutional choice questions are settled.
As Professor Vermeule points out,
“[i]nterpretive choice is the intra-institutional parallel to Komesar’s conception of the
allocation of responsibilities among institutions.”177 But the institutional question is not
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settled here; rather, I have argued that outside the setting of ex ante institutional design,
courts must generally address institutional issues in the context of choosing particular
doctrines that are more or less deferential to other institutional actors. As Larry Kramer
has noted, “there is no single doctrine of judicial review . . . . [C]onstitutional law is filled
with doctrines that require the Justices to defer in varying degrees to other
decisionmakers acting in the realm of ordinary politics.”178 Even though I have ruled out
wholesale judicial abdication of federalism issues to the political process, the
comparative advantages and disadvantages of courts vis-à-vis other actors plays an
important role in shaping federalism doctrine.
The use of institutional factors as tools to shape doctrine both enhances and
constrains ordinary institutional analysis. The remainder of this section considers two
senses in which this is true. The first is that since we are no longer making a binary
choice between institutions, judicial doctrine may be used to reinforce rather than
supplant the political branches’ own institutional mechanisms for handling federalism
issues. The second point is that while institutional analysts typically seem to assume that
different institutions approaching the same problem will ask basically the same questions,
judicial decision-making is actually quite different from action by the political branches.
In particular, courts’ obligation to decide cases according to law imposes important
burdens of coherence on judicial action. Those burdens have played – and will continue
to play – an important role in shaping federalism doctrine.
1.

Collaborative Enforcement

Institutional analysis of the allocation of authority over federalism questions
sometimes seems to proceed as if one institution or another will have sole authority over
a particular sort of question. Either the courts are to “establish areas of state control that
are to remain immune from federal regulation”179 or those questions must be “remit[ted] .
. . to politics.”180 Other applications of comparative institutional analysis often qualify
this binary model, of course, but the qualifications often seem to assume that we are still
simply allocating particular aspects of an issue to one institution or the other.181 I am
suggesting here, however, that institutional analysis should primarily shape judicial
doctrine, and doctrine is sufficiently flexible to open up a third possibility – that is, that
one institution’s activity on a particular question might be tailored primarily to helping
another institution decide that question in an optimal way.
What I have in mind is the notion, prominent in the constitutional theory of our
Founders, that structural constraints on federal political actors ought generally to be selfenforcing. As I have observed elsewhere, Madison’s famous account of separation of
178
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powers and federalism in Federalist 51 does not mention judicial review as an
enforcement mechanism; rather, it depends primarily on the ambitions of the multifarious
state and federal institutional actors to keep one another in check.182 Subsequent
experience has shown, however, that these institutional mechanisms often function
imperfectly.183 That, in turn, suggests an intermediate role for courts – not as alternative
decision-makers, but as collaborators who sit to ensure that the essential checks and
balances within the political branches remain in place.
This is the basic idea of “process federalism.”184 As will become clear, I doubt
that process-based doctrine is a complete answer to the problem of enforcing federalism.
I do believe, however, that critics of the process approach have missed the vast potential
that this sort of collaborative enforcement has for redressing some of the current
imbalances in the system.185 If that potential is largely unrealized at present, it may be in
part because the notion of process-based doctrine has not yet adequately been explored.
Part V of this essay tries to go some distance toward that goal by probing the
prerequisites for a self-enforcing federalism and identifying the ways in which judicial
doctrine can promote that goal.
2.

Judicial Decision-making and the Frankfurter Constraint

A second problem with institutional analysis is that it often seems to assume that
the basic character of the decision to be made, once we choose the right institution to
make it, does not vary according to which institution is chosen.186
But courts,
legislatures, executive officials, and markets decide questions quite differently due to the
constraints imposed by their institutional roles. To assume that when we commit a given
problem to a court rather than a legislature, the court will nevertheless ask the same
question that the legislature would ask, is to disregard many of the rich differences
between institutions that lie at the heart of institutional choice. Choosing who decides
often fundamentally affects what question will be decided.
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The crucial thing about judicial decisionmaking – as opposed to executive or
legislative action – is that courts must make decisions according to law. We all know
that courts make policy and value choices, but for most it is crucial that courts do not
have the same right to forthrightly choose policy and value as a legislature might.
Rather, the value and policy choices that courts make arise from the inevitable
indeterminacies in the law that courts must apply.187 Ideally those choices are themselves
grounded in the applicable legal materials, broadly construed.188 Failing that, they are at
least constrained in scope by those legal materials.189 One can, of course, argue endlessly
about the nature of the difference between judicial and legislative decisions. But most
would agree that courts are more constrained in the sorts of choices they can make than
legislative or executive actors.190
The nature of judicial decision-making imposes two strong constraints on
interpretive choice. The first is to privilege constitutional text and, to a lesser extent,
history over other more functional or consequentialist sources of doctrine. I argue in
Part III that neither text nor history can provide many determinate answers to federalism
questions. Nonetheless, sometimes they do provide clear answers: The text clearly
guarantees, for example, each state the right to elect two senators absent some
fundamental change in the structure.191 Few theories of constitutional interpretation
allow departures when the text speaks clearly,192 and most also consider the historical
understanding of that text to be relevant in some way.193 There will thus be some
187

[Hart, Concept of Law]
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See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1057, ___ (1975) (arguing that where the
directly applicable legal materials fail to determine an answer, judges should recur to the more basic
principles and policies of the law).
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See, e.g., HANS KELSEN, THE PURE THEORY OF LAW 351-52 (Max Knight, trans., Univ. of Cal. Press
1978) (1960) (arguing that “the law to be applied constitutes only a frame within which several applications
are possible” and “there is no [legal] criterion by which one possibility within the frame is preferable to
another”).
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They may be less constrained in other respects. Individual legislators, of course, are highly constrained
by the need to convince a majority of their colleagues and the procedural hurdles to lawmaking; in this
respect, they can only envy the splendid isolation and broad remedial flexibility accorded to the single
federal trial judge.
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See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3 (“The Senate . . . shall be composed of two Senators from each State. . . .”);
art. V (“[N]o State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate.”). I set to one
side the more difficult question whether the requisite change would require something other than an
ordinary amendment. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS ___ (1991) (discussing this
issue).
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See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation,
100 HARV. L. REV. 1189, 1195 (1987) [hereinafter Fallon, Constructivist Coherence] (“Arguments from
text play a universally accepted role in constitutional debate. . . . Where the text speaks clearly and
unambiguously . . . its plain meaning is dispositive.”).
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See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611, 614-20 (1999)
(arguing that some version of originalism has become widely-accepted throughout the community of
constitutional lawyers); Jack N. Rakove, Fidelity Through History (or to it), 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1587,
1592 n.14 (1997) (“[I]n truth, the turn to originalism seems so general that citation is almost beside the
point.”).
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instances in which clear text and/or history dictate particular doctrinal outcomes
regardless of institutional factors.
The second and probably more important constraint is that judicial decisionmaking must be coherent in a way that decisions by the political branches need not
always be. Larry Lessig has observed that “[w]hatever else defines a successful judicial
system, one dimension of its success is its ability to deliver consistent rulings in cases
that appear to be the same.”194 Consistency is central to the legitimacy of the judicial
role; as Professor Lessig explains,
To the extent that results of a particular rule appear consistent, it is easier
for the legal culture to view this rule as properly judicial, and its results as
properly judicial . . . . To the extent, however, that the results appear
inconsistent, this pedigree gets questioned; it becomes easier for observers
to view these results as determined, or influenced, by factors external to
the rule—in particular, factors considered political.195
This phenomenon gives rise to what Lessig calls “the Frankfurter constraint”: “[A] rule
is an inferior rule if, in its application, it appears to be political, in the sense of appearing
to allow extra-legal factors to control its application.”196 Because we can expect the
Court to try and minimize the political costs that arise when its results are perceived to be
political, the Court will – and should – move away from rules that are not susceptible of
determinate application.197
The “Frankfurter constraint” derives its name from Felix Frankfurter’s analysis of
Commerce Clause decisions in the first part of the Nineteenth Century, which
emphasized the Court’s desire to avoid the appearance of “judicial policy-making.”198
This constraint plays a crucial role with respect to contemporary doctrine. Both the
majority opinion in Garcia and Justice Souter’s dissents in Lopez and Morrison, for
example, claimed that the Court should defer to the political branches on federalism
questions because such questions cannot be resolved in a sufficiently determinate, lawlike way.199 Justice Souter has warned of “the portent of incoherence” hanging over any
194

Lessig, Translating Federalism, supra note 82, at 170-71; cf. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral
Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 15 (1959) (“[T]he main constituent of the judicial
process is precisely that it must be genuinely principled, resting with respect to every step that is involved
in reaching judgment on analysis and reasons quite transcending the immediate result that is achieved.”).
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Lessig, Translating Federalism, supra note 82, at 174.
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Id. at 174-75.
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See FELIX FRANKFURTER, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE UNDER MARSHALL, TANEY AND WAITE 54 (1937);
see also Lessig, Translating Federalism, supra note 82, at 174 n. 142 (invoking Frankfurter’s analysis).
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See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 546 (1985) (complaining that prior
doctrine, which tried to protect ‘traditional state functions’ “inevitably invites an unelected federal judiciary
to make decisions about which state policies it favors and which ones it dislikes”); [Lopez dissent]; United
States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, ___ (Souter, J., dissenting); see also id. at 656 (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(emphasizing “the difficulty of finding a workable judicial Commerce Clause touchstone—a set of
comprehensible interpretive rules that courts might use to impose some meaningful limit, but not too great
a limit, upon the scope of the legislative authority that the Commerce Clause delegates to Congress”).
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attempt to develop doctrinal limits on the commerce power200 and explicitly invoked the
Court’s painful institutional memories of the Lochner period.201
These concerns are serious. They do not, in my view, justify total judicial
withdrawal from the field, but they do suggest that the Frankfurter constraint should have
a powerful influence on the shape of doctrine. Part VI of this essay is thus centrally
concerned with uncovering the characteristics of federalism doctrine in the pre-1937
period that caused that doctrine to fail the Frankfurter test. That experience in turn
suggests directions that contemporary doctrine might pursue in order to avoid similar
problems in the future.
*

*

*

Choosing federalism doctrine requires consideration of a wide variety of disparate
questions. We do not begin in a vacuum, however. Various factions on the Supreme
Court have developed their own models of federalism doctrine – models that combine a
particular view of the “ends” of such doctrine with a theory of the best means to get there.
It will help to start with these competing models before I try to develop my own.
II.

Competing Visions

It is customary to start by saying that the Supreme Court has failed to develop a
coherent theory of federalism.202 Although the point is generally put forward as a telling
200

Morrison, 529 U.S. at 647 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 611 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“And here once again history raises its objections
that the Court's previous essays in overriding congressional policy choices under the Commerce Clause
were ultimately seen to suffer two fatal weaknesses: when dealing with Acts of Congress . . . nothing in the
Clause compelled the judicial activism, and nothing about the judiciary as an institution made it a superior
source of policy on the subject Congress dealt with. There is no reason to expect the lesson would be
different another time.”). Academics have been equally quick to cry “Lochner!” See, e.g., Sylvia A. Law,
In the Name of Federalism: The Supreme Court’s Assault on Democracy and Civil Rights, 70 U. CIN. L.
REV. 367, 369-70 (2002) (“The assumption that Lochner was wrong-that courts should not quash state or
federal legislative judgments about social and economic regulation-was bedrock in our legal and political
culture from 1937 to 1995. Since 1995, the Supreme Court has rejected that assumption. In effect, a bare
majority of the Supreme Court seeks to reverse six decades of settled federalism jurisprudence.”).
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The tone of much academic criticism faults the Court for not being more, well, academic. See, e.g.,
Jenna Bednar & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Steadying the Court’s “Unsteady Path”: A Theory of Judicial
Enforcement of Federalism, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1447, 1447 (1995) (“[T]he Supreme Court's . . . federalism
jurisprudence might, uncharitably, be described as "a mess." . . . The decisions are inconsistent with
constitutional text and with one another, and they lack a persuasive normative theory to justify the first
inconsistency or to resolve the second.”); Todd E. Pettys, Competing for the People’s Affection:
Federalism’s Forgotten Marketplace, 56 VAND. L. REV. 329, 330 (2003) (complaining that the Court has
“failed to articulate an overarching vision of federal-state relations”); Ronald Krotoszynski, Jr., Listening to
the “Sounds of Sovereignty” but Missing the Beat: Does the New Federalism Really Matter?, 32 IND. L.
REV. 11, 14 (1998) (accusing the court of having “failed to articulate a coherent theory of federalism that
explains the discrete results reached in particular cases and that would facilitate reasonably accurate
predictions regarding the probable results in future cases”). I have argued elsewhere that this sort of
criticism is neither fair nor realistic. See Young, State Sovereign Immunity, supra note 184, at 35-38.
Unfortunately, it seems to be an occupational hazard of law-professoring; one is hard pressed to find an
area of constitutional law where one does not observe legal academics pronouncing the prevailing doctrine
“incoherent.” See, e.g., E. Donald Elliot, Why Our Separation of Powers Jurisprudence is So Abysmal, 57
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criticism, articulating general theories is only tangentially related to the Court’s job
description. The Court sits to decide cases. In order to decide like cases alike – more
precisely, in order to tell which cases are “like” and which aren’t – it must develop
doctrine. But doctrine and theory are not the same thing. Doctrine is the mechanism that
translates legal theories into results, but doctrine can often capture theory only
imperfectly. That problem is compounded by the imperative to ground doctrine, where
possible, in constitutional texts that themselves often represent political compromises
among competing structural visions. The fact that doctrine yields results that are often
inconsistent with the dictates of theory should surprise no one.
The Court decides cases, moreover, under conditions that are hardly congenial to
“coherent” theory. The Court has quite limited control over its agenda, and cannot
choose to develop its doctrine in an orderly progression; it must wait for cases to come to
it.203 And it must do so while deciding many other cases on other issues in other fields,
each raising their own imperatives to construct a coherent theory. Years may pass before
it can return to a particular issue to elaborate on what it said before.204 Worst of all, the
writing justice – charged with articulating a coherent theory – must achieve consensus
among at least five of his colleagues, and preferably more, all the while knowing that he
or she may not have the opinion when the next twist on the same issue comes before the
Court. How many legal academics regularly try to write with at least four co-authors?

GEO. WASH. L. REV. 506 (1989) (title says it all); Robert Post, Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, 47
STAN. L. REV., 1249, 1249-50 (1995) (“Although the pattern of the Court's recent First Amendment
decisions may well be (roughly) defensible, contemporary First Amendment doctrine is nevertheless
striking chiefly for its superficiality, its internal incoherence, its distressing failure to facilitate constructive
judicial engagement with significant contemporary social issues connected with freedom of speech.”);
Pamela S. Karlan, Our Separatism? Voting Rights as an American Nationalities Policy, 1995 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 83, 91(observing that the Court’s race-based redistricting cases “the cases betoken a
jurisprudence that is both incoherent and doctrinally unstable”). The malady, moreover, is hardly confined
to constitutional law. See, e.g., Philip P. Frickey, Adjudication and its Discontents: Coherence and
Conciliation in Federal Indian Law, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1754, 1754 (1997) (“More than any other field of
public law, federal Indian law is characterized by doctrinal incoherence and doleful incidents.”). Surely the
fact that legal academics always say this ought to inspire some skepticism about the claim in each instance.
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Two famously-confusing cases about the scope of federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331
illustrate the problem posed by case order. Franchise Tax Board of California v. Construction Laborers
Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1 (1983), came to the Court three years before Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc.
v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804 (1986), even though from a purely intellectual standpoint, it makes more sense
to consider the Merrell Dow question first. (The Hart & Wechsler casebook inverts the order for
pedagogical purposes. See RICHARD H. FALLON, DANIEL J. MELTZER, & DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART &
WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 915-46 (4th ed. 1996)). The Court might
have had a better chance of developing a more coherent theory of § 1331 if the cases had arisen in a more
convenient order.
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On the issue of Congress’s power to abrogate state sovereign immunity, for instance, thirteen years
passed between the Court’s decision on abrogation under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment, see
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976), and its parallel decision on abrogation under the Commerce
Power, see Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989).
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As Adrian Vermeule and I have argued elsewhere, the Constitution resists grand
unified theories.205 For good or ill, much judicial doctrine evolves in an incremental,
common law fashion. This is particularly true in an area like constitutional federalism,
where the constitutional text provides relatively light constraint and judicial doctrine
must respond to the actions of other governmental institutions that are themselves
evolving in response to particular circumstances. Nonetheless, more general theories
surely influence the decision of individual cases,206 and theory can help lawyers and
judges decide where to focus when they argue and decide cases about federalism. As
Richard Fallon has observed, “questions of constitutional theory are not optional; they
cannot be put off as merely academic pre-occupations, which have no necessary role in
the work of judges and lawyers.”207 Academics can provide a valuable office here in
divining the theory implicit in doctrine, identifying and criticizing inconsistencies, or
proposing alternative visions. We should remember, however, that much of this valueadded derives from the fact that academics have very different jobs from judges.
The Supreme Court does have a theory of federalism – in fact, it has several.
Much of this Part is concerned with identifying the different theoretical perspectives
already extant in current doctrine, while proposing some important alterations in
emphasis. I want to organize my discussion here around three different variables. The
first has to do with the ends of federalism doctrine – here, the aspect of federalism to be
promoted. The second two factors are about means – that is, the role of judicial review in
promoting federalism. Section A of this Part develops these variables. With respect to
the first, I want to focus on the tension between state “sovereignty,” which I define as the
inviolability of state institutions, and state “autonomy,” defined as the ability of the states
to govern themselves. The second and third factors concern, respectively, the focus of
judicial review on issues of substance or process and the rigidity of the doctrinal rules
proposed vis a vis efforts by other branches of government to override them.
Section B considers the doctrinal approach of the five justices that have formed
the pro-states majority in the Rehnquist Court’s most prominent federalism cases. While
the Court has actually pursued a number of different approaches on different occasions, I
argue that the general drift is toward a strong role for courts, involving “hard”
constitutional rules focused on substance, and directed toward promoting state
“sovereignty” rather than autonomy. This approach manifests not only in the high-profile
cases that have limited national power, such as Seminole Tribe or Lopez, but also in the
less widely-marked preemption cases that have declined to protect state regulatory
autonomy.
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See Adrian Vermeule & Ernest A. Young, Hercules, Herbert, and Amar: The Trouble with
Intratextualism, 113 HARV. L. REV. 730, 749-58 (2000); see also LAURENCE H. TRIBE & MICHAEL C.
DORF, ON READING THE CONSTITUTION 24-25 (1991) (warning against “hyper-integrationist” readings of
the Constitution).
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See, e.g., Young, Jurisprudence of Structure, supra note 37
, at 1638 -51 (discussing the role of political
theory in Lopez, Term Limits, New York, and Alden).
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Richard H. Fallon, Jr., How to Choose a Constitutional Theory, 87 CAL. L. REV. 535, 539 (1999)
[hereinafter Fallon, How to Choose].
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I discuss a quite different vision in Section C. That vision stresses state
“autonomy” over “sovereignty,” and it stresses soft, process-based doctrines over hard,
substantive constitutional limits on federal power. Such an approach accords with the
position taken – in some cases, but not all – by those justices who have generally
dissented from the Rehnquist Court’s federalism rulings. Although the pattern is sketchy,
the evidence suggests that the dissenters do acknowledge the importance of federalism
and the Court’s role in protecting it. Their vision of federalism is different from the
majority, but it is not the simple dismissal of federalism’s importance that one often sees
in the academy.208
The dissenters’ notion of federalism is important, and current debates would be
more edifying if they paid it greater attention. But I doubt that it provides a complete
answer to the problem of balance in our system. I therefore sketch a somewhat different
model in Section D. That model – which I have labeled an “autonomy” model in
opposition to the Rehnquist Court majority’s “sovereignty” model – shares many
elements of the dissenting vision, but couples that vision with some concern for “hard”
constitutional restraints on federal power and a somewhat more aggressive view of
“process”-based protections. The remainder of this essay develops and defends that
model in substantially greater depth.
A.

The Ends and Structure of Judicial Review

We might describe different models of federalism doctrine in any number of
different ways, but for present purposes I think it best to focus on three dimensions in
particular: the aspect of federalism to be promoted, the focus of judicial review on issues
of substance or process, and the rigidity of judicial review in terms of the ease with which
other actors may override its results. Choices along each of these dimensions combine in
different ways to produce quite different models of federalism doctrine. We rarely see
the pure form of these models, of course, in the real world. Individual justices and
particular factions in the courts are likely to pursue a mix of these different approaches.
Nonetheless, the models can help us identify and assess what real judges are doing and
what effect proposed doctrines are likely to have.
1.

Sovereignty vs. Autonomy

The first dimension involves a tension between state “sovereignty” and state
“autonomy.” These terms are often used interchangeably, and, in truth, there is
considerable overlap in their definitions. They also, however, have somewhat different
connotations and, by focusing on the divergence, I want to adopt them as terms of art
signifying a broader divide in federalism values. If my usage here seems idiosyncratic, it
nonetheless serves the purpose of putting names to tendencies that are usually identified
much less precisely.
The Oxford English Dictionary defines “sovereignty” as “[s]upremacy in respect
of power, domination or rank; supreme dominion, authority, or rule.”209 This notion of
208
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supreme power harkens back to the classical conception of unitary sovereignty, which
held that “there must reside somewhere in every political unit a single, undivided, final
power, higher in legal authority than any other power, subject to no law, a law unto
itself.”210 Although our Framers “split the atom of sovereignty,”211 shattering the notion
that political authority must remain undivided, this notion of unaccountability – that the
sovereign is “subject to no law” – remains central. Hence, the most common usage of the
term in legal circles is sovereign immunity, that is, the legal unaccountability of
governmental entities for their violations of the law.212
“Autonomy,” on the other hand, bears a different emphasis on the positive usage
of governmental authority, rather than the unaccountability of the government itself. The
OED defines “autonomy” as “[t]he right of self-government, of making [a state’s] own
laws and administering its own affairs.”213 This suggests a government doing things –
making policy and carrying it out, for the benefit of its citizens – not simply shielding
itself from threats. An autonomy-based federalism doctrine would be concerned, for
example, with the States’ ability to make its own choices about protecting the
environment, ensuring health coverage for citizens, or whether to have capital
punishment.
As I have said, the two terms overlap. Sovereignty’s notion of supreme power
readily suggests the efficacy of rule, that is, the ability to do things with power, not just to
be unaccountable for what has been done. Thomas Hobbes, for instance, included in the
rights of “sovereignty” not only the notion that “[w]hat soever the Soveraigne doth, is
unpunishable by the Subject” but also that “[t]he Soveraigne is judge of what is necessary
for the Peace and Defence of his Subjects.”214 And autonomy can mean “[t]he condition
of being controlled only by its own laws, and not subject to any higher one.”215 One
would hardly do violence to the English language if, for example, one identified
sovereign immunity as an aspect of state autonomy.
For that reason, one cannot simply assume that references to “sovereignty” or
“autonomy” in the Court’s decisions (much less in the academic literature) indicate the
narrow meanings I have assigned them here. Nevertheless, I find a significant analytic
payoff to distinguishing between a state’s ability to take positive governmental action –
enacting laws and regulations, providing benefits to its citizens – and the same state’s
210

BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 198 (2d ed. 1992). See
also WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, (“[T]here is and must be in all [governments] a supreme,
irresistible, absolute, uncontrolled authority, in which the jura summi imperii, or the rights of sovereignty,
reside.”). [find quote – try vol. 1, 49, 160-62 (Cooper ed. 1803)]
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unaccountability for illegal or unpopular actions. As I argue in Part III, notions of
sovereignty and autonomy – as I define them narrowly here – stand in quite different
relation to federalism’s underlying values; the remainder of the present Part, moreover,
suggests that the choice to emphasize one or the other can have strikingly different
doctrinal implica tions.
Having said all this, however, one must acknowledge that sovereignty and
autonomy also overlap in a second, non-definitional sense. Many actions that affect state
“sovereignty” will also impinge on state “autonomy.” Even the classic example of
sovereignty jurisprudence – the Court’s constitutionalization of state sovereign immunity
in cases like Seminole Tribe216 and Alden217 – purports to benefit state autonomy by
preserving the States’ control over their internal budgetary policies.218 But I am not
arguing that sovereignty and autonomy are unrelated. I simply hope to demonstrate in
the remainder of this Part that differences in emphasis have sufficiently important
implications to make the distinction worth drawing.
2.

Substance vs. Process

The remaining dimensions concentrate on the focus and shape of judicial review
in federalism cases. One is best captured by the notoriously vague distinction between
“process” and “substance.” The decision in Morrison, for example, invalidated the civil
suit provision of the Violence Against Women Act based on the substantive character of
the federal regulation – in particular, the non-commercial nature of the regulated activity
– and largely without regard to the process of the law’s formation or the effect of that law
on the broader political dynamic of federalism. The majority was unimpressed, for
example, by the fact that Congress had conducted extensive hearings of its own on the
effects of violence against women on interstate commerce.219 A different strand of
federalism jurisprudence, by contrast, insists that “the fundamental limitation that the
constitutional scheme imposes on the Commerce Clause” – and, by extension, all federal
power – “is one of process rather than result.”220 Rules of “process federalism” thus
derive their force and structure from the need to prevent malfunctions in the political and
institutional mechanisms that ordinarily act to preserve the federal balance in the absence
of judicial intervention.
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Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Fla., 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (holding that Congress may not abrogate the states’
sovereign immunity from suits by private individuals when it acts pursuant to its Article I powers).
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Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (holding that Congress may not abrogate the states’ sovereign
immunity from suits in state courts).
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See id. at 750-51.
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See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). The Court’s decision in Lopez, by contrast,
appeared to have both substantive and process-based components. The Court noted that not only was the
Gun Free School Zones Act aimed at non-commercial activity (substantive), but also that Congress had
neither made findings of a substantial effect on interstate commerce nor included a jurisdictional element
requiring such findings to be made in individual trials. See 514 U.S. 549, ___ (1995). Morrison, however,
rather firmly closed off these process-oriented lines of potential development in favor of a strong
substantive emphasis on the character of the regulated activity. See 529 U.S. at ___.
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Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 554 (1985).
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Many have confused process-oriented doctrine with a purely nationalist model of
judicial abdication.221 The confusion is understandable, since many scholars have used
Herbert Wechsler’s notion of “political safeguards” for federalism as a basis for just such
abdication. Larry Kramer’s influential attempt to revive Wechsler’s theory, for example,
moves very quickly from a rejection of substantive limits to a rejection of judicial review
altogether. “Inflexible divisions between what is national and what is local,” he observes,
“ceased long ago to make sense, a product of profound cultural, economic, and
technological changes.”222 Professor Kramer also finds, however, that political
mechanisms such as organized political parties and linkages among state and federal
administrative bureaucracies have shorn up the institutional safeguards for state
autonomy that Wechsler identified a half-century ago.223 From this, Kramer concludes
that federalism questions should be remitted entirely to politics. “For the Founders,” he
says, “such arguments were to be addressed to the people, through politics. And the
wisdom of their judgment in this respect has been ratified in practice throughout more
than two centuries of American history - leaving as the real puzzle here just why these
judges feel compelled to countermand that decision and substitute their own.”224
Proponents of substantive limits on federal power have likewise equated any shift
in emphasis away from these sorts of limits with the abdication of judicial review in
federalism cases. Saikrishna Prakash and John Yoo, for example, have attacked Brad
Clark’s argument that separation of powers doctrines can protect state autonomy,225
calling it an “effort to prop up the deeply flawed political-safeguards theory” and “rather
akin to reinforcing the walls of a sand castle as the tide returns.”226 These scholars seem
generally optimistic that the relatively modest substantive limits on Congress’s authority
imposed in decisions like Lopez and Morrison can be extended far enough to
meaningfully protect the states from federal encroachments. Given that expectation, they
have little patience for the seemingly more modest guarantees offered by process
doctrine.227
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See infra Section II.A.5.
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Kramer, Politics, supra note 136, at 234-52. Professor Kramer concedes that “theoretically” the Court
might fashion more flexible substantive limits, but appears to discount this possibility in practice. See text
quoted in note 750, infra.
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Id. at 293. Like most proponents of judicial abdication, however, Kramer does not urge the courts to
hold these cases non-justiciable. Rather, he simply proposes a very deferential standard of review. See id.
at ___ [quote].
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See also Viet Dinh, Reassessing the Law of Preemption, 88 GEO. L. J. 2085, 2117 (2000) (“Redefining
the proper balance of legislative powers between Congress and the states is better accomplished directly,
through an insistence on the limits of Congress’s enumerated and limited powers under Article I, rather
than circuitously and ineffectually through some vague and ill-conceived presumption against preemption
under the Supremacy Clause.”). As I discuss further in Part VII, the “presumption against preemption” is
probably the most important of the process-oriented doctrines. See infra Section ___.
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Other scholars, however, have long argued that “process federalism” has
significant potential for limiting federal power.228 Vicki Jackson and Stephen Gardbaum
have both proposed the courts should review the process by which Congress makes laws
to make sure that Congress has itself considered the constitutional limits of its authority
before acting.229 Brad Clark’s work on the “procedural” safeguards of federalism
suggests that courts may serve state autonomy best by enforcing separation of powers
requirements built into the federal lawmaking process.230 And the Court itself has been
quite active in developing process-oriented checks on federal power. The anticommandeering doctrines are the most prominent example: They require Congress to
internalize the financial and political costs of its actions by prohibiting it from requiring
state institutions to enforce federal law.231 The Court’s less flashy clear statement rules
may be an even more important set of examples. Those rules enhance the political and
procedural checks on federal lawmaking in a number of sensitive areas, including
regulation of traditional state functions,232 abrogation of state sovereign immunity,233
imposition of conditions on federal funding,234 and preemption of state law.235
As with the sovereignty-autonomy divide, however, one would not want to draw
the distinction between process and substance too sharply. In particular, I will argue later
on that the “political safeguards of federalism” lying at the heart of process federalism
cannot be expected to work if the state governments have too few substantive
responsibilities to be viable governments.236 Nonetheless, it would be a mistake to
underestimate the independent constraining force of process doctrine. To see why, we
might compare process federalism with its cousin in the realm of individual rights, John
Hart Ely’s notion of representation reinforcement.237 Dean Ely’s theory has been
criticized on a number of grounds,238 but no one claims that it amounts to judicial
surrender; it was constructed, after all, to explain and justify the work of the Warren
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See, e.g., Rapaczynski, supra note 184 (making such an argument shortly after the Court’s decision in
Garcia).
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See Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law: Printz and Principle? 111 HARV. L.
REV. 2180, 2245 (1998); Stephen Gardbaum, Rethinking Constitutional Federalism, 74 TEX. L. REV. 795
(1996) [hereinafter Gardbaum, Federalism].
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See Clark, Separation of Powers, supra note 117. [find a quote]
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[cites]; Young, Two Cheers, supra note ___, at 1360-61.
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See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
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See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 243 (1985).
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See Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981).
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See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
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See infra TAN ___.
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See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980).
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See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89
YALE L. J. 1063 (1980) (arguing that process theory cannot avoid choosing values).
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Court.239 So, too, a “Democracy and Distrust” for federalism doctrine would offer a
different focus for judicial review but not necessarily a decrease in rigor or efficacy.
3.

Hard vs.Soft

A third dimension focuses on the relationship between the rules formulated by
courts and the actions of the federal political branches. Judicial doctrines may be “hard”
in the sense that they impose categorical restrictions on other actors that may be
overridden only by constitutional amendments (or judicial overruling), or they may be
“soft” to the extent that they can be overcome by less extreme measures. Congress may
have to re-enact a statute to clarify its intent, for example, or it may have to take a
particular action itself rather than delegating it to others. The important point is that
“soft” limits return the ball to Congress’s court rather than trying to fix the boundary
between state and federal power at a particular point.240
Two criminal law examples will help illustrate the distinction. United States v.
Lopez held that Congress simply lacked power under the Commerce Clause to regulate
guns in local schools. Despite some initial speculation to the contrary, it now seems clear
that Congress can do nothing to supply this deficit of power.242 United States v. Jones,243
on the other hand, illustrates a less categorical approach to a similar problem. The
question in Jones was whether the federal arson statute could reach arson of a private
residence. Suggesting that the question was a difficult one, the Court construed the
statute not to press the outer limits of the Commerce Power – that is, not to apply to
private residences – absent a clear statement of Congress’s intent to do so.244 This
approach left open the possibility that Congress might clarify its broad intent in a
subsequent enactment, but avoided a more direct confrontation in the case before the
Court.
241

Jones was an instance of the familiar canon that courts will construe statutes to
avoid constitutional doubts.245 I have argued elsewhere, however, that the avoidance
239
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See generally Dan T. Coenen, The Rehnquist Court, Structural Due Process, and Semisubstantive
Constitutional Review, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1281 (2002); [Friedman piece on dialogue].
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514 U.S. 549 (1995).
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Congress re-enacted the Gun Free School Zones Act shortly after Lopez with explicit findings that gun
possession in schools has a substantial effect on interstate commerce. [cite] These findings responded to
language in the Lopez opinion suggesting that the lack of such findings might be important to the statute’s
constitutionality. See 514 U.S. at ___. But the Court’s subsequent decision in Morrison makes clear that
the presence of such findings cannot save a statute that does not regulate commercial activity. See 529 U.S.
598, ___ (2000). Congress could possibly achieve the same result through conditional spending, see Lynn
A. Baker, Conditional Federal Spending After Lopez, [cite], but that would involved a different power
altogether, not “fixing” the Commerce Clause problem.
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529 U.S. 848 (2000).
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See id. at 859 (concluding that “§ 844(i) is not soundly read to make virtually every arson in the country
a federal offense”).
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See Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring)
(“When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question, and even if a serious doubt of
constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction
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canon is best understood as a means of enforcing – not avoiding the enforcement of – the
underlying constitutional norms that create the doubt in the first place.246 One might read
Jones, for example, as a response to the difficulty of defining limits on Congress’s
Commerce Power in a principled and workable way. Given this difficulty, a court might
despair of enforcing hard limits that constrain Congress within any but the broadest
bounds; at the same time, it might seek to vindicate a more limiting vision of enumerated
powers by effectively remanding statutes that press the outer boundary to Congress for a
second look.247
The Jones principle – that Congress must speak clearly if it wishes to press the
limits of its Commerce Clause authority – fits comfortably into a class of constitutional
rules that I have dubbed “resistance norms.” These are “norms that may be more or less
yielding to governmental action, depending on the strength of the government’s interest,
the degree of institutional support for the challenged action, or the clarity of purpose that
the legislature has expressed.”248 Federalism doctrine is rife with other “clear statement”
rules covering any number of intrusions on state sovereignty or autonomy, including
subjecting states to liability,249 imposing conditions on grants of federal funds,250
regulating traditional state government functions,251 and preempting state law.252 But
other quite different federalism rules – such as the Pike balancing test requiring a
substantial state interest to support regulation burdening interstate commerce253 – are also
“soft” in that the structural principle will give way under certain circumstances.

of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided.”); Jones, 529 U.S. at 857-58
(invoking the avoidance canon).
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See generally Ernest A. Young, Constitutional Avoidance, Resistance Norms, and the Preservation of
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avoidance of one, see Frederick Schauer, Ashwander Revisited, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 71, 87; Richard A.
Posner, Statutory Interpretation—in the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 816
(1983).
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See Young, Constitutional Avoidance, supra note 246, at 1603-09 (arguing that use of canons of
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“Soft” limits have some obvious advantages from the courts’ standpoint. They
avoid direct confrontations with Congress, and they encourage the political branches to
take part in a dialogue about the proper balance of federalism.254 Less obviously, they
may ease line-drawing difficulties and permit courts to impose some restraint in areas
where constitutional norms would otherwise be “under-enforced.”255 On the other hand,
such doctrines carry a pronounced risk: National political actors may choose simply to
override the constraints that the courts erect, leaving the federal balance potentially at
risk. It is, for example, difficult to predict reliably the ways in which Congress will
respond to statutory interpretation decisions such as those involving “clear statement”
rules.256 As a result, it is hard to know exactly how much faith to put in these “soft”
constraints.
4.

Combining Dimensions

Combining the dimensions I have discussed in various ways produces quite
different models of federalism doctrine. I discuss the leading models later in this Part;
the present subsection is meant to clear up a few points related to the ways in which the
various dimensions fit together.
The first point is that the dimensions are not unrelated to one another. It may be
easier, for instance, to have strong, categorical rules protecting state sovereignty than to
build similar fences around state autonomy. The reason would be that sovereignty rules
generally protect only the institutions of state governments themselves and need not
interfere directly with the primary federal regulatory project of policing private conduct.
The National League of Cities doctrine,257 for example, did not interfere with the Fair
Labor Standards Act’s ability to govern employment conditions in the overwhelming
majority of the economy.258 Likewise, the Court’s decisions holding state governments
immune from suit under various federal statutes like the Americans with Disabilities Act
or the Patent Act affect only a very small proportion of litigation under those statutes.259
It may thus be easier for the system to tolerate categorical sovereignty protections than,
say, equally categorical efforts to protect state regulatory autonomy by holding
significant sections of American life off limits to federal legislation.
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See generally Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REV. 577 (1993).
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See Young, Constitutional Avoidance, supra note 246, at 1603-09. On under-enforcement, see
generally Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms,
91 HARV. L. REV. 1212 (1978).
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See, e.g., Vermeule, Interpretive Choice, supra note 175, at ___ (detailing the many empirical
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There is also an obvious affinity between process-based federalism doctrine and
“soft” limits on federal power, particularly the “clear statement” canons of statutory
construction. Rules requiring that Congress speak clearly when it intrudes on state
prerogatives help to enhance the political and institutional checks on such intrusions in at
least two ways: First, they give notice to the states’ federal representatives that an
intrusion is afoot, and may thus serve to help rally opposition.260 Second, they increase
the costs of drafting and securing support for federalism-threatening measures, simply by
adding another hurdle through which such measures must jump.261 “Process federalism”
thus often signifies not only an orientation for judicial review – to correct malfunctions of
the political and institutional checks that are supposed to make federalism self-enforcing
– but also a technique of constructing doctrines in such a way as to enhance those
political and institutional checks. Any model emphasizing process doctrine is thus likely
to feature “soft” rules of this kind.
Nonetheless, the variables are independent enough to warrant separate conceptual
treatment. Simply because “soft” rules have certain process-oriented advantages, for
example, does not mean that we never see “soft” rules targeting substance or “hard” rules
oriented toward process. If we organize these two variables in a matrix, we can identify
examples of doctrinal approaches fitting each of the squares:
Judicial Review

Hard Limits

Substance

Process

1

2

Subject-matter
limit
Commerce Clause (Lopez).

on

Absolute anti-commandeering
rule based on concerns about
political accountability (Printz).

Absolute rule against abrogation
of state sovereign immunity
(Seminole Tribe).

Soft Limits

3

4

Clear statement rule against
broad use of Commerce Power
(Jones).

Clear
statement
rule
for
conditions on federal funds,
based on need for states to know
what
they’ve
agreed
to
(Pennhurst).

Clear statement rule against
abrogation of state sovereign
immunity (Union Gas).

260

See Young, Two Cheers, supra note ___, at 1359.

261

See James J. Brudney, Congressional Commentary on Judicial Interpretations of Statutes: Idle Chatter
or Telling Response? 93 MICH. L. REV. 1, 30 (1994) (noting that anytime drafters must add “details to text
increases the possibility for delay and obstruction even though the details themselves would command
overwhelming support”); Young, Constitutional Avoidance, supra note 246, at 1596-98.
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Box 2 indicates that although process federalism is often associated with weak or even
non-existent judicial checks on Congress, for instance, the anti-commandeering rule
represents a categorical restriction on congressional power most persuasively grounded in
process justifications, e.g., the need to force Congress to internalize the monetary and
political costs of its programs.262 Likewise, Box 3 recognizes that the Court has often
chosen to enforce substance-based limits on congressional power through non-absolute
techniques, such as clear statement requirements, notwithstanding conventional wisdom
identifying substantive restrictions with more unyielding rules.263 I do not mean to argue
at this point in the discussion that any particular combination is preferable to any other,
only that the two variables are logically – and empirically – independent.
The same is true of the relationship described above between the
sovereignty/autonomy variable and substance/process variables. Some pairings may be
more natural than others, but all appear at least occasionally in current doctrine:

Sovereignty

Substance

Process

1

2

State
sovereign
immunity
broadly
prohibits
private
lawsuits
threatening
state
dignitary or budgetary interests
(Ports Authority).

Congress must speak clearly in
order to abrogate state sovereign
immunity under § 5 of the 14th
Amendment (Atascadero).
Congress may not impose
regulation on state governments
that it is unwilling to impose on
private actors as well (Cf.
Condon264).
Congress may not delegate
authority to sue states on behalf

262

See Printz v. United States, 527 U.S. 898, 930 (1997); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 168-69
(1992); see also Young, Two Cheers, supra note ___, at ___ (discussing the process justifications for the
anti-commandeering rule).

263

See generally Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 252, at ___; Young, Constitutional Avoidance, supra note
246, at 1596-98 (discussing use of clear statement rules to protect Article III values associated with judicial
review).
264

The Condon Court reserved the question whether Congress may impose regulatory burdens on states
alone for decision in a future case. See Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 151 (2000).

265

The Court held in Stevens that Congress had not clearly subjected the states to liability under the False
Claims Act and thus had no occasion to decide whether Congress could delegate the United States’ interest
in such suits to private qui tam litigants. See Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel.
Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 787 (2000).
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of the U.S. to private litigants
(Cf. Stevens265).

Autonomy

3

4

Congress may not regulate noncommercial activities, leaving
those activities open to state
regulation without fear of
preemption (Lopez; Morrison).

Congress must speak clearly in
order to preempt state law
(Rice).
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To complete the set, we can do a similar matrix comparing the
sovereignty/autonomy and hard/soft variables:

Sovereignty

Autonomy

Hard Limits

Soft Limits

1

2

No abrogation of state sovereign
immunity under Art. I powers
(Seminole Tribe).

Congress may abrogate under
Section
5
of
the
14th
Amendment, but must state its
intent very clearly (Atascadero).

3

4

Congress may not regulate noncommercial activities, leaving
those activities open to state
regulation without fear of
preemption (Lopez; Morrison).

Congress must speak clearly in
order to press the limits of its
commerce power (Jones) and
may not delegate that decision to
others (Solid Waste).
Presumption against preemption
in statutory construction (Rice).

Again, all the possibilities are present in current law. This matrix also helps illustrate a
somewhat different point, which is that “soft” limits are not necessarily less constraining,
on balance, than “hard” ones. For instance, a broadly applicable soft rule like the
presumption against preemption, which at least in theory applies in every preemption
case, probably protects state autonomy to a greater degree than the very narrow “hard”
prohibition articulated in Lopez and Morrison.266

266

See Young, Two Cheers, supra note ___, at 1384-86 (demonstrating that much more state autonomy has
been at stake in recent preemption cases than in Commerce Clause litigation).
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The variables I have discussed – sovereignty/autonomy, substance/process,
strong/weak rules – do not exhaust the choices to be made in formulating federalism
doctrine. There is, for example, the familiar dichotomy between rules and standards.267
We might plot that dichotomy against the substance/process variable, for instance, to
yield the following examples:

Substance

Process

Rule

Standards

1

2

Congress may regulate only
commercial activity under the
Commerce Clause (Morrison).

Congress must observe principle
of subsidiarity – that is, it may
regulate only those issues that
cannot be better addressed at the
state or local level (EU law).

3

4

Super-strong clear statement rule
for abrogating state sovereign
immunity under Section 5 of the
14th Amendment (Atascadero).

Presumption against preemption
in statutory construction (Rice).

This particular matrix prompts several observations. One is that in order to fill Box 2 we
have to look to another federal constitutional system altogether – that is, to the principle
of subsidiarity included in the Maastricht Treaty on European Union.268 The National
League of Cities doctrine was a standard – it incorporated several mushy factors and
provided for balancing of the federal government’s interest in regulating against the
state’s interest in sovereignty over the function at issue269 – but that doctrine is no longer
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See, e.g., Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22
(1992).
268

EC Treaty art. 5 (ex art. 3b). See generally George A. Bermann, Taking Subsidiarity Seriously:
Federalism in the European Community and the United States, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 331 (1994); Young,
European Union, supra note 42,at 1677 -82.
269

See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 287-88 & n.29 (1981)
(directing courts to consider whether the law in question (1) regulated the “states as States,” (2) dealt with
issues that are “indisputably attributes of state sovereignty,” and (3) impaired states’ ability “to structure
integral operations in areas of traditional governmental function,” as well as (4) whether “the nature of the
federal interest advanced [is] such that it justifies state submission”). The sheer fuzziness of this test may
well explain why the Rehnquist Court’s current pro-states majority has never tried to revive National
League of Cities. Justice Scalia, for one, has been an extremely vocal critic of this sort of mushy standard.
See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1989).
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with us. I argue in Section ___ that this is largely as it should be, that is, that substantive
federalism doctrines are probably best cast as formal (but narrow) rules.270
The second observation is that the rules/standards dichotomy can be applied to
canons of statutory construction, like the clear statement rules in Boxes 3 and 4, as well
as to more familiar forms of constitutional doctrine. Here, a canon is standard-like to the
extent that it allows the interpreter to consider a wide variety of sources of statutory
meaning, such as legislative history, underlying policies, pragmatic concerns about
implementing the statute, and the like. A canon is rule-like, on the other hand, to the
extend that it tends to narrow the range of considerations down toward a focus on the text
alone. The Eleventh Amendment clear statement rules, which insist on a clear statement
of Congress’s intent to abrogate state sovereign immunity in the text of the statute
itself,271 fit this latter description. The presumption against preemption, on the other
hand, exemplifies the more common form of clear statement standard that simply urges
courts to err on the side of state autonomy while still considering all potentially relevant
sources of statutory meaning.272
The rules/standards choice will remain important whichever model of federalism
doctrine one chooses. But the three variables upon which I have focused here -sovereignty/autonomy, substance/process, and strong/weak doctrine – seem to represent
the defining choices that actually separate the models actually in play in our current
debates about federalism. Other choices, such as whether doctrines should be rule-like or
standard-like, will remain important within these models. For a similar reason, I do not
try to define and explore a different model reflecting every permutation of the three
variables that I have emphasized. Rather, I use those variables to discuss the three
models that emerge most naturally from the Court’s actual decisions and the criteria for
interpretive and institutional choice that I have already identified.
5.

The Nationalist Alternative

Before discussing the models of federalism doctrine reflected in the Court’s
decision, however, I should note that all of these models presume something that is in
fact quite controversial: That courts will construct doctrine to enforce principles of
federalism. I have already argued that courts generally cannot abstain from deciding the
cases, and in fact no judges and relatively few commentators argue that federalism cases
should be non-justiciable.273 But one could also argue for a doctrinal model that would
be so deferential to political actors as to simply not show up on the dimensions I have
sketched. There would, for example, be no choice between sovereignty and autonomy
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See infra TAN ___.
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See, e.g., Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 230 (1989) (“Legislative history generally will be irrelevant
to a judicial inquiry into whether Congress intended to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment. If Congress'
intention is ‘unmistakably clear in the language of the statute,’ recourse to legislative history will be
unnecessary; if Congress' intention is not unmistakably clear, recourse to legislative history will be futile,
because by definition the [clear statement] rule . . . will not be met.”).
272

Eskridge & Frickey?

273

See supra TAN ___.
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because neither aspect of federalism would be protected; likewise, courts would impose
neither “hard” nor “soft” limits on federal power.
Applied even-handedly, we might call this simply a “non-interventionist” model.
But proponents of judicial non-intervention rarely argue for junking the dormant
Commerce Clause limit on state legislation or various other doctrines of dormant
preemption.274 And judges who occasionally suggest that courts should not adjudicate
“conflicts of sovereign political interests implicated by the Commerce Clause” because
“the Constitution remits them to politics”275 generally do not mean the dormant
Commerce Clause.276 Rather, the argument is that courts should not protect states from
federal encroachments. The model is thus more appropriately termed “nationalist”; it
holds that courts should defer to federal political actors but not states.
Nationalists are basically uninterested in the distinction between state sovereignty
and state autonomy, tending to see both as pernicious and outdated. To the extent that
this model sees any federalism requirement at all in the Constitution, it tends to take the
form of a minimalist vision of sovereignty entailing the “separate and independent
existence” of the States. The example customarily cited is Coyle v. Oklahoma,277 which
held that Congress may not tell a state where to put its capitol. Beyond this, the
nationalist model views state autonomy – that is, the degree to which the states are
allowed to exercise meaningful responsibilities – as purely a policy choice.278
While this model is popular among academics, one of my most important
descriptive claims is that no justice on the present Supreme Court actually takes this
“pure nationalist” position. The remaining sections of this Part consider the models that
are in play, as well as a somewhat different alternative of my own.
B.

The Strong Sovereignty Model

By and large, the five justices making up the Rehnquist Court’s usual majority on
federalism issues – the Chief Justice and Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, Scalia, and
Thomas – have tended to opt for federalism doctrines that aggressively protect state
sovereignty. At the same time, they have displayed relatively little sympathy for state
autonomy, particularly in cases involving the preemption of state regulatory authority.
These justices have also tended to opt for strong, substantive doctrines over rules that
274

See, e.g., Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968) (holding that the federal foreign affairs power
impliedly preempts state laws that affect foreign affairs).
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United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 649 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting).
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See, e.g., Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325 (1996) (Souter, J.); Camps Newfound/Owatonna v.
Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 571-72 (1997) (rejecting call to reconsider dormant Commerce Clause
doctrine) (Stevens, J., for majority including Souter and Breyer). On the other side of the divide, some of
the justices most intent on developing doctrines to limit national authority have called for junking the
Court’s negative commerce jurisprudence. See id. at 610-20 (Thomas, J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist
and Scalia). But the justices who hold the balance in federalism cases – Justices O’Connor and Kennedy –
have been willing to limit both state and federal power.
277

221 U.S. 559 (1911).

278

See, e.g., Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41
UCLA L. REV. 903, ___ (1994).
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focus on process or leave open a dialog with Congress. The Court’s preferences on the
judicial review variables are less pronounced, however, and one can find numerous
counter-examples.
1.

Sovereignty over Autonomy

The Court’s preference for sovereignty over autonomy is the most obvious
hallmark of the “federalist revival.” In other work, I have grouped the pro-sovereignty
cases under the heading of “immunity federalism” because they all “involve protecting
the states from being held accountable, in their own activities, to federal norms.”279 All
share, as a common theme, the assumption that the Court can best help the States by
getting the Federal Government to leave them alone.
One can discern the intellectual roots of this approach in National League of
Cities v. Usery,280 which shows up the distinction between sovereignty-based and
autonomy-based federalism doctrines particularly well. National League of Cities was
one of a series of cases involving the constitutionality of federal wage and hour
regulation under the Fair Labor Standards Act. Congress’s ability to regulate the wages
and hours of private employers – and therefore to preempt contrary state regulation of the
same subject – was established in the morning after the New Deal “revolution” in United
States v. Darby.281 Two subsequent decisions involved the additional question whether
such regulation could be extended to state governments themselves in their capacity as
public employers. Maryland v. Wirtz held that it could in 1968,282 but a new majority
overruled that holding eight years later in National League of Cities. 283
Then-Justice Rehnquist’s opinion for the Court in the latter case viewed these two
questions – whether Congress may supersede state regulation of private entities (Darby),
and whether Congress may regulate the states themselves (Wirtz, National League of
Cities) – as sharply different. The Secretary of Labor pointed out that the Court had
already “upheld sweeping exercises of authority by Congress, even though those
exercises pre-empted state regulation of the private sector.”284 The Court, however,
rejected the suggestion that such foreclosure of state regulation of third parties “curtailed
the sovereignty of the States quite as much” as the challenged FLSA provisions, which
regulated state institutions themselves.285 “It is one thing,” Justice Rehnquist wrote, “to
recognize the authority of Congress to enact laws regulating individual businesses
necessarily subject to the dual sovereignty of the government of the Nation and of the
State in which they reside. It is quite another to uphold a similar exercise of congressional
authority directed, not to private citizens, but to the States as States.”286 Although the
279
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280
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Court insisted that “there are attributes of sovereignty attaching to every state government
which may not be impaired by Congress,” those attributes conspicuously did not include
the right to regulate within the States’ own jurisdiction free of federal interference.
Rather, they were limited to the right to be free of federal regulation of state institutions
themselves.
The Court overruled National League of Cities just nine years later,287 and the
justices driving the Federalist Revival have not chosen to revive this particular aspect of
state sovereignty. Nonetheless, a similar concern for state sovereignty over state
regulatory autonomy pervades the Court’s recent decisions on state sovereign
immunity.288 These cases represent neither the opening moves in the Federalist
Revival289 nor its most dramatic departures from prior precedent.290 But they surpass all
other areas of federalism doctrine in both number – there are simply more decisions – and
in the Court’s willingness to push to the pro-states extreme on a continuum of doctrinal
possibility.291 The Eleventh Amendment (and its background “postulates which limit and
control,” which actually seem to drive most of the recent cases292) has become the poster
child of federalism doctrine under the Rehnquist Court.
Like the National League of Cities doctrine, state sovereign immunity limits
Congress’s ability to bring federal law to bear on state institutions themselves. This
effort constantly invokes the rhetoric of state sovereignty. Justice Thomas began his
analysis in the Ports Authority case,293 for example, by noting that the States “entered the
union ‘with their sovereignty intact,’” and that the States’ immunity from private suits is

287

See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).

288
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“[a]n integral component of that ‘residuary and inviolable sovereignty.’”294 Likewise,
Justice Kennedy’s more extended discussion of the Framers’ original understanding
focused on “the close and necessary relationship understood to exist between sovereignty
and immunity from suit.”295
There is an important shift in emphasis from National League of Cities to the
sovereign immunity cases, however. Under the former doctrine, the Court stressed the
need to relieve state governments from federal regulation so that they might better serve
their own constituents. Justice Rehnquist stressed that “[o]ne undoubted attribute of state
sovereignty is the States' power to determine the wages which shall be paid to those
whom they employ in order to carry out their governmental functions, what hours those
persons will work, and what compensation will be provided where these employees may
be called upon to work overtime.”296 In one example of the FLSA’s impact, California
“reported that it had thus been forced to reduce its [highway patrol] academy training
program from 2,080 hours to only 960 hours, a compromise undoubtedly of substantial
importance to those whose safety and welfare may depend upon the preparedness of the
California Highway Patrol.”297 Although the National League of Cities doctrine was
couched in terms of sovereignty and operated by foreclosing federal regulation of state
institutions themselves, then, the key to the doctrine was the degradation of the state’s
ability to govern resulting from loss of control over its own governmental functions.298
In this sense, National League of Cities shared many of the basic concerns of the
autonomy model.299
The Court’s state sovereign immunity opinions, on the other hand, seem typically
to invoke the notion of sovereignty for its own sake. The Court has said that “[t]he
preeminent purpose of state sovereign immunity is to accord States the dignity that is
294
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See id. at 851 (“[I]t is functions such as these [e.g., police and fire protection] which governments are
created to provide, services such as these which the States have traditionally afforded their citizens. If
Congress may withdraw from the States the authority to make those fundamental employment decisions
upon which their systems for performance of these functions must rest, we think there would be little left of
the States’ ‘separate and independent existence.’”) (quoting Coyle v. Oklahoma, 221 U.S. 559, 580 (1911)).
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consistent with their status as sovereign entities.”300 Dignity may have some relationship
to state governance; indeed, the general level of respect for state institutions seems likely
to affect the degree of participation in state political processes and the states’ ability to
attract good people for public service.301 It seems unlikely, however, that the sort of
dignity enhanced by state sovereign immunity helps on these fronts. If anything, one
would expect that haughty refusals by the State to compensate those injured when the
State violates federal laws would engender resentment toward state institutions. Of
course, all of these effects – both positive and negative – would be hard to measure
rigorously. But at best the case for promoting viable state governance through a
sovereign immunity jurisprudence based on state dignitary interests is far from proven.
State sovereign immunity serves other values besides dignity, and some are much
more closely related to a state’s ability to govern. Occasionally, the Court has invoked
the potential of damages liability to disrupt a state’s financial decisionmaking processes
as a reason for expanding immunity from suit. In Alden, for instance, Justice Kennedy
noted that “‘[t]he principle of immunity from litigation assures the states and the nation
from unanticipated intervention in the processes of government.’”302 “A general federal
power to authorize private suits for money damages,” by contrast, “would place
unwarranted strain on the States' ability to govern in accordance with the will of their
citizens.”303 Aside from this passage in Alden, however, this concern for the degradation
of state governance arising from damages liability hardly ever crops up in the Court’s
analysis. Rather, most opinions have tended to focus either on more abstract notions of
sovereignty or state dignitary interests.304 Indeed, the Ports Authority decision explicitly
300
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rejected an argument that the States should not be immune where autonomy-related
concerns about state finances are not present: “While state sovereign immunity serves
the important function of shielding state treasuries and thus preserving ‘the States’ ability
to govern in accordance with the will of their citizens,’ the doctrine’s central purpose is to
‘accord the States the respect owed them as’ joint sovereigns.”305
The Court has made clear that, despite its benefits for state financial integrity,
state sovereign immunity is not meant to increase state governments’ freedom of action
by allowing them to make their own policies at variance with federal law. In Alden, for
example, Justice Kennedy insisted that “[t]he constitutional privilege of a State to assert
its sovereign immunity in its own courts does not confer upon the State a concomitant
right to disregard the Constitution or valid federal law.”306 Indeed, the Court plainly
expects that state governments will generally continue to comply with federal law
notwithstanding their immunity from suit.307 In any event, a broad range of private
remedies against state entities remain, and Congress retains an impressive array of
legislative instruments to ensure state compliance with federal law.308 That does not
mean that the state sovereign immunity decisions are unimportant; as Dan Meltzer has
observed, the remedial architecture is a critical, if often overlooked, aspect of
constitutional law.309 My point is simply that restrictions on particular remedies against
state governments are likely to have a considerably more attenuated impact on the ability
of states to govern themselves than restrictions on Congress’s ability to regulate states
per se.
The Court’s focus on sovereignty is not restricted to the old National League of
Cities doctrine and state sovereign immunity. Federalism concerns also stand at the
center of the Court’s habeas corpus jurisprudence,310 and recent doctrinal developments
in that area also have the effect of constricting state accountability for violations of
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federal rules.311 The doctrine of procedural default, for example, holds that federal
constitutional errors committed at a state court trial ordinarily cannot be remedied on
habeas review if the petitioner failed to comply with state procedural rules.312 As with
state sovereign immunity, the effect is not to absolve state courts from their obligation to
comply with federal constitutional rules – states cannot, for instance, choose not to follow
Miranda’s rules on custodial interrogation – but rather to restrict the availability of
federal remedies when such violations occur. And the central concern is to prevent
federal interference with the internal workings of state institutions.313
The habeas case law, like sovereign immunity and the National League of Cities,
defies any attempt to draw too bright a line between sovereignty and autonomy concerns.
The Court has reined in habeas remedies largely out of a general concern for the States’
ability to punish violations of their criminal laws – surely a core concern of state
governance.314 And a rule like the procedural default doctrine is designed to protect the
States’ ability to manage their criminal justice system by establishing rules of criminal
procedure; if state procedural defaults are ignored on federal habeas review, the Court
has argued, then no one will have any incentive to comply with state procedural rules.315
Although one occasionally sees references to state dignitary interests in habeas opinions,
they tend to take a back seat to the practical costs that federal habeas review imposes on
state law enforcement.316 Nonetheless, the autonomy concerns present in habeas cases
are at one further remove from those at issue when the Court decides whether or not to
impose federal constitutional rules on the states in the first place.317
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Given that most federalism doctrines will serve both sovereignty and autonomy to
some degree, the evidence so far hardly demonstrates a clear commitment to the former
over the latter. But the case for such a commitment becomes much clearer, in my view,
when we turn to the cases in which the Rehnquist Court’s pro-states majority has failed to
protect state autonomy. The most important cases here involve preemption of state laws
by federal statutes, administrative agency action, and judge-made federal common law.
A number of commentators – including this one – have observed that the Court’s
putatively pro-states majority often votes against the States in preemption cases.318 The
strong tendency of the Rehnquist Court is to find state law preempted more often than
not,319 and the five Justices who made up the pro-states majority in cases like Lopez,
Printz, and Seminole Tribe are the most likely to favor preemption.320 As Calvin Massey
has observed, “[i]t is hard to understand why Justices who are so aware of the values of
federalism in Lopez, Morrison, or Garrett exhibit such blindness to those values when
presented with a preemption case.”321
I have canvassed the Rehnquist Court’s preemption jurisprudence in wearisome
detail in a companion article,322 so I will provide only a few examples here. Lorillard
Tobacco Co. v. Reilly323 is perhaps the most striking. There, the Court held that federal
law requiring warning labels on cigarette packages preempted a Massachusetts law
forbidding sign and poster advertising near schools. In dissent, Justice Stevens pointed
out that “[t]he Court’s holding that federal law precludes States and localities from
protecting children from dangerous products within 1,0000 feet of a school is particularly
ironic given the Court’s conclusion [in Lopez] that the Federal Government lacks the
constitutional authority to impose a similarly-motivated ban.”324 Even more ironic was
the line-up, which featured exactly the same five-four split as in Lopez, except that the
putatively pro-states “conservatives” voted to strike down the state law.
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Lorillard is suggestive because of its facts, but it pales in importance beside a
case like AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Board,325 decided in 1999. The federalism issue
in that case concerned whether the new rules implementing competition in the local
telephone market under the 1996 Telecommunications Act would be written by the
Federal Communications Commission or the state regulatory agencies. Local telephone
regulation had expressly belonged to the States under the 1934 Communications Act, and
nothing in the new statute clearly purported to shift implementation responsibility to
Washington.326 Nonetheless, Justice Scalia’s majority opinion found the dissenters’
invocation of federalism “most peculiar”; to him, the case was a straight up question of
federal administrative law with no vertical structural implications. But Iowa Utilities
Boardobli terated more state regulatory “turf” at one fell swoop than any other decision
in recent memory.327
As I discuss in more detail in Section D, preemption cases are the quintessential
“autonomy” cases. They concern whether the states will continue to have the authority to
regulate third parties within their own jurisdiction, pursuant to their own view of the
public interest, or whether that authority will be displaced by federal control. The
Rehnquist Court majority’s failure to see central federalism concerns at issue in
preemption cases thus provides the best evidence that, for them, the central values of
federalism lie elsewhere – not in state regulatory autonomy, but in the sovereign
prerogative of state institutions themselves to be exempt from federal intrusion or control.
To be sure, elements of the Court’s jurisprudence – most importantly, the Court’s limited
revival of the doctrine of enumerated powers in cases like Lopez and Morrison – seem
directed to autonomy-type concerns.328 These departures serve as reminders of the
difference between theoretical models and the inevitably more messy judicial
performance that the models help us to evaluate. I do think it is fair to conclude,
however, that the Rehnquist Court’s strong tendency has been to promote a vision of state
sovereignty that bears only an attenuated link to the viability of state governance.
The reasons for this choice of emphasis are not obvious, and I do not pretend to
offer a complete explanation here. As Richard Fallon has demonstrated, much of the
Court’s emphasis on sovereign immunity may be path dependent: “Significant obstacles
impede aggressive steps to protect federalism along other paths,” he points out. “By
contrast, the Court has learned how to deploy sovereign immunity to symbolize and
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525 U.S. 366 (1999). I have discussed Iowa Utilities Board in greater detail in an earlier work. See
Young, State Sovereign Immunity, supra note 184, at 39-42 (arguing that Iowa Utilities Board was far more
important to federalism that the sovereign immunity decisions in the same Term, including Alden and the
Florida Prepaid cases).

326

See Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC, 120 F.3d 753, 800 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding that the States retained
administrative authority over the local market), rev’d, 525 U.S. 366 (1999).
327

Justice Breyer tellingly compared the impact of Iowa Utilities Board with Printz, in which Justice Scalia
had waxed eloquent about in the intrusion on state sovereignty arising from a federal requirement that state
law enforcement officials conduct background checks for gun sales. “Today's decision,” he said, “does
deprive the States of practically significant power, a camel compared with Printz's gnat.” Iowa Utils. Bd.,
525 U.S. at 427 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
328

See infra TAN ___.

65

13-Jul-04 draft

protect federalism.”329 Path dependence may also explain the Court’s efforts to protect
state sovereignty in habeas cases: Courts have traditionally taken a strong role in shaping
habeas relief, and for much of the past decade Congress has been supportive of the
Court’s effort to narrow the availability of the writ.330 Finally, both the immunity cases
and the habeas cases dovetail with politically conservative suspicions of civil plaintiffs
and criminal defendants.331
Nonetheless, these explanations seem unlikely to capture the whole picture. After
all, many of the Court’s critics – people who would overrule the precedents that the Court
has built upon, and who generally do not share the political predilections that some of the
cases may vindicate – seem to accept the states’ righters’ assumption about the central
importance of doctrines like National League of Cities or state sovereign immunity in
determining the balance of power between the States and the Nation. How else could one
argue, for example, that the Court’s state sovereign immunity decisions have truly
“narrowed the nation’s power” and altered our federal balance in favor of the States?332
A wide range of people on both sides of the federalism debate seem to agree that
sovereignty is just what federalism is about.
2.

Judicial Review

So much for the first dimension of federalism doctrine – the choice of sovereignty
over autonomy. What about the other two variables, which are concerned with the focus
and structure of judicial review? Many commentators have seen the Court as plainly
committed to a strong judicial role focused on drawing substantive lines between state
and federal authority. In one important article, for instance, John Yoo observed that the
Rehnquist Court’s recent decisions “have reasserted the applicability of judicial review to
questions concerning state sovereignty and the proper balance between the national and
state governments.”333 That meant, for Professor Yoo, that the Court would “establish
329
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areas of state control that are to remain immune from federal regulation.”334 Although
Professor Yoo acknowledged that “the Court has and will continue to debate where the
line is to be drawn between federal enumerated powers and state sovereignty,” he
nonetheless concluded that “there seems to be little dispute on the Court over its
institutional obligation to draw that line.”335
Professor Yoo’s assessment is most obviously applicable to the Commerce Clause
cases, Lopez and Morrison. Although Lopez contained language suggestive of a process
focus,336 Morrison makes clear that the doctrine turns on substance: Congress may only
regulate commercial activity under the Commerce Clause. The Court’s other line of
enumerated powers cases – construing the limits of Congress’s power to enforce the
Reconstruction Amendments337 – is similar. One can make a case for process orientation
here as well by focusing on the Court’s language concerning the legislative record
compiled by Congress in enacting the law.338 But I and others have argued elsewhere
that a more plausible reading of the cases focuses on the nature of the activity prohibited
by Congress and the proportion of that activity that is actually unconstitutional under the
constitutional provision that Congress is enforcing.339 That would put these cases firmly
on the substance side of the relevant divide.
The immunity cases also generally fit this preference for substance over process.
One occasionally sees a process argument in the opinions: The Court has suggested, for
instance, that we should worry about the U.S. government delegating to private persons
its right to sue the states notwithstanding immunity, because private suits are not subject
to the same political checks as suits by federal governmental actors.340 But by and large
these cases are about the substance of federal legislation – the imposition of liability on
state institutions – rather than defects in the federal lawmaking process that produces the
334
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challenged statutes. And the rules produced – that Congress may not abrogate the
sovereign immunity of the states – are not designed to enhance the States’ representation
in Congress or shore up their political position more generally. If anything, the Court’s
notion of immunity may be counterproductive to that purpose.341
These two areas of the Court’s jurisprudence – the Commerce Clause and
immunity cases – have also generally featured “hard” doctrinal rules. Although Congress
has treated Lopez as a remand for more legislative findings,342 that effort seems unlikely
to save the statute should it be challenged again. It seems better to read Lopez and
especially Morrison as categorical statements that non-commercial activities are simply
outside the scope of Congress’s commerce power. So, too, with the immunity cases.
There, the Court has substituted a hard rule (Congress simply may not abrogate state
immunities when it acts pursuant to its Article I powers343) for the pre-existing soft one
(Congress may abrogate only by making a very, very clear statement of its intent344).
Indeed, to the extent that the soft rule remains operative in Section Five abrogation
cases,345 the Court has watered it down by no longer requiring painfully explicit
abrogation language in the text of the statute itself.346 That move strongly suggests that
the Court has placed its faith in hard rules as the primary guarantors of state sovereignty.
As with the choice between sovereignty and autonomy, the Court’s preference for
hard, substantive rules may be best illustrated by the cases in which the justices in the
usual pro-states majority have not sided with the States. Again, the preemption cases are
the best example. The basic presumption against preemption in statutory construction347
is substantive in the sense that it would turn upon the substantive effect of the federal
statute in question rather than defects in the lawmaking process that gave rise to the
statute.348 But we might rely on process-oriented justifications for such a rule. One
might argue, for instance, that the sort of concentrated interest groups that often seek
preemption of state regulation have certain organizational advantages at the federal level
that offset state representation.349 More fundamentally, one might emphasize the extent
341

See Young, State Sovereign Immunity, supra note 184, at ___ (arguing that immunity rules may lead
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to which widespread preemption threatens the state autonomy necessary to maintain a
viable system of political checks on central power.350 Consistent with its focus on the
substantive scope of federal power, the Rehnquist Court has been relatively uninterested
in these sorts of arguments.
The presumption against preemption is also the quintessential “soft” limit on
federal power. When the courts rule that a federal statute does not preempt state law,
Congress can always amend the act to clarify its intent to preempt more broadly. The
unwillingness of many usually pro-states justices to apply the anti-preemption canon
rigorously may reflect a general lack of faith in soft rules and a preference for the harder
limits offered in cases like Lopez or Seminole Tribe. That preference is explicit in the
writings of several scholars sympathetic to the general aims of the Federalist Revival but
critical of the presumption against preemption.351
There may be any number of explanations for the pro-states justices’ distaste for
the presumption against preemption. It may reflect the fact that federal preemption
generally displaces more rigorous state regulation, so that political conservatives
generally hostile to government regulation may be sympathetic to preemption
arguments.352 Several of the ordinarily pro-states justices, like Justice Scalia, tend to
believe that statutes have a readily discernible “plain meaning”; for that reason, they may
be relatively uninterested in “clear statement” rules whose application is predicated on
statutory ambiguity.353 I explore this question of motivation further in a companion
article.354 The important point for present purposes, however, is simply that the five
justices ordinarily constituting the Rehnquist Court’s pro-states majority have tended to
deemphasize the most important form of “soft” limit on federal power.
But just as the Rehnquist Court has not single-mindedly pursued sovereignty over
autonomy, so, too, it has taken different directions at different times on the focus and
structure of judicial review. Under the Commerce Clause, for instance, Lopez and
Morrison exist side-by-side with Jones v. United States355 and Solid Waste Association v.
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,356 both of which employed “soft” clear statement rules to
avoid decision whether the statutes in question fell within or without the outer reaches of
the Commerce Clause. Jones used a soft rule that turned on the substance of the
regulated activity (arson of a non-commercial building).357 Solid Waste, on the other
350
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hand, combined its soft rule with a process-based concern about delegation of power to
administrative agencies.358 In essence, Solid Waste held that administrative agencies
(which in corporate no mechanism for representing state interests) may not push the
limits of the Commerce Clause unless Congress (where the states are represented) clearly
authorizes them to do so.359
The anti-commandeering doctrine of Printz and New York offers a more dramatic
instance of process federalism.360 While that doctrine is not concerned with the process
that led to enactment of a law like the Brady Act, it does focus on the ways in which
commandeering can undermine the political safeguards that ordinarily operate to protect
states. Hence, the Court has emphasized the ways in which commandeering distorts the
ordinary operation of the political process by shifting the costs of regulation and
obscuring which level of government is responsible for unpopular policies.361 Justice
Scalia explained in Printz that
By forcing state governments to absorb the financial burden of
implementing a federal regulatory program, Members of Congress can
take credit for "solving" problems without having to ask their constituents
to pay for the solutions with higher federal taxes. And even when the
States are not forced to absorb the costs of implementing a federal
program, they are still put in the position of taking the blame for its
burdensomeness and for its defects.362
Put another way, the anti-commandeering doctrine helps shore up the political safeguards
of federalism by forcing the national government to internalize the costs – both fiscal and
political – of its actions.363
Printz and New York establish the anti-commandeering principle as a hard limit
on national power: Congress cannot, for instance, overcome that principle by clearly
stating its intent to do so. But much of that firmness disappears when we take into
account the Court’s refusal to place any meaningful limits on Congress’s power to
358
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condition federal funding on state compliance with federal directives.364 Absent such
limits, Congress may generally purchase state implementation of federal policies through
conditions on the grant of federal funds.365 That hardly renders the anti-commandeering
doctrine meaningless; as Roderick Hills has demonstrated, there are good reasons to
prefer a regime under which Congress must purchase state implementation rather than
simply mandate it.366 In particular, the purchase price undermines Congress’s ability to
use commandeering to externalize the costs of its regulation. The conditional spending
option does, however, largely transform the anti-commandeering rule into a “soft”
doctrine that Congress can generally overcome through further action.367
These examples again demonstrate that while particular models of judicial review
may help to analyze trends in the jurisprudence of actual courts, we rarely see such
models in their pure form. It seems fair to say that the vision of federalism embraced by
the five justices of the Rehnquist Court’s usually pro-states majority leans strongly
toward this “strong sovereignty” model, choosing sovereignty over autonomy, substance
over process-oriented rules, and hard doctrines rather than soft ones. To say the
jurisprudence “leans” in this direction is to admit that not all cases fit the pattern. But the
model is useful, I hope, in comparing the majority’s approach both to other positions on
the Court and to the somewhat different model I will be pressing here.
C.

Weak Autonomy

If state sovereignty has prospered under the Rehnquist Court, state autonomy has
had a considerably tougher time of it. That might initially seem like a strange judgment;
after all, many still see Lopez v. United States – as well as its follow-up in United States
v. Morrison – as the paradigm cases of the Federalist Revival. The Commerce Clause
cases do address state autonomy relatively directly by holding that some areas are offlimits to federal legislation.368 If Congress were to attempt to supplant state autonomy to
make regulatory decisions over physician-assisted suicide or gay marriage, for example,
Lopez and Morrison would likely offer the most promising basis for challenging such
legislation.369
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The emphasis on Lopez and Morrison is understandable. Lopez was the most
dramatic of all the recent cases in its departure from prior trends, invalidating a federal
statute under the Commerce Clause for the first time in nearly 60 years. The Commerce
Clause cases are also the easiest to teach in the first-year course in Constitutional Law,
which is often the only exposure to constitutional federalism that attorneys receive in law
school. The more significant cases concerning state sovereign immunity, for instance,
are typically held for more advanced courses in federal jurisdiction.370
Nonetheless, Lopez and Morrison are likely to have only limited practical
significance. They seem thus far to have had little impact on the lower courts.371 And
even if lower court judges could be persuaded to follow, it is unclear how far the
Supreme Court is willing to lead. Lopez and Morrison were both extreme cases; if the
Court had upheld either the Gun Free School Zones Act or the Violence Against Women
Act, it would have been very difficult to say there was any limit at all on the commerce
power.372 To say that such a limit exists, however, is not to say that it is very
constraining. Most important, the Court has conceded that the national economy has
become integrated to the extent that there is no meaningful distinction between intra- and
inter-state commerce; rather, there is just “commerce.”373 And the Court has also
eschewed any effort to compartmentalize the various forms of economic activity, as it
once sought to distinguish between “commerce” and “manufacturing” or “agriculture.”374
Now all of these things are “commerce”; that term, the Court has made clear,

Commercial Regulations but Preserve State Control Over Social Issues, 85 IOWA L. REV. 1, 170-72 (1999)
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comprehends all “economic activity.”375 These concessions belie Erwin Chemerinsky’s
assertion that “there has been a revolution with regard to the structure of the American
government because of the Supreme Court decisions in the last few years regarding
federalism.”376
Despite such breathless assessments, these decisions seem important mostly for
what they symbolize, not what they actually do. They may also (perhaps) remind the
Congress to consider the limits of its powers when it acts.377 We must look elsewhere,
however, for meaningful protection for state autonomy. Fortunately, there is an
elsewhere, and it crops up in an unusual quarter. The same justices who have formed a
monolithic dissenting bloc in cases like Lopez, Printz, and Seminole Tribe378 have also, in
a different class of opinions dealing with the preemption of state law, developed their
own theory of federalism enforcement. This theory forms the heart of the “weak
autonomy” model of federalism doctrine.
I have already canvassed some of the Court’s recent preemption cases in my
treatment of the strong sovereignty model. As I discussed, cases like Lorillard Tobacco
Co. v. Reilly are striking because they reverse the ordinary voting alignments: Ordinarily
pro-states justices forget about federalism in preemption cases, and generally nationalist
justices suddenly remember. Nor are Lorillard or Iowa Utilities Board flukes. As Dan
Meltzer has shown, the Lopez majority is consistently pro-preemption and the Lopez
dissenters consistently oppose it.379
The significance of the preemption cases goes beyond the voting alignments,
however. Equally important are the rationales that the putatively nationalist give for
reaching the results that they do. All these cases concern the central problem of how to
treat federal statutes that are ambiguous on the subject of their preemptive effect on state
law. There are a variety of sub-issues: How does the presence of an express preemption
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clause change the analysis for issues outside the scope of that clause?380 How much
deference should the views of the enforcing agency get on the preemption question?381
Does it matter if Congress is regulating within a field of “traditional state concern”?382
But at bottom these are generally cases about how strongly to apply a longstanding rule
of statutory construction that Congress should generally make itself clear before a court
should find preemption of state law.383 On this question, the Lopez dissenters have
generally demanded considerably more evidence to defeat this “presumption against
preemption” than have the members of the Lopez majority.384
Justice Stevens’ dissent in Geier v. American Honda Motor Co.385 provides a
good window into the weak autonomy model of federalism doctrine. Geier was one of
five major preemption cases decided in the 1999 Term.386 All of them went against the
States, at the same time that the Court was working hard to promote state sovereignty in
cases like Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents387 and the Alden trilogy.388 Geier itself was
a products liability suit by an injured motorist who claimed that her car was defectively
380
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designed because it lacked an airbag. Honda defended on the ground that Department of
Transportation standards promulgated under the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle
Safety Act did not require airbags for Ms. Geier’s model year, and that this federal policy
judgment preempted the state tort suit.389 A majority of the Court agreed, finding that
while the Act itself did not expressly preempt Ms. Geier’s suit, the suit did conflict with
the policy embodied in the DOT’s regulations promulgated under the Act.390
Justice Stevens began his analysis in dissent by noting that “‘[t]his is a case about
federalism,’” raising “important questions concerning the way in which the Federal
Government may exercise its undoubted power to oust state courts of their traditional
jurisdiction over common-law tort actions.”391 He emphasized the impact of federal
preemption on the state’s autonomy to make basic policy choices for itself, insisting
that”[t]he Supremacy Clause does not give unelected federal judges carte blanche to use
federal law as a means of imposing their own ideas of tort reform on the States.”392
Justice Stevens also highlighted the process concerns implicated by doctrines of implied
preemption like the conflict theory employed by the Geier majority. “Congress neither
enacted any such rule itself [that state courts may not entertain airbag suits] nor
authorized the Secretary of Transportation to do so.”393 In such cases, the presumption
against preemption should control:
The signal virtues of this presumption are its placement of the power of
pre-emption squarely in the hands of Congress, which is far more suited
than the Judiciary to strike the appropriate state/federal balance
(particularly in areas of traditional state regulation) . . . . In this way, the
structural safeguards inherent in the normal operation of the legislative
process operate to defend state interests from undue infringement.394
389
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By quoting that language, Justice Stevens both tweaked his more conservative colleagues in the majority
(Stevens had dissented in Coleman) and made the more important point that preemption cases raise the
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Finally, Justice Stevens stressed the dialogic nature of the “soft” presumption against
preemption; rejecting the preemption argument in the case before the Court, he noted,
would still leave to the political branches the option of clarifying their preemptive intent
later on.395
The presumption against preemption that Justice Stevens argued for in Geier is, of
course, a rule of statutory construction. For that reason, many seem to treat preemption
cases as hardly raising any constitutional issues at all.396 But the presumption against
preemption – along with the other pro-federalism “clear statement” rules – are in fact a
form of constitutional review. Clear statement rules matter only when they cause a court
to pick an interpretation of a statute other than the one it would have picked in the
absence of the rule.397 That requires us to ask, What justifies a court in departing from
what would otherwise be its best interpretation of what the enacting Congress intended?
I argue in Part VII that he best answer to that question in the federalism context – perhaps
the only plausible answer – is that principles of federalism derived from the constitutional
structure require the departure. The clear statement rules must be defended on the same
sorts of grounds as, say, the anti-commandeering doctrine: Both doctrines are judgemade rules, not clearly grounded in constitutional text, but functionally promising as
means to enforce federalism under contemporary conditions.398
When a court applies a judge-made rule of statutory construction for the purpose
of protecting state autonomy, in other words, it is enforcing the Constitution. Such a
decision neither ignores federalism concerns nor, as Justice Souter suggested in his
Morrison dissent, “remits them to politics.”399 The preemption cases thus make clear that
when these justices speak of “political safeguards” in the Commerce Clause and state
sovereign immunity cases, they are willing to formulate and apply doctrine to try to
ensure that those safeguards have some bite.
Several qualifications are in order. First, the various justices’ positions in
preemption cases are not nearly as consistent as their positions on the Commerce Clause
or the Eleventh Amendment. Justice Breyer wrote the pro-preemption majority opinion
Id. at 980-09 (quoting California Coastal Comm’n v. Granite Rock Co., 480 U.S. 572, 583 (1987)).
395
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in Geier, for example, and Justice Thomas dissented in Iowa Utilities Board.400 Over the
run of cases, the four Lopez dissenters are pretty consistently “better” for the States in
preemption cases, but these cases are not uniformly five-to-four, many are unanimous,
and most justices are likely to vote for preemption in some cases and others. This should
not be surprising, since preemption cases will always turn at least in part on what the
particular statute in question actually says.
The second caveat is that while the dissenters have promoted a vision of processbased, soft limits on federal power in the preemption cases, they have often been
unwilling to follow that model in similar sorts of cases arising in other contexts.
Although the record is mixed, these justices have often been skeptical of pro-federalism
clear statement rules outside the context of preemption.401 Justice Stevens, who often
seems the intellectual leader of the bloc in terms of developing an alternative positive
vision of state autonomy, nonetheless dissented from the seminal clear statement decision
in Gregory v. Ashcroft.402 Both Justices Stevens and Souter have been skeptical of clear
statement rules protecting state governments from statutory liability,403 and none of the
Lopez dissenters were willing to accept a clear statement requirement for federal
legislation delegating authority to federal administrative agencies seeking to push the
limits of the commerce power.404
Even more important, the “weak autonomy” justices have been unwilling to
extend their notion of process federalism to embrace “hard” rules predicated on political
malfunctions. All four joined Justice Stevens’s strong dissent in Printz, which rejected
“hard” limits in favor of “political safeguards” for state authority.405 This rejection of the
process-based anti-commandeering doctrine, taken together with their reticence on clear
statement rules outside the preemption context, suggests that the Lopez dissenters have
not yet followed through on Garcia’s invitation to develop a full-blown “Democracy and
Distrust” model of federalism doctrine.

400

See generally Young, Preemption, supra note ___, at ___ (describing the voting patterns in preemption
cases in more detail).

401

Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848 (2000), is the most important exception to this skepticism. Jones
was unanimous, and Justice Ginsburg wrote the majority opinion. Jones v. United States, Justice Stevens’s
concurrence explicitly linked the clear statement rule employed in Jones to the presumption against
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Notwithstanding these limitations, it is important to recognize that the Lopez
dissenters do have a theory of federalism. It is not judicial abdication, and it highlights a
value – state autonomy – that the Court’s putatively pro-states majority has often ignored.
The dissenters’ theory may be incomplete, as I argue in the next section, but it deserves to
be taken seriously.
D.

Strong Autonomy

The weak autonomy model of federalism doctrine has much to recommend it, but
I doubt it describes in itself an adequate judicial role in enforcing the federal balance. Its
unwillingness to draw any firm substantive boundaries for federal power seems likely to
send a dangerous message to Congress – that is, that it may behave as if no such
boundaries exist.406 And it likely underestimates the extent to which some problems with
the process by which states are supposedly represented in Congress may require stronger
medicine than clear statement rules. In this Section, I sketch the outlines of a model that
borrows much from weak autonomy but is, in general, somewhat more willing to look to
substance and to employ hard doctrinal rules. For want of a better term, I call this model
“strong autonomy.”
The approach I propose differs from the “weak autonomy” model in at least three
important respects. First, it would employ a wider variety of soft, clear statement-type
rules than the Lopez dissenters have been willing to accept. While the dissenters have
been relatively strong supporters of the presumption against preemption, they have been
far more reluctant to accept other clear statement rules, such as the requirement that
Congress generally may not delegate authority to push the limits of its Commerce Clause
authority to an administrative.407 This reluctance is understandable: The clear statement
rules are often predicated on the canon of avoiding constitutional doubts, and in many of
these cases the dissenters believe that there is no constitutional difficulty under the
Commerce Clause to be “avoided.”408 Better, then, simply to enforce the statute as it
would be interpreted without any such presumption.
This view, however, neglects the possibility that federalism constraints like the
Commerce Clause may simply be under-enforced. As Larry Sager has demonstrated,
some constitutional principles are never fully realized in judicial doctrine because of
institutional constraints on the ability of courts to enforce them; this does not mean,
however, that those “underenforced” norms are not themselves constitutional law.409 For
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Simply acknowledging some limit on Congress, on the other hand, may be salutary even if it is not a
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them.” Posting of Douglas Laycock to CONLAWPROF@listserv.ucla.edu (Aug. 1, 2000) (quoted with
permission).
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reasons that I discuss further in Part VI, it makes sense to think of many constitutional
limits on federal power as underenforced, especially after 1937.410 That fact argues for
decoupling the federalism clear statement rules from the existence of an underlying
constitutional likelihood that a court would strike down the statute in question if it were
not narrowly interpreted. The fact that Congress might well have the authority to
regulate migratory birds in the Solid Waste case, for example, doesn’t mean that it is
inappropriate to require a clear statement delegating authority to the Corps of Engineers
to do so. Hence, even if one accepts the dissenting position that courts are not
institutionally well-suited to enforce hard limits on the Commerce Clause, one might still
think that soft limits on that authority are justified. The strong autonomy model would
also value the process-forcing aspects of these clear statement rules, not just in
preemption cases but across the board.411
Second, the strong autonomy model contemplates that process federalism may be
enforced through hard rules as well as soft ones. In this, it builds upon the suggestion in
Garcia that “[a]ny substantive restraint on the exercise of Commerce Clause powers must
find its justification in the procedural nature of this basic limitation, and it must be
tailored to compensate for possible failings in the national political process.”412 The anticommandeering rule of Printz and New York is a good example: Because they clarify
lines of political accountability and force the national government to internalize its
financial and political costs, Printz and New York fit squarely into the model of processcorrecting doctrines that Garcia seemed to authorize. Given the importance of such
rules, moreover, the strong autonomy model might also seek ways to constrain
Congress’s ability to circumvent them through the spending power.
The “weak autonomy” justices, however, have made relatively clear that they are
unwilling to go beyond “soft” presumptions in imposing limits on federal power.413 It
seems likely that this reluctance stems from an intuition that “clear statement” rules are
not really constitutional rules at all – they’re just rules of statutory construction. I have
already argued that that view is a mistake: One cannot justify pushing the interpretation
of a statute in a particular substantive direction unless one thinks either that the enacting
legislature would have intended that direction or some other source of law authorizes the
push. Few think the federalism canons are in fact accurate descriptions of Congress’s
intent, and the only alternative justification for them is that they are derived from the
410

See Young, Constitutional Avoidance, supra note ___, at 1603-04 & n.281 (suggesting that several
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412

Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 554 (1985).

413
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constitutional structure itself.414 If that is so, then there is considerably less of a
principled distinction between “hard” and “soft” rules than the Lopez dissenters seem to
think.
Finally, the approach I propose recognizes a link between process and substance
in cases implicating state autonomy. As I discuss in Part ___, arguments about “political
safeguards” for federalism presuppose that states are viable, functioning governments
with sufficiently important and salient responsibilities to attract and retain the loyalty of
their citizens. For that to be true, however, states must retain some minimum level of
autonomy. Process federalism probably cannot work without some ultimate check on the
national government’s ability to appropriate important governmental responsibilities
exercised by the states. Any rule designed to maintain that check, however, seems likely
to be substantive in its structure. It seems likely that process checks should play a
primary role in constraining the national government, but some minimal substantive
check may also be necessary.415
Much of the remainder of this essay is concerned with fleshing out and defending
this strong autonomy model of federalism doctrine. Whether or not that defense is
persuasive, however, it is important to recognize that different sorts of federalism
doctrines may have quite different implications. Our current debates about federalism,
unfortunately, generally fail to recognize many of these distinctions. That has lent a
stilted and ideological cast to discussions about federalism in the academy and in the
society at large. We are more likely to come up with persuasive solutions if we realize
that the problem is more complex and multi-sided than is frequently supposed.
III.

Federalism, History, and Constitutional Change

My central concern in this article is how we should choose among the different
theories of federalism doctrine discussed in the preceding Part. One possibility is that the
text and history of the Constitution make that decision for us, either by mandating
particular doctrines or at least embodying a particular theory of federalism. Assuming
we find text and history binding – and I will discuss different reasons why we might –
these two possibilities suggest different degrees of constraint for judges tasked with
enforcing federalism today. The former would leave relatively little room for judicial
creativity; federalism doctrine would be found, not made. The latter, on the other hand,
would leave judges free to fashion means for implementing, say, a strong sovereignty
theory of federalism, but would foreclose consideration of alternate models.
I argue in this Part that neither text nor history constrains federalism doctrine in
either of these two senses. While textual and historical arguments have played a critical
role in recent federalism cases – witness, for instance, the historical trench warfare
between Justices Stevens and Thomas in the Term Limits case416 – they play a less central
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part in my own analysis. This hardly means that text and history are unimportant, but
they leave many of the crucial questions unanswered. This Part seeks to explain what the
role of text and history is, and to explore the limits of what history can and can’t tell us
about federalism.
The most important role for text and history, I argue in Section A, is to require us
to have a federalism doctrine. The Constitution creates a federal structure and its
provisions presuppose the continued viability of two distinct levels of government.
Fidelity to that design requires a continuing commitment to the basic elements of that
structure; even if one were convinced that all the functional arguments for federalism
discussed in the previous Part were spurious, it would not be open to us to reject
federalism and create a unitary structure.
Government officials bound by the
Constitution have a continuing obligation to enact and enforce laws and create doctrines
that maintain the basic attributes of the federalism in place. But exploring the basis for
such an obligation makes clear that it necessarily entails substantial flexibility in adapting
the original structure to current needs.
Section B contends that this is true notwithstanding the fact that the historical
thrust of the Founding era was to centralize government. A number of scholars have
pointed out that the drafters of our Constitution generally were nationalists, driven by the
failures of the Articles of Confederation to create a much stronger national government
than anything the country had known before; as a result, these scholars claim, it is
anachronistic to look to the Founders for support for limits on national authority.417
While conceding the premise, I argue that the conclusion does not follow. The fact that
the Founders wished to create an equilibrium more nationalist than the previous
arrangement hardly proves that under present circumstances, when national power has
expanded beyond their wildest dreams, fidelity to the Constitution does not support
movement in the opposite direction.
Finally, in Section C, I argue that text and history can tell us relatively little about
the shape of federalism doctrine under contemporary circumstances. The primary
strategy of the original Constitution for preserving the federal balance – the doctrine of
enumerated powers – has become far less effective over the last century with the advent
of an integrated national economy. And the Framers’ political strategy, relying on the
direct representation of the States in Congress, has been undermined by such
developments as the direct election of senators and the advent of political parties and
interest group politics.
These developments do not release us from the obligation to
preserve a federal balance, but they do mean that contemporary statesmen and judges
may well have to devise new and innovative techniques to protect that balance under
modern conditions.
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See, e.g., Mark R. Killenbeck, Pursuing the Great Experiment: Reserved Powers in a Post-Ratification,
Compound Republic, 1999 SUP. CT. REV. 81, 85 (“[T]he recent federalism opinions undervalue the extent
to which the Framers and Founders embraced certain constitutional precepts as necessary means for
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A.

Fidelity and Its Limits

Debates about federalism often proceed as if the constitutional principle of
federalism must stand or fall based on the functional values that it serves. The implicit
suggestion seems to be that if federalism can be shown to be a bad idea from the
standpoint of protecting human rights or promoting good policy, we would be justified in
reading that principle out of the Constitution. That suggestion flies in the face of the very
notion of constitutionalism, which is to entrench certain structures and values so that they
will be highly resistant to change, even if those structures or values fall out of favor with
the present generation.418 My own view, of course, is that federalism does serve
important values, and Part III of this essay argues that those values should help determine
the structure of federalism doctrine in important ways. But I want to insist in this Section
that the constitutional principle of a federal balance would compel our adherence even if
it could be shown to be pernicious from a policy standpoint.
Any argument from fidelity, of course, must begin with what the text and history
of the Constitution actually entail. Because those materials have been well-canvassed
elsewhere, I provide only the briefest overview here. I then discuss the nature and limits
of arguments from textual and historical fidelity in the context of federalism.
1.

Text and History

The constitutional text says relatively little about federalism. But then, why
would it? As I have discussed,419 this is the national government’s constitution, not a
constitution for the system as a whole. The essential creative work of the federal
constitution was to empower the new national government and establish its internal
structure. Just as the federal Bill of Rights was originally unconcerned with limiting state
governments,420 so too the original Constitution was not directly concerned with
empowering state governments.421
One critical component of the federal structure is present in the original text: the
principle of enumerated powers. Simply by listing specific powers for Congress rather
than conferring a general legislative authority, Article I establishes the notion that federal

418

See, e.g., Lino A. Graglia, “Interpreting” the Constitution: Posner on Bork, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1019,
1030 (1992) (“The purpose of constitutional restrictions on self government is to impede policy
, § 1 -8, at 23 (comparing
adjustments in light of changing circumstances.”); 1 TRIBE, supra note 67
constitutional restrictions to the ropes that bound Ulysses to the mast of his ship so that he would not be
able to succumb to the temptation of the Sirens).
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See Matthew D. Adler, State Sovereignty and the Anti-Commandeering Cases, 574 ANNALS AM. POL.
SCI. ASS’N 158, 162 (2001) ( “Places in the constitutional text where the states are explicitly accorded
rights against the national government are few in number and relatively minimal in importance--notably,
Article I, Section 9's prohibition of federal taxes on exports from any state and of federal preferences for
the ports of one state over another; Article IV, Section 3's ban on the creation of new states through the
division or merger of old ones; and various references to the state legislatures, implying that Congress
cannot validly abolish them.”).
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Although Article I also included a robust notion of implied
power is limited.422
423
powers, Chief Justice Marshall would acknowledge in Gibbons v. Ogden that “[t]he
enumeration presupposes something not enumerated.”424 The Tenth Amendment
emphatically underlines this notion.425 Even if Justice Stone was right to suggest that this
Amendment states “but a truism that all is retained which has not been surrendered,”426
contemporary confusion about that point suggests that this in itself is an important office.
In hindsight, it turns out that categorical enumeration may not be such a great
strategy for guaranteeing balance in a federal system.427 As I discuss in Section B, the
failure of this strategy to prevent the national government from invading virtually every
category of state activity presents a difficult problem for federalism doctrine. For present
purposes, however, my point is simply that the original constitution includes, as a purely
textual matter, a strong commitment to a balanced federal structure. The document not
only refers to the states as viable and responsible actors at several points, but also
structures the basic grant of federal lawmaking power – arguably the Constitution’s most
important feature – in a way designed to preserve state autonomy.
If the text itself focuses on empowering the federal government, the surrounding
history features more prominent concern for protecting the states. As Justice Powell
observed in Garcia, “[m]uch of the initial opposition to the Constitution was rooted in the
fear that the National Government would be too powerful and eventually would eliminate
the States as viable political entities.”428 Some of this concern shaped the drafting of the
document itself at Philadelphia. As Jack Rakove has recounted, James Madison and
422
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James Wilson arrived at Philadelphia with an aggressive plan “to render the Union
politically independent of the states and the states legally dependent on national
oversight.”429 But this position “only inspired other delegates to articulate their notions
of statehood with equal vigor, ultimately producing in recoil a reaffirmation of the vital
place that the states would occupy in the federal system.”430 That reaffirmation is
reflected in the structure of the Senate, implementation of the principle of federal
supremacy, and the scope and definition of federal legislative power.431
These concessions did not satisfy everyone. In one of the most influential
critiques, for example, Elbridge Gerry complained that “[t]he Constitution has few, if any
federal features, but is rather a system of national government.”432 Brutus, a
pseudonymous writer in New York, conceded that the proposed Constitution did not “go
to a perfect and entire consolidation,” yet warned that “it approaches so near to it, that it
must, if executed, certainly and infallibly terminate in it.”433 As I discuss further in
Section B, most Anti-Federalists were not states-rights absolutists; many were willing to
concede the need to strengthen national authority beyond the Articles of Confederation
model.434 But virtually all Anti-Federalists feared that the Philadelphia draft took this
imperative too far.435
The Anti-Federalist opposition does not, of course, itself establish a constitutional
commitment to federalism; standing alone, it would corroborate claims that the
Constitution was a profoundly nationalizing document.436 What is critical is the response
to these concerns by the Constitution’s proponents. They might have conceded the
charge of consolidation and defended the virtues of national government; that is surely
what most legal scholars today would haven chosen to do had they been there.437 But
429
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instead the Constitution’s most prominent defenders chose to concede – even reaffirm –
the importance of state governments and deny that the proposed national entity would
unduly threaten the states’ role. As Mark Killenbeck observes, the Antifederalists’
“concerns were widely shared, and these individuals played an important role in shaping
the text, the ratification dialogues, and, eventually, the drafting and ratification of what
became the Tenth Amendment.”438 The debates thus strongly suggest that both Federalist
and Anti-Federalist leaders alike were committed to a meaningful role for state
governments under the new regime.439 More importantly, the fact that such arguments
were thought to be necessary in order to achieve ratification indicates broad-based
support for federalism in the Founding Generation at large.
The Federalist assurances about state sovereignty and autonomy have been wellcatalogued elsewhere,440 and I will provide only a few illustrative examples here. James
Wilson’s summation to the Pennsylvania ratifying convention insisted that the proposed
Constitution, “instead of placing the state governments in jeopardy, is founded on their
existence.”441 Madison conceded in Federalist 39 that the new government had several
national features but emphasized that it remained federal in many crucial respects. In
particular, he observed that in “the extent of its powers . . . . the proposed Government
cannot be deemed a national one; since its jurisdiction extends to certain enumerated
objects only, and leaves to the several States a residuary and inviolable sovereignty over
all other objects.”442 And more specific assurances were given as well. Hamilton, for
example, pledged in Federalist 81 that nothing in the Constitution should be understood
as overriding the traditional principle of state sovereign immunity.443
Nor were these references to the continuing importance of state governments
mere grudging concessions to the opposition. Federalism, for instance, constitutes one
half of the “double security” at the core of Madison’s theory of checks and balances in
Federalist 51.444 Lance Banning has concluded that “[d]uring the ratification contest, as
438
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in 1793, Madison desired a well-constructed, partly federal republic—not, like Hamilton,
because he thought that nothing more could be obtained, but (more like many
Antifederalists of 1788) because he thought that nothing else would prove consistent with
the Revolution.”445
As Professor Banning’s comments indicate, not all Framers –
especially not Hamilton – necessarily shared this view. But where we must choose
between them, it seems likely that Madison’s is the more important perspective.446
In the end, some of the Framers may have had their doubts about state power.447
But we deal here in original understandings, not intentions,448 and there seems little
doubt that the Constitution was understood to reserve an important place for state
governments. As Jack Rakove concludes,
The existence of the states was simply a given fact of American
governance, and it confronted the framers at every stage of their
deliberations. In the abstract, some of the framers could imagine
redrawing the boundaries of the existing states, and a few hoped to convert
the states into mere provinces with few if any pretensions to sovereignty.
But in practice the reconstruction of the federal Union repeatedly led the
framers to accommodate their misgivings about the capacities of state
government to the stubborn realities of law, politics, and history that
worked to preserve the residual authority of the states—and with it the
ambiguities of federalism with which later generations would continue to
wrestle.449
I begin wrestling with exactly what the Framers’ accommodation commits us to in the
next subsection.
2.

The Argument from Fidelity

If the text and history of the Constitution entail a commitment to federalism, what
does that mean for the Constitution’s present interpreters? The answer depends on two
different kinds of constitutional theories: a theory of obligation and a theory of
interpretation.450 The first asks, What is it about the Constitution that binds us? The
second inquires, How do we ascertain the meaning of the materials that bind us?
Although these two questions are related in important ways, they are not the same, and
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keeping them separate will help in assessing arguments about fidelity to the
Constitution’s federalist commitments.451
One might express this insistence in a number of different ways, depending on the
theory of constitutional obligation that one brings to the enterprise. Those who view the
Constitution as a binding social contract would stress the inherent authority of the initial
bargain. Other sorts of originalists might stress the binding nature of the Constitution as
law, based on the authority vested in the Ratifiers by the sovereign People.452
Conventionalists, on the other hand, would emphasize the need for society to agree on a
basic set of constitutive principles; such agreement becomes difficult if, once a particular
document is agreed upon, people remained free to pick and choose which principles in
that document will actually be binding in individual instances.453 Finally, Burkeans
would point to the prescriptive wisdom immanent in a political order that has survived for
over two centuries and view departures from that order with suspicion.454
Each of these different arguments establishes the binding nature of constitutional
obligation, independent of whether we would approve various principles or structures in
the Constitution on moral or policy grounds.455 The breadth of that obligation, however,
will depend at least to some extent on the particular rationale for constitutional obligation
one accepts. The broadest obligation would stem from the view that the original
understanding binds of its own force – that is, we are bound by the Framers’ conception
of federalism because they said so. I have argued at length elsewhere that this conception
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of constitutionalism is less persuasive than one that takes account of the entire arc of our
history,456 and most seem unwilling to accord this sort of dispositive authority to a
particular phase of our national development. And even those who do accept the
contractarian account of obligation tend to moderate its implications for radical change in
other ways, such as a strong commitment to stare decisis in adjudication.457 Others have
insisted that fidelity to the Constitution’s original understanding may require, under
modern circumstances, some alteration in institutions or doctrine.458
The other accounts of obligation produce significantly more limited implications.
Take conventionalism first. The basic notion here is that a diverse society needs to agree
on a basic set of ground rules, which include not only a constitution but also basic rules
for interpreting that constitution.459 The need to secure widespread agreement tends to
rule out efforts to substitute some other set of principles for the constitution that history
has left us. But conventionalism is basically presentist in its fundamental criterion: the
need to secure societal acceptance. As a result, the constitution that binds is the one that
has come down to us – a product of the entire arc of our history, rather than a few isolated
founding moments. If the fundamental goal is societal agreement on a basic set of rules,
we cannot isolate the Constitution from “the gloss that life has written on it,”460 because
that gloss informs what our fellow citizens understand the Constitution to mean.461 The
conventionalist is thus bound by more recent history as well as the Founding, and he will
find it impossible to reject entirely the more nationalizing trends of the Twentieth
Century.
The Burkean perspective is similar. Like the conventionalist, the binding force of
history extends to the whole sweep of our national story: not just 1787, but 1800, 1868,
1876, 1937, 1980, 1994, etc. Burkeans are skeptical of human reason and foresight in the
setting-up of political arrangements, and they doubt the capacity of any single generation,
no matter how extraordinary, to comprehend, anticipate, and capture in a set of political
institutions all the needs and contingencies of a large and complex society.462 They thus
456
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stress the organic and incremental growth of political institutions over time. 463 This
perspective at once inspires a reverence for the past – the present generation, after all, is
no more omniscient than its predecessors – and a limit on that reverence based on
appreciating the need for constant reform.464 The insistence that reform be incremental,
however, means that Burkeans will be almost prohibitively reluctant to launch a broad
attack on established institutions.465 Like the conventionalist, then, a Burkean proponent
of federalism must be prepared to live with the New Deal and other institutional
alterations in the original structure that have themselves stood the test of time.
From a variety of different theoretical perspectives, then, federalism’s prominent
place in the original constitutional design as well as its continuing significance in the
years since impose an obligation of fidelity to the notion of a federal balance between
States and Nation.
As Jenna Bednar and William Eskridge have observed,
“[c]onstitutional law must make some sense of federalism.”466 The conventionalist and
Burkean perspectives allow for gradual evolution of this balance over time, however.
Moreover, as I have already discussed, even a strong originalists may have to allow for
“translation” of the original understanding into contemporary circumstances.467 For that
reason, history can provide only limited guidance on the question of what federalism
doctrines to adopt. Before discussing that problem, however, I must deal with a potential
counter-argument – that is, that because the Founding Generation intended the
Constitution to create a more nationalistic one than existed under the Articles of
Confederation, fidelity in fact requires adherence to a strong nationalist vision. I address
that argument in the next section.
B.

The Nationalist Vector

One cannot dispute that the Constitution is a centralizing document. The Framers
did not meet in Philadelphia in 1787 because they feared the overweening power of the
Confederation Congress. Rather, they were concerned about weakness at the center:
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Congress’s inability “to frame and implement satisfactory foreign policies,”468 for
example, or to put the Union on a firmer financial footing.469 Many of the Framers were
also profoundly mistrustful of the competence and good faith of the state governments
with respect to their internal policies, and they sought a national constraint on state
politics.470 The direction of movement at Philadelphia clearly was from a comparatively
less centralized to a more centralized plan of government.
The question is the significance of this centralizing purpose for contemporary
constitutional interpretation. Some have urged that fidelity to the Founders’ purpose
requires that we continue their nationalist project. Mark Killenbeck, for example, has
insisted that “current reserved powers opinions . . . shortchange the extent to which the
decisions made in the nation’s formative years were motivated by and directed toward a
pervasive desire to curtail the sovereignty of ‘subordinately useful’ states.”471 The
suggestion seems to be that since the Framers meant to move the country from a less to a
more centralized state, it is illegitimate to invoke their understanding of the federal
balance for the opposite purpose – that is, to justify an effort to reinvigorate state power
and autonomy.
The counter-argument – which I mean to argue for here – is that however much
more centralized the 1787 Constitution was than the Articles of Confederation, we have
now moved far beyond what even the most nationalist Framers could have envisioned.
The position is not so much that the Framers would favor a more limited federal
government if we could ask them today – we can’t. Rather, it is that the original
understanding of the Constitution embodied a notion of balance between state and
national authority that was more centralized than the Articles but lesscentralized than,
say, the New Deal or the Great Society. The same vision that inspired centralizing
pressure in 1787 thus ought to tug in the opposite direction today. That vision need not
mandate a reactionary effort to tear down the administrative state and return to the early
19th century; it does suggest, however, that the primary direction of incremental reform
ought to be toward shoring up the limits on federal authority.
An analogy to elementary geometry may help illustrate the contending positions.
In geometry, a “ray” is a line that extends from a set starting point in a particular
direction to infinity.472 A “vector,” on the other hand, has a set magnitude; it extends in a
particular direction for a specified distance, but goes no further.473 With these terms in
mind, we might restate our question as whether the Framers’ centralizing intentions
should be treated more like a vector or a ray. Did they, in other words, intend to keep
centralizing indefinitely? Or did they simply desire a more centralized government than
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existed in 1787 while nonetheless contemplating that some degree of centralization might
be excessive?
Some constitutions may explicitly mandate a ray rather than a vector. The Treaty
of Rome that established the European Economic Community – predecessor to today’s
European Union – committed the signatories to seek an “ever closer union of the Peoples
of Europe.”474 European courts have tended to treat the EU’s foundational treaties as a
constitution of sorts, and they have invoked the “ever closer union” language to support
an explicitly teleological approach pressing for increasing centralization.475 More
generally, it is safe to say that many Europeans see a teleological purpose to EU
institutions as a whole – to function as engines of integration – rather than a purpose to
maintain a balance.
One can find similar examples of a centralizing teleology in our own law, albeit
arguably on a somewhat more modest scale. For much of our history, the federal
judiciary – and particularly the Supreme Court – has functioned as an engine of
integration. Certainly that was the thrust of federalism doctrine in the Nineteenth
Century, which both legitimated an expansive view of federal legislative power476 and
reined in state attempts to regulate the national economy.477 It was also the thrust of the
Warren Court, which my colleague Scot Powe has described as centrally concerned with
imposing national norms on recalcitrant states, primarily in the South.478 The Lochnerera Commerce Clause cases – which restricted Congress’s legislative power – might
seem like an obvious exception to this trend.479
But as Stephen Gardbaum has
demonstrated, the Supreme Court simply used the Commerce Clause (as a check on
federal economic regulation) in tandem with theories of economic substantive due
process (as a check primarily on state economic regulation) to achieve a uniform,
nationally-imposed policy of laissez faire.480 And one can argue that even the Rehnquist
Court’s gestures in the direction of “states’ rights” have been overshadowed, as a
practical matter, by its willingness to squelch state policy in any number of areas.481
The Supreme Court’s centralizing tendency should surprise no one, given that the
Justices are national officials and face relatively strong incentives to favor the national
474
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government.482 But the constitutional text and historical record on this side of the
Atlantic hardly provide the same support for a centralizing teleology that one finds in
Europe. Indeed, the question whether the Framers contemplated infinite centralization
virtually answers itself.483 To deny that possibility is to concede that, at some point, we
will reach a point of optimal centralization and at that point the task of constitutionalists
will be to prevent further consolidation. Nor is there any particular reason to think that
centralization occurs at a uniform rate across the wide variety of areas of governmental
concern, or that the optimal centralization point is the same in each of these different
areas.
If all this is true, then surely it is the task of federalism doctrine to ask, in each
area, not only whether we are centralized enough but also whether we have centralized
too much. There are no true rays, only vectors. Federalism doctrine must guard against
both centripetal and centrifugal forces. As Richard Fallon has observed, “[i]t is not
enough for courts to identify constitutional values and weight those values against each
other. . . . [C]ourts must also ask what are the main threats to constitutional values at any
particular time, which rules would work more or less effectively to protect those values,
and what would be the empirical effects of alternative rule structures.”484 The “main
threats” to the balance of federalism are likely to come from different directions in 2004
than in 1789.
The best reading of the history seems to bolster this conclusion – that is, that we
should think of federalism as a state of balance rather than a centralizing teleology. Even
in 1787, neither the proponents nor the opponents of the Constitution seem to have had
much sympathy for extreme polar positions of centralization or decentralization. With
respect to the Anti-Federalists, Saul Cornell has observed that
Relatively few Anti-Federalists were willing to return to the Confederation
as a model for federalism, and few of the Anti-Federalist elite were willing
to challenge the Federalist claim that the Articles of Confederation were
inadequate and that some central authority ought to be created with
sufficient power to force compliance from the states. Most AntiFederalists conceded that some limited degree of coercive authority had to
be ceded to the federal government.485
As a result, Professor Cornell concludes, the Antifederalists’ “quarrel with the Federalists
was, not over consolidation, but the degree to which the new government would be
nationalized.”486
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Likewise, few Federalist proponents of the new constitution were unwaveringly
committed to consolidation. Jack Rakove has observed that while the Anti-Federalists
focused on the Philadelphia draft’s centralizing tendencies, “for the framers, by contrast,
the greater irony was that it was much more ‘federal’ than the alternatives they had
rejected.”487 The Supremacy Clause, for example, is far more respectful of state
autonomy than Madison’s initial proposal for a congressional negative of all state laws.488
Likewise, the Necessary and Proper Clause’s recognition of implied powers, even
defined broadly as in McCulloch, stops well short of the Virginia Plan’s initial grant of a
discretionary federal legislative power.489
The area of agreement between Federalists and Anti-federalists thus turns out to
have been larger than is sometimes supposed. Both groups wanted some movement in a
more nationalist direction from the Articles of Confederation; neither wanted to push that
movement to its logical extreme. James Madison’s own political trajectory exemplifies
this wish to push centralization only so far. Lance Banning has documented that “[a]s
late as August 1789, Madison believed that state encroachments on the powers of the
federal government would be most likely to endanger constitutional reform. By 1792, his
fears were on the other side.”490 The case seems strong for treating centralization as a
vector – with a limited magnitude – rather than a ray extending infinitely in the
nationalist direction. That, of course, leaves plenty of room to argue over the appropriate
magnitude of the vector. I argue in the next section that that argument is less important
than it might seem, and that more generally the history can tell us relatively little about
the particular shape of federalism doctrine.
C.

Limits of History, Limits of Change

So if history doesn’t tell us to centralize relentlessly, can it tell us how to maintain
balance? Unfortunately, I think the answer will generally be “no” – at least if we are
looking for specifics. I have already argued that history does bind us to have federalism
doctrine, that is, fidelity to both history and text forecloses a conclusion that federalism is
simply unattractive under modern circumstances and therefore not something courts
should worry about.491 In this Section, however, I argue that history is comparatively less
useful in helping us choose among particular federalism doctrines. As my colleague
Frank Cross has observed, “the Constitution clearly creates a federalist structure of
government” but “it does not necessarily command anything approaching current
federalism doctrine.”492 Rather, those doctrines will most often have to be chosen based
on a variety of more functional and pragmatic grounds.
The obvious alternative, of course, is to cast off the “dead hand” of the past and
seek the answers to questions of federalism in purely presentist terms. Those terms might
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include a broad array of concerns, such as economic efficiency, protection of minority
rights and interests, or maximizing the accountability of public officials. I do not want to
deny that all of these presentist values – and no doubt many others – are important, and
they should play a role in resolving federalism issues. But I also want to insist on an
important role for the “dead hand” in the definition of the federal balance, rather than
simply – as I argued earlier – in requiring us to have one. While my argument in Section
A sought to justify some respect for federalism from a variety of different perspectives on
the relevance of history, the latter half of this Section adopts an explicitly Burkean view.
Changes in the structure of our constitution should be incremental, and the direction of
marginal change should be influenced – at least in part – by an imperative to stay
reasonably close to historical norms.
1.

Can History Dictate Doctrine?

One thing we might search the history for is a description of the appropriate
equilibrium between state and federal power. I claimed in the previous section that the
Founders most likely understood federalism to entail such a state, rather than viewing it
as an open-ended centralizing imperative. But that does not mean that they clearly
envisioned what such a state should look like. Aspects of such a vision emerge from
their debates, but so does a general sense that much would remain to be worked out.493
The immediate task that the Framers confronted was to choose the direction and
mechanisms of present reform, not necessarily to crystallize the ideal end-state. As Mark
Killenbeck has observed, the Framers were “pragmatists who viewed their assignment
[as] creating not the ‘ultimate’ Union, but simply ‘amore perfect’ one.”494
Likewise, I doubt that we need to agree on an end-state in order to choose
contemporary federalism doctrine. The judicial process proceeds incrementally; as I have
argued elsewhere, that is one of its most important strengths.495 As long as courts
formulate doctrine in incremental rather than sweeping terms, they can focus on
ascertaining the direction of incremental change without necessarily formulating a firm
idea of how far that change ought to go in the future. In Lopez, for example, the Court
confronted the question whether it should end its half-century moratorium on striking
down federal statutes as outside the Commerce Power. One could answer that question
affirmatively, deciding that the Court should be more willing to strike down federal laws
on this ground than it had been, while leaving a more complete version of Commerce
Clause doctrine to be developed in future cases.496 For reasons that I will discuss
further,497 the incremental method seems like the best approach. Even if history could
paint us a complete picture of the federal end-state envisioned by the Founders, I would
suggest that courts should pay it relatively little attention.
493

See Killenbeck, supra note 417, at 85; [others]

494

Killenbeck, supra note 417, at 86.

495

See Ernest A. Young, Judicial Activism and Conservative Politics, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 1139, 1208-09
(2002) [hereinafter Young, Judicial Activism].
496

Cf. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, ___ (1995) (noting that if the Court had upheld the statute in
question, there would have been no basis for ever invalidating commerce legislation).

497

See infra TAN ___.

94

13-Jul-04 draft

We might alternatively ask two somewhat narrower questions of history. First,
can history tell us how to choose between the two different ends of federalism – state
sovereignty or state autonomy – that I identified in Part II? Second, does history sanction
particular means for enforcing federalism? I think the answer to the first question is no;
both the constitutional text and history seem relatively indeterminate on the choice of
ends. Evidence of concern for both sovereignty and autonomy appears in the record. On
the sovereignty side, the constitutional text includes specific guarantees against
dismemberment of states,498 and Deborah Jones Merritt has argued that the Guarantee
Clause can be interpreted as a safeguard against national interference with the integrity of
state governmental processes.499 Likewise, the Framers’ discussions of state sovereign
immunity indicate significant concern for protecting state sovereignty.500 On the other
hand, the whole notion of reserving governmental powers over key policy areas to the
States in the Tenth Amendment speaks to state autonomy.501 And – to pick just one of
several possible examples – the solicitude of Article III’s drafters for preserving a
meaningful role of state courts indicates a strong concern that state institutions should
retain important things to do.502 Nor should we necessarily take the balance of this
evidence as conclusive, even if it all pointed in the same direction. In particular, we
would not expect to see as much evidence of concern for state “autonomy,” defined
primarily in terms of state regulatory prerogatives, in an era that generally eschewed
activist government.503 Obviously, state autonomy may be a much more important factor
today.
The answer to the second question is “yes, but.” The Framers did seem to
envision two particular strategies for enforcing federalism. One was to rely heavily on
political and institutional checks. The second was through enumeration of federal
responsibilities and reservation of the remainder to the states – a strategy which does
seem to have contemplated some degree of judicial enforcement. The problem is that
these strategies have each been substantially undermined by subsequent developments.
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The notion of political enforcement has been undermined by changes in the incentives
facing federal politicians,504 the severance of direct ties between federal representatives
and state political institutions,505 and the watering-down of institutional mechanisms at
the national level that once encumbered federal lawmaking.506 Likewise, I have already
discussed the changes of fact and failures of doctrine that undermined the enumerated
powers strategy.507
The question thus becomes whether history binds us to these failed strategies or
permits innovations designed to shore up their weaknesses. There is good reason to find
the latter course consistent with historical understandings. Mark Killenbeck, for
example, finds that the Framers “understood that the text as ratified provided an
important, but by design not necessarily a definitive matrix for analyzing sovereignty
issues.”508 Rather, they expected that many issues of federalism would be worked out in
the course of time.509 Likewise, Jack Rakove states more generally that “[w]hatever else
we might say about [the Framers’] intentions and understandings, this at least seems
clear: They would not have denied themselves the benefit of testing their original ideas
and hopes against the intervening experience that we have accrued since 1789.”510
The Founders’ vision of a flexible federalism may be understood through a
variety of different interpretive lenses. We might shift to new, ahistorical strategies for
protecting federalism as an act of “translating” the original design into new contexts.
Such translation, as Larry Lessig has pointed out, often entails a “duty of creativity” for
the contemporary interpreter.511 A Burkean, on the other hand, might simply say that our
duty of fidelity runs to the whole of our history, not simply the founding moment, and
that part of the duty of fidelity is the adoption of incremental reforms designed to
preserve the basic character of our institutions.512 Finally, a conventionalist might argue
that the essential characteristic of federalism doctrine is its ability to command
widespread assent, and pragmatic virtues of consistency and coherence are more
important by this measure than the connection of doctrine to the Founders’ own
expectations about how federalism would be enforced.513 The case for departure from or
modification of the Founders’ own enforcement strategies can thus be made from any of
these perspectives.
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The Supreme Court itself has recognized that history provides only limited
assistance in answering particular doctrinal questions on a number of occasions. In the
Ports Authority case,514 for instance, the Court confronted the question whether state
governments should enjoy sovereign immunity in proceedings before federal
administrative agencies. Writing for the majority, Justice Thomas acknowledged that,
“[i]n truth, the relevant history does not provide direct guidance for our inquiry. The
Framers . . . could not have anticipated the vast growth of the administrative state.” 515
As a result, “the dearth of specific evidence indicating whether the Framers believed that
the States’ sovereign immunity would apply in such proceedings is unsurprising.”516
The Ports Authority Court overcame this lack of specific historical evidence
primarily through doctrine rooted in more functional considerations.517 Justice Thomas
first examined proceedings before the Federal Maritime Commission, to which the South
Carolina Ports Authority had been subjected, to determine whether they were
institutionally similar to federal judicial proceedings in which the Eleventh Amendment
would bar jurisdiction.518 He then asked whether the underlying value of federalism that
state sovereign immunity is supposed to protect – state dignitary interests – is threatened
by federal administrative adjudications.519 One can quarrel about whether the particular
value of dignity is really crucial to federalism,520 but the basic approach of building
doctrine with an eye on federalism’s underlying values seems sound.
History thus does not generally propose particular doctrines; in fact, most of the
doctrines that we have employed for much of the past two centuries are, well, history.
The history does suggest a basic strategy, however – that is, that federalism and other
structural values ought to be as self-enforcing as possible. I doubt that we are bound to
this strategy if it can be shown to be ineffective, but surely respect for the Founders’
vision counsels that we should look to this strategy first in seeking to reinvigorate
federalism doctrine. I turn to the prospects for reviving that strategy in Part V. In the
remainder of this Section, however, I focus on the relation between history and structural
change.
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Federal Maritime Comm’n v. South Carolina State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743 (2002).
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Id. at 755.
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Id.
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Justice Thomas did say that “[w]e . . . attribute great significance to the fact that States were not subject
to private suits in administrative adjudications at the time of the founding or for many years thereafter.” Id.
But this argument seems important primarily as simply indicating the absence of historical counterexamples to the Court’s ultimate result; it can bear little affirmative weight. After all, “[b]ecause
formalized administrative adjudications were all but unheard of in the late 18th and early 19th century,” id.,
we shouldn’t be surprised that States didn’t appear in them. In any event, the remainder of the majority
opinion makes clear that the more functional considerations are doing the analytical heavy lifting here.
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See id. at 756-59.
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2.

History and Incremental Change

It turns out, as I argue in Part VI, that a desire to make changes incremental is a good
reason to choose courtsas the agents of that change. (It also, of course, shapes the sorts
of doctrines that courts should adopt.)
IV.

Sovereignty, Autonomy, and the Values of Federalism

The shape of an institutional strategy for protecting federalism ought to be
influenced – although not completely determined – by why we care about federalism in
the first place. Many reasons are often given, and I try to collect the major themes in this
Section. They tend to fall into two loose groups. The first is concerned with regulatory
outcomes: Federalism permits a diversity of regulatory regimes from state to state, which
may allow satisfaction of more people’s preferences, regulatory experimentation, and
competition among states to provide the most attractive regime. The second group has to
do with the political process itself: State governments provide a check on national
overreaching, foster political competition and participation, and may even help build
social capital.
Autonomy, not sovereignty, provides the common theme of all these arguments.
Just having state governments is not enough; those governments need to have meaningful
things to do. Federalism cannot provide regulatory diversity unless states have autonomy
to set divergent policies; state governments cannot provide fora for political participation
and competition unless meaningful decisions are being made in those fora. The
sovereignty model advanced by the Rehnquist Court’s working majority on federalism
issues, by contrast, has emphasized on the “separate and independent existence” of the
States, as if mere existence were the primary value to be preserved.521 The Court’s focus
on the States’ sovereign immunity from private lawsuits, for example, has expended
much of the Court’s time and political capital on an issue that has little to do with what
functions remain for state governments to perform.522
This Section surveys the values generally associated with federalism and uses
them as criteria for assessing the relative importance of sovereignty and autonomy.
Before undertaking that discussion, however, two caveats are in order. First, I do not
mean this section as a normative defense of federalism. The pros and cons of federalism
521

The phrase itself goes back to then-Justice Rehnquist’s opinion in National League of Cities v. Usery,
426 U.S. 833, 845-46 (1976), which framed the crucial issue as whether setting wages and hours for state
employees “are ‘functions essential to separate and independent existence’ so that Congress may not
abrogate the States’ otherwise plenary authority to make them.” (quoting Lane County v. Oregon, 74 U.S.
(7 Wall.) 71, 76 (1869)). Much has changed since 1976 in the Court’s jurisprudence, but the current
majority remains focused on this principle.
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See, e.g., Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (holding that Congress may not,
pu
r suant to its Article I powers, abrogate the States’ immunity from suit); see also Fallon, Conservative
Paths, supra note 291, at 459 (commenting on “the relative boldness of the sovereign immunity decisions”
as compared with the Court’s caution in other areas of federalism doctrine); Young, State Sovereign
Immunity, supra note 184, at 1-2 (arguing that the Court’s “most persistent and aggressive efforts” to
advance the cause of federalism have occurred in the area of sovereign immunity).
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have been ably debated by others,523 and I am unsure whether I have anything much to
add to that discussion. What I want to do instead is to survey the grounds on which
federalism has been defended, and trace the implications of those arguments for
federalism doctrine. Obviously I do find these reasons for valuing federalism persuasive,
but that is not what this Article is about. The point is simply to identify with some
precision why we care about federalism in the first place so that we can then ask what
follows in terms of enforcement strategies.
The second caveat is that, as I argued in the last Part, federalism need not be
defended in terms of its promotion of particular values at all.524 The Constitution
presupposes some meaningful balance between state and federal power; constitutional
fidelity therefore requires some level of constitutional protection for state governmental
prerogatives. As Justice O’Connor has written, “[o]ur task would be the same even if one
could prove that federalism secured no advantages to anyone. It consists not of devising
our preferred system of government, but of understanding and applying the framework
set forth in the Constitution.”525 Nonetheless, we still confront questions of interpretive
choice concerning the particular form that protections for federalism should take. And it
makes sense for the answers to those questions to be shaped, to the extent that binding
legal materials permit, by the respects in which federalism may be beneficial.
A.

Regulatory Diversity, Competition, and Experimentation

One of the most basic aspects of state autonomy is the right to do things
differently. California chooses to set rigorous environmental standards, while Louisiana
prefers looser regulation in order to attract industry.526 Vermont relies for revenue on a
state income tax, while New Hampshire emphasizes property taxes.527 New Jersey
protects lesbians and gay men from discrimination based on their sexual orientation,
while Michigan does not.528 New York’s state judges are appointed by the governor,
523

See, e.g., Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82 MINN. L. REV. 317 (1997); Michael McConnell,
Federalism: Evaluating the Founders’ Design, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1484, 1491-1511 (1987) (book review);
Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism for a Third Century, 88
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 3-10 (1988); Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a
National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903 (1994). For a particularly well-balanced appraisal of both sides
in this debate, see DAVID L. SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE (1995).
524

See supra Section ___.
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New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 157 (1992). The obligation is comparable to our commitment
to protect broad categories of harmful expression under the First Amendment. See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU,
521 U.S. 844 (1997) (indecency); R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (hate speech). The analogy is
not a perfect one; most critics of particular forms of speech do not claim that “free speech” is on-balance a
bad thing, whereas that claim is sometimes made with respect to state autonomy. [cites] But few actually
do make the on-balance claim about federalism, and it is not clear that it would matter in terms of
constitutional obligation if they did.
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[cite]
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[cite]; see also SHAPIRO, supra note 523, at 89 n. 113 (discussing the disparities in taxing policy among
the New England states).
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See Lambda Legal, Summary of States, Cities, and Counties Which Prohibit Discrimination Based on
Sexual Orientation, available at http://www.lambdalegal.org/cgi-bin/iowa/documents/record?record=217
(visited Feb. 7, 2003).
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while Texas elects them.529 As my examples demonstrate, state-by- state diversity
extends not only to particular substantive policies, but also to the structure of the
government and the means by which policy choices are carried out.
Lynn Baker and I have argued elsewhere that federalism is analogous to the
“negative freedom” of individuals in that federalism frees state governments from
constraints on their policy options without dictating what choices they should actually
make.530 This makes it difficult to argue for or against federalism based on the
attractiveness or unattractiveness of particular policies that the states might adopt. The
most basic argument for state autonomy thus starts with the observation that individuals
often have different preferences, so that the best way to please more of the people, more
of the time is to offer a choice of regulatory regimes.531 Assuming that the initial
geographical distribution of preferences is not uniform, then a higher proportion of
citizen preferences are likely to be satisfied by state-level regulation than by adoption of a
uniform national rule.532 On issues that are sufficiently important to induce individuals to
“vote with their feet,” the proportion of satisfied preferences is likely to be even
higher.533 As Seth Kreimer has observed, “the lesbian who finds herself in Utah, like the
gun lover who lives in Washington, D.C., and the gambler in Pennsylvania, need only
cross a state border to be free of constraining rules.”534
A related set of arguments does suggest that regulatory diversity will in turn lead
to “better” policy outcomes. The first is that, as Justice Brandeis famously noted, “a
single courageous state may serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic
experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”535 The most well-known recent
example of such experimentation is the recent federal welfare reform, many elements of
which were tried out by individual states such as Wisconsin.536 Even more recently,
529

[cite]
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See Baker & Young, supra note 10, at 135 (“[J]ust as negative freedoms do not prescribe what the
individual shall do within this protected sphere of liberty, so too federalism does not dictate that the state
go
v ernment make any particular substantive choice within the range of options permitted it.”). On the
concept of “negative freedom,” see generally ISAIAH BERLIN, FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 122 (1969).
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See Baker, Conditional Spending, supra note 364, at 1947-51 ; McConnell, supra note 523, at ___ .
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See McConnell, supra note 523, at ___. Of course, groups holding a particular preference may not be
sufficiently numerous even in their state of greatest concentration to enact a regime that reflects their
preference. This may be an argument for further decentralization on some issues (if, say, the group is more
politically powerful in particular localities) or simply an occasion for observing that no system can satisfy
everyone’s preferences.
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See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Exit Rights Under Federalism, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 147, 150
(1992) (observing that “[f]ederalism works best where it is possible to vote with your feet”); Kreimer,
supra note 134, at 72 (“Mormons moved from Illinois to Utah, while African Americans migrated from the
Jim Crow South. Rail travel and, later, automobiles and airplanes enabled residents of conservative states
to escape constraints on divorce and remarriage.”). See generally ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE,
AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES 106-12 (1970).
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Kreimer, supra note 134, at 72.
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New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); see also Friedman,
Valuing Federalism, supra note 523, at 397-400.
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Maine has provided health insurance for all of its residents, thereby providing a valuable
test for similar proposals at the federal level.537 Important aspects of federal
environmental regulation are based on prior experimentation at the state level, and state
programs have moved in to fill gaps in the federal scheme.538
Much of this innovation, as Barry Friedman has observed, “just happens as
governments try to solve problems.”539 But a second argument provides a further
impetus, that is, that state governments will compete with one another to offer a more
attractive policy mix to mobile employers, investors, and taxpayers.540 Drawing an
analogy to the free market, proponents of regulatory diversity thus argue that competition
among jurisdictions will result in “better” policies.541
One problem with these sorts of arguments, of course, is that we have not yet
defined “better,” and definitions may be hard to agree upon. One man’s regulatory
competition may be another’s “race to the bottom” – that is, a situation in which
regulatory competition among autonomous jurisdictions makes it impossible to
implement desirable policies. In Hammer v. Dagenhart,542 for example, the Court
recognized that competitive dynamics made it difficult for individual states to implement
restrictions on child labor, since industry could avoid one state’s restrictions by relocating
to another state, with a concomitant loss in jobs and tax revenue to the regulating state.
For proponents of child labor, this would simply be an example of regulatory competition
at its best, while reformers saw these dynamics as an argument for national regulation.
Others have made similar arguments for action at the national level in a variety of
contexts.543
When a national consensus emerges in a particular policy area, arguments from
regulatory diversity lose much of their force. We have such a consensus, for example, on
537

See On Health Care, Maine Leads, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 2003, at ___.
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See [cite on California’s pre-existing mobile source emissions limits]; Richard L. Revesz, Federalism
and Regulation: Some Generalizations, in REGULATORY COMPETITION AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION:
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 3, 13-14 (Daniel Esty & Damien Gerardin, eds., 2001) (describing state
innovation in hazardous waste regulation and cleanup). For other policy innovations by state governments,
see, e.g., Friedman, Valuing Federalism, supra note 523, at 399 (citing “bookmobiles, pre-election day
‘early’ voting, town meetings, televised court proceedings, greenways, community agenda programs,
leadership programs”); Merritt, Guarantee Clause, supra note 523, at 9 [examples]; SHAPIRO, supra note
523, at 87-88 (citing “the development of workers’ compensation programs, experiments in public
education, welfare reform, health care, taxation systems, penology, environmental protection, and a number
of other subjects”).
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Friedman, Valuing Federalism, supra note 523, at 398.
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See, e.g., SHAPIRO, supra note 523, at 78 (“The argument rooted in the value of competition among the
states, especially when combined with the right of exit of capital or labor, remains at the heart of the
economic case for federalism.”).
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247 U.S. 251, 273 (1918).
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[cites]; see also DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL
INTRODUCTION 76 (1991) (“Interstate competition hampers inefficient regulation, but it can also hamper
efficient regulation as well.”).
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the unacceptability of most forms of racial discrimination, and those areas have been
appropriately federalized – placed off-limits to state-by- state regulatory diversity – as a
result.544 But in many, many other areas – environmental policy, safety regulation, other
forms of discrimination, to name just a few examples – no such consensus exists. We
either do not know the best way to reach an agreed-upon policy end, or we disagree about
the proper ends themselves.
All this makes it quite difficult to say that regulatory diversity will result in more
(or less) “good” policy outcomes on balance. Two possible lines of argument are
available. The first would be to define a “good” set of outcomes as simply that which
maximizes the preferences of the most voters; in this sense, it seems plausible to say that
regulatory diversity is “better” than uniformity whenever there is no consensus on
substance.545 Even this argument, of course, assumes the absence of spillover effects or
public goods problems. The second argument would attempt to define the “better” policy
outcome on the merits across a broad range of issues, then ask whether regulatory
experimentation and competition are likely to help or hinder the implementation of that
outcome. Merely to frame the question this way, however, is to make clear that it is
unanswerable. Not only is the range of relevant issues broad and the effects of
competition hard to assess, but also normative agreement on many, if not most, of the
relevant policy questions will be contested.
These problems pervade the extensive literature disputing whether federalism is a
“good” or “bad” thing. I would prefer to make two less ambitious points. The first is that
our constitutional tradition is committed to some degree of state autonomy, and that
autonomy has traditionally been justified, in part, on grounds of regulatory diversity.546
When we look for doctrine that can realize and make sense of our constitutional
commitment to federalism, it thus makes sense to focus on the value of regulatory
diversity. We should have doctrines that preserve the ability of state governments to
regulate in diverse ways, and downplay doctrines that offer little or no protection for that
function.
The second point is that many critics of state autonomy seem to think that the
normative question can be answered in a definitive way. They seem convinced, despite
544

As the child labor example suggests, such consensus will more often than not be negative in character –
that is, we are more likely to agree that particular practices are unacceptable than that a particular
regulatory program is optimal. Racial equality is another example of this kind; we can agree that
segregation was unacceptable, but it is harder to reach consensus on the right package of remedies for it.
On race, of course, the remedial questions were rightly federalized as well once it became apparent that
deferring to state and local policymakers on remedies would thwart implementation of the more general
principle of racial equality. See, e.g., [cites].
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One might say that in the classic “race to the bottom” situation, inter-jurisdictional competition actually
thwarts the realization of voters’ preferences. The voters of New Hampshire, for example, might prefer to
ban child labor, but might nonetheless be deterred from enacting such a law by fear that their vital
manufacturing industries will move to Vermont. It seems more accurate in that situation, however, to say
that New Hampshirites’ real preference is for jobs and tax revenue over a child labor ban.
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See, e.g., C. Boyden Gray, Regulation and Federalism, 1 YALE J. REG. 93 (1983) (justifying the Reagan
Administration’s “New Federalism” initiative in part on the ground that returning regulatory authority to
the States “fosters diversity and experimentation”).
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the problems canvassed above, that races to the bottom predominate over beneficial
competition, and in particular that state-by- state regulatory diversity will tend to thwart
the implementation of “progressive” policy reforms. Many of these arguments come
from political liberals who seem not to have woken up to the fact that they no longer
control the national government.547 In any event, I have endeavored in other work to
demonstrate that federalism generally lacks a reliable political valence.548 It may be
impossible to demonstrate that inter-jurisdictional competition and experimentation will
produce “good” policy outcomes in a majority of cases, but one can identify a wide range
of instances in which regulatory diversity fosters rather than impedes “progressive”
policy goals. This is not to say that such goals are inevitably the ones that ought to be
pursued; rather, the point is that debates over state autonomy ought not to break down on
simple ideological lines.
B.

Political Participation, Competition, and Checks on the Center

A second set of values associated with federalism focuses on the political process
itself rather than the substantive policies likely to be adopted by institutions at the state or
national level. We might usefully divide these values into two clusters – one associated
with the benefits that citizens derive from participating in politics on the level of
individuals and local communities, and another associated with the benefits of dividing
power to the system as a whole.
David Shapiro (along with many others) has pointed out that “to the extent the
electorate is small, and elected representatives are thus more immediately accountable to
individuals and their concerns, government brought closer to the people, and democratic
ideals are more fully realized.”549 Public participation seems easier at the state and local
level; this may be so because the issues seem more immediate, because citizens are more
likely to know state or local politicians personally, or because the barriers to entry into
politics are lower at the state and local level.550 We might value this participation for a
547

See Baker & Young, supra note 10, at 151-53. Progressives may, of course, retake power in
Washington, D.C. But the important point is that a broader view of our history demonstrates that the
political leanings of individual institutions – the national political branches, the federal or state courts, even
the national political parties – tends to swing back and forth over time. It would be a mistake to make basic
structural judgments based on an ephemeral current configuration of political forces.
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See id. at 149-62; Young, Preemption, supra note ___.
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SHAPIRO, supra note 523, at 91-92. See also Merritt, supra note 523, at 7 (“The greater accessibility and
smaller scale of local government allows individuals to participate actively in governmental
decisionmaking. This participation, in turn, provides myriad benefits: it trains citizens in the techniques of
democracy, fosters accountability among elected representatives, and enhances voter confidence in the
democratic process.”); Friedman, Valuing Federalism, supra note 523, at 389 (“States, and their substate
local governments, are closer to the people and provide an opportunity for greater citizen involvement in
the functional process of self-government.”).
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Many of these benefits are far more pronounced at the local level than at the state level, and for that
reason some have suggested that notions of constitutional federalism – which protect only state
governments as a constitutional matter – are therefore irrelevant to values of citizen participation. See, e.g.,
Rubin & Feeley, supra note 523, at 915. As I explain further infra at TAN ___, this Article’s concern with
values of regulatory autonomy is central to local and state governments alike. Moreover, as David Shapiro
points out, “the states are in a far better position to respond to local pressures for home rule than is a more
remote and centralized government.” SHAPIRO, supra note 523, at 93
- 94.
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number of different reasons. For some, it is a good in itself.551 For others, it is a means
of building community solidarity and social capital.552 On this theory, the opportunities
for participation in politics that federalism affords encourage individuals to interact not
only with the government but with each other, building networks of trust and reciprocity
which in turn redound to the benefit of citizens in a wide variety of ways.553
The operation of state and local governmental processes may also benefit our
political system as a whole. To the extent that state and local processes are more
participatory and responsive to citizens, shifting responsibilities to them may alleviate the
“democratic deficit” suffered by a distant central government that is often perceived as
bureaucratic and dominated by special interests.554
Many forms of political
accountability, moreover, are best exercised at close range. Barry Friedman thus
observes that “[o]fficials, elected and appointed, should be available for public comment,
anger, approval, suggestions, and ideas about the course of public affairs. . . . Officials
ought to look their constituents in the eye on the street and see them in the grocery
store.”555
More fundamentally, our federalism has always been justified as a bulwark
against tyranny. Madison extolled federalism as part of the “double security” that the
new Constitution would provide for the people; just as the three branches of the central
government were to check one another, the state governments would check the center.556
As Lynn Baker and I have discussed elsewhere,557 Madison’s discussion in the Federalist
emphasized worst-case scenarios in which the States would have to oppose the Center
militarily,558 and this emphasis has sometimes distracted critics of federalism from more
prosaic – but also more relevant – mechanisms by which federalism protects liberty.559
Even in the Founding period, however, state autonomy buttressed individual liberty in
other, less dramatic ways.
States may oppose national policies not only militarily but politically, and in so
doing they may serve as critical rallying points for more widespread popular opposition.
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See, e.g., Jason Mazzone, The Social Capital Argument for Federalism, 11 S. CAL. INTERDISCIPLINARY
L. J. 27, 29 (2001) (“[F]ederalism has value because it promotes social capital: ‘features of social
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coordinated action.”) (quoting ROBERT D. PUTNAM, MAKING DEMOCRACY WORK: CIVIC TRADITIONS IN
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Madison and Jefferson, out of national power during the Federalist administration of John
Adams, worked through the Virginia and Kentucky legislatures to oppose the Alien and
Sedition Acts.560 The States thus, as Professor Friedman puts it, “serve as an independent
means of calling forth the voice of the people.”561 More recently, “[s]ome state and local
governments have proven themselves formidable lobbyists and indefatigable litigants” on
issues such as affirmative action, benefits for the disabled, and environmental policy.562
The intertwinement of federal and state bureaucracies through various forms of
“cooperative federalism” likewise gives state and local officials the ability to resist
federal initiatives in more subtle ways. Recently, for instance, dozens of localities and
several states have criticized – and sometimes even refused to cooperate with – aspects of
the War on Terrorism that they felt intruded too far into personal liberties.563
More fundamentally, states serve as the seedbeds of political competition in our
“compound republic.”564 Many political and social movements – such as abolitionism
and Progressivism – originate and gain strength at the state level before making a bid for
national power. The existence of the states as alternate arenas for political competition
bolsters our two-party system, moreover, by ensuring that a party defeated at the national
level can nonetheless exercise power in statehouses around the country. In the 2002
elections, for example, the Democrats lost their hold on the Senate but picked up power
at the state level by winning three additional governorships.565 Because the loyal
opposition can not only oppose but actually govern at the state level, the opposition party
can develop a track record of success that enhances its prospects in subsequent national
elections. Hence, the Democrats’ control of so many statehouses “prepared the ground
for a revival of their own party.”566 Opposition parties in non-federal systems, by
contrast, face greater obstacles in staying competitive. A recent comparison of the
British Tories with American Republicans, for example, noted that the Tories “face
560

[cite Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions]; see also Friedman, Valuing Federalism, supra note 523, at
403 & n.363. For another example, see MCDONALD, supra note 43, at 66-70 (describing the New England
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problems in imitating Mr. Bush—not least because they lack a testing ground for their
ideas.”567 It should not be surprising, then, that four of the last five U.S. presidents were
former governors who developed a reputation for competence at the state level while the
other party held the White House.568 As Deborah Merritt has pointed out, federalism
buttresses our liberty by “maintain[ing] the multiparty system and prevent[ing] the
growth of a monolithic political power on the federal level.”569
Again, of course, there are counter-arguments. A tradition in political science
reaching back to Federalist No. 10 holds that it is state and local governments – not the
national one – that are more likely to be dominated by special interests.570 While
participation may be easier at the state and local levels, voter turnout measures suggest
that it is also less valued by many people.571 And some states have become such large
political communities in their own right that the state government hardly seems likely to
realize the benefits of political participation on a human scale.572 Finally, the whole
experience of racial subordination in this country demonstrates that state governments
will sometimes be the oppressors, and the national government the bringer of liberty.573
I would hesitate to argue for state autonomy without an agreed-upon, national
floor for fundamental human rights. But that, in fact, is the system we have. Virtually no
proponent of state autonomy today wishes to roll back the Reconstruction Amendments,
the incorporation of the Bill of Rights as binding on the States, or even the broad power
of the Congress to enact basic civil rights legislation.574 But state autonomy may enhance
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personal liberties even in the sphere of individual rights by allowing space for more
expansive interpretations of those rights. In areas of privacy, criminal procedure, and
civil rights protections, for example, individual states have chosen to provide a greater
measure of protection for individual liberty than that available under federal law.575
More fundamentally, nothing in the logic supporting the necessity of federal protection
for individual rights suggests that such protections are a sufficient condition for liberty.
Modern constitutional law has focused its attention on those individual rights provisions,
but the federalism and separation of powers constraints on government tyranny have
always been operating in the background. Our history affords no reason for confidence
that a significant erosion of state autonomy would not have a negative impact on
individual freedom.576
C.

Sovereignty, Autonomy, and Decentralization

All these values associated with federalism share a common characteristic: They
are predicated on active state governments with important responsibilities. “Active” in
this context need not mean intrusive or interventionist; whether states adopt rigorous
regulatory policies or laissez faire ones, the important point is that the policy questions
they confront must be meaningful ones, and their regulatory jurisdiction must cover a
broad range of issues important to their citizens. Regulatory diversity means little, after
all, if it extends only to a handful of unimportant issues. And citizens will have little
incentive to participate in state and local politics if the issues decided at those levels are
not important to them.

Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001); Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); but see
[Hibbs] (upholding Congress’s power, under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment, to abrogate state
sovereign immunity for private suits under the Family Medical Leave Act). This line of cases, moreover,
has gone out of its way to reaffirm earlier precedents upholding the Voting Rights Act – probably the most
important civil rights statute enacted under Section Five. [cites] The exceptions to this trend are City of
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), and United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), which held
that Congress lacked power entirely to enact civil rights protections against burdens on religious exercise
and gender-motivated violence. But Boerne was driven as much by separation of powers concerns as by
federalism, [cite]. The Violence Against Women Act struck down in Morrison, on the other hand, was an
unusual civil rights statute in that its substantive prohibitions – i.e., assaults and rapes – were duplicative of
existing state law protections and strayed outside the traditional spheres of employment and public
accommodations, in which Congress has been able to employ the Commerce Clause. See, e.g., Katzenbach
v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) .
Nothing in the Court’s recent jurisprudence suggests that other recent civil rights statutes – such as the
Americans with Disabilities Act or the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, or even the other
provisions of the VAWA itself – are in any danger of being found to lie outside the commerce power.
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This might seem like an obvious point. Why, after all, should anyone care about
state governments if those governments have nothing to do? The point is worth
belaboring, however, because of the Rehnquist Court’s focus on issues of sovereignty
rather than autonomy. Although many aspects of the jurisprudence are positive, the
Court has done relatively little to protect the regulatory jurisdiction of the States or their
ability to provide essential services to their citizens.577 Instead, the Court has focused on
limiting the accountability of state governments when they violate federal law. The most
important line of such cases – those expanding the sovereign immunity of the states from
suits for money damages under federal law578 – has even emphasized the “dignity” of the
states over the impact of federal damages remedies on the states’ ability to perform their
governmental functions.579 To be sure, limiting the ability of courts to impose extensive
financial liabilities on state governments may protect important aspects of state
autonomy, such as the ability of state institutions to control the allocation of scarce
financial resources pursuant to their view of the public good. And even dignity may have
some importance, especially in an age in which state sovereignty is so often denigrated in
the most extreme terms.580 But these considerations, in my view, pale beside the
importance of preserving meaningful state regulatory responsibilities.581
The Court’s federalism jurisprudence has thus been preoccupied with Texas v.
White’s notion of “an indestructible Union, composed of indestructible States.”582 But
“indestructibility” gained prominence at a time when dismemberment – either of the
individual States or the Union as a whole – was a more than credible threat. It has little
relevance to the problems confronting our federal system today, because
“indestructibility” in itself offers no guarantee that the States will retain the sorts of
powers and responsibility necessary to be viable, functioning governments. A State may
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remain “indestructible,” in terms of the integrity of its own institutions, while retaining
no meaningful role in the broader system.
A federalism jurisprudence focused on problems of regulatory autonomy would
directly address many of the values that motivate our attachment to federalism in the first
place. An autonomy-centered model may also be well-adapted to address two other
functional dilemmas facing doctrines that rely more heavily on notions of state
“sovereignty.” The first of these, identified by a number of scholars, is that federalism
doctrine generally protects state governments while ignoring local governments, which
have no independent status under the federal Constitution.583 This is true despite the fact
that, as Richard Fallon has observed, “in functional analysis of the values that federalism
serves, the significance of local governments is enormous.”584 Threats to state regulatory
autonomy like federal preemption, however, often fall on both state and local
governments alike.585 Autonomy-centered doctrines that limit the preemptive sweep of
federal law are thus likely to benefit all governmental entities further down the food
chain.
Likewise, autonomy doctrine is well-suited to address an argument by Edward
Rubin and Malcolm Feeley to the effect that the benefits of federalism discussed in this
Section generally flow from decentralization of decisionmaking, whether such
decentralization arises from constitutional mandate or merely from the policy decisions
of officials at the center to devolve power. Values of regulatory diversity and citizen
participation, in other words, are not necessarily reasons to enforce protections for state
autonomy as a matter of constitutional law.586 The short answer, which I explain further
below,587 is that autonomy doctrine has the capacity to address these values on both
levels – that is, the constitutional guarantee of state prerogatives and the policy choice to
devolve power. To appreciate how this is so, however, requires an investigation of the
institutional imperatives involved in the enforcement of federalism. That investigation is
the subject of the next Section.
V.

Federalism in the Political Branches:
Enforcement

The Viability and Extent of Self-

Doctrine should be shaped not only by the values that it seeks to promote but also
by the relative institutional capacity of courts to promote them. This question, as I
acknowledged in Part I, is a matter of comparative institutional choice. At least in theory,
583

See, e.g., David J. Barron, A Localist Critique of the New Federalism, 51 DUKE L. J. 377 (2001);
Richard Briffault, “What About the ‘Ism’?” Normative and Formal Concerns in Contemporary
Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1303 (1994).
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Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713 (1985) (“[F]or the purposes of the Supremacy Clause, the constitutionality of local
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the institutional choice question (Are the courts or the political process better suited to
protecting the federal balance?) is distinct from and prior to a second question of
interpretive choice (What sort of doctrinal tools should courts adopt for protecting
federalism?). I have already argued, however, that the institutional question will
generally be so multifarious in the federalism context as to preclude categorical
conclusions, and that in any event courts are not free simply to abstain from deciding
federalism questions institutional grounds.588
A third reason emerges from the
discussion in this Part: The political branches’ capacity to protect federalism is simply
too limited and uncertain to justify a categorical exclusion of the matter from judicial
concern.
If we are unwilling or unable to exclude courts entirely, then comparative
institutional analysis is best brought to bear on doctrine – that is, we will resolve the
interpretive questions in federalism doctrine to give courts a broader or narrower role,
depending on whether how we think courts compare with other institutions that might
resolve federalism questions. That is certainly commonplace enough: Courts adopted
federalism doctrines that were highly deferential towards Congress after 1937, for
example, because their experience of the prior two or three decades suggested (to them, at
least) that the political branches were better suited for resolving such questions.589
Comparative institutional analysis will also be relevant to other issues as well; I conclude
this Part, for example, with some very brief speculations about how the political branches
might structure their own internal operations to reflect these sorts of considerations. But
this is primarily an essay about courts and doctrine, so the bearing of institutional
considerations on the latter must necessarily take center stage.
Although I frame the issue as one of interpretive choice, a frequent observation by
institutional analysts remains critical: Too many scholars and judges have addressed the
question who should decide federalism issues in what Neil Komesar describes as “single
institutional analysis.”590 Some have stressed the strengths or weaknesses of courts in
addressing federalism issues; others have emphasized the capacity, or lack thereof, of the
political branches.591 As Professor Komesar explains, however, “[v]alid institutional
comparison calls upon courts to function when they can do a better job than the
alternatives.” This means that “[c]ourts may be called upon to consider issues for which
they are ill equipped in some absolute sense because they are better equipped to do so in
a relative sense.592
My analysis here tries to address both sides of the comparison. The present Part
focuses on the political branches, while the following Part emphasizes courts. The
analysis is far from definitive in either case. As I have suggested, it is simply not
possible to draw many firm conclusions at a high level of generality on these sorts of
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questions. Moreover, as Adrian Vermeule has demonstrated, issues of interpretive choice
(and institutional choice as well) often turn on empirical questions, and in many cases the
answers may be unknown or even unknowable.593 I have tried throughout my discussion
to point out areas where it might be possible to advance the ball through empirical
research. But many important facts will remain unknown, and courts will often have to
frame doctrine under conditions of uncertainty.
For example, my discussion in Section A of the argument that federal political
actors represent state governmental interests accepts that this dynamic operates some of
the time, but also suggests that in other situations federal representatives may actually
compete with state-level politicians. Which effect dominates is, at bottom, an empirical
question, but one would be hard pressed to resolve it through further research. It would
be even more difficult to calculate the “optimal” level of judicial intervention to
counteract the competitive activities of federal politicians, even if we could agree on
exactly how much federalism we want. Similar sorts of difficult and possibly intractable
empirical uncertainties pervade this area of the law.
My analysis here attempts to respond to these uncertainties through several
related strategies. First, I address these institutional questions at a relatively high level of
generality, assessing general tendencies while recognizing that individual doctrinal
contexts may require different resolutions, depending in part on how the underlying
empirical issues play out in that particular context. Second, I pay relatively close
attention to the claims made by prior advocates of judicial deference to the political
branches, on the view that the factual intuitions reflected in those views represent the
considered assessments of informed and intelligent observers over time. Third, I argue
that the development of federalism doctrine should be incremental, so that we need only
decide the direction and approach of incremental change while leaving its magnitude to
be worked out over a series of decisions. Finally, I suggest that empirical uncertainty is
itself an argument for choosing a “soft” over a “hard” model of judicial review; under the
former, the court’s resolution of federalism question is provisional and subject to
modification by the political branches, who may have better information in any given
case. I will still have to make certain assumptions and leaps, but hopefully I can at least
press some distance toward a more nuanced analysis of the “political safeguards of
federalism” than has sometimes appeared in the prior literature.
I consider three different sets of claims about the institutional capacity of the
political branches to protect federalism. Section A begins by addressing the most
commonclaim, that political actors at the federal level represent and respond to the
interests of state political institutions. This is the classic Twentieth Century version of
the “political safeguards” claim advanced by Herbert Wechsler and Jesse Choper, among
others. Section B considers an older variant, identified most closely with James Madison,
which holds that the sovereign People control the federal balance of power and that
federal and state governments compete for their loyalty. In Section C, I canvass the quite
different claim that the federal political process protects the States not through
representation but through sheer inertia; States retain their freedom of action to the extent
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that it is difficult to make federal law. Finally, Section D considers what each of these
arguments can tell us about how to build current federalism doctrine.
A.

Representation

Herbert Wechsler’s classic article began by describing a national “mood,” under
which national action is “regarded as exceptional in our polity, an intrusion to be justified
by some necessity, the special rather than the ordinary case.”594 The bulk of his
argument, however, emphasized the first aspect of Madison’s discussion in Federalist 45,
that is, the extent to which federal political institutions are derived from and dependent
on the institutions of state government. The Senate, Wechsler observed, “cannot fail to
function as the guardian of state interests as such,” and “[f]ederalist considerations . . .
play an important part even in the selection of the President.”595 Because of these
relationships, he concluded that “the Court is on weakest ground when it opposes its
interpretation of the Constitution to that of Congress in the interests of the states, whose
representatives control the legislative process and, by hypothesis, have broadly
acquiesced in sanctioning the challenged Act of Congress.”596
The Supreme Court largely adopted Professor Wechsler’s analysis in Garcia,
observing that
The Framers thus gave the States a role in the selection both of the
Executive and the Legislative Branches of the Federal Government. The
States were vested with indirect influence over the House of
Representatives and the Presidency by their control of electoral
qualifications and their role in Presidential Elections. . . . They were given
more direct influence in the Senate, where each State received equal
representation and each Senator was to be selected by the legislature of his
State.597
Because of these safeguards, the Court concluded that “[s]tate sovereign interests . . . are
more properly protected by procedural safeguards inherent in the structure of the federal
system than by judicially created limitations on federal power.”598
There is no evidence that Professor Wechsler meant the “political safeguards” to
be a complete theory of federalism enforcement. To the contrary, he carefully denied
“that the Court can decline to measure national enactments by the Constitution when it is
called upon to face the question in the course of ordinary litigation.”599 By pointing out
that “the supremacy clause governs there as well,”600 Wechsler seemed to insist that the
limits on federal power in the Constitution itself, such as the doctrine of enumerated
594
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powers, remain supreme law that courts must enforce. Judicial review should be
deferential, but it must still police the outer boundary of federal power.
That would be consistent with the apparent position of Chief Justice Marshall,
who made his own “political safeguards” argument in Gibbons v. Ogden601:
If, as has always been understood, the sovereignty of Congress, though
limited to specified objects, is plenary as to those objects, the power over
commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, is vested in
Congress as absolutely as it would be in a single government, having in its
constitution the same restrictions on the exercise of the power as are found
in the constitution of the United States. The wisdom and the discretion of
Congress, their identity with the people, and the influence which their
constituents possess at elections, are, in this, as in many other instances, as
that, for example, of declaring war, the sole restraints on which they have
relied, to secure them from its abuse. They are the restraints on which the
people must often rely solely, in all representative governments.602
Critics of judicial review in federalism cases have sometimes read this passage as an
argument for abdicating judicial enforcement altogether. Justice Souter’s dissent in
Morrison, for example, moves seamlessly from Marshall’s declaration that politics is the
“one restraint on [the] valid exercise” of Congress’s “plenary . . . power within the sphere
of activity affecting commerce”603 to the conclusion that “supposed conflicts of sovereign
political interests implicated by the Commerce Clause” are “remit[ted] . . . to politics.”604
But the italicized concepts are not equivalent. Justice Souter carefully and correctly (as is
his wont) characterizes Marshall as holding that politics take over only when Congress is
actually regulating commerce. Morrison, however, was a case about whether that
condition was met in the first place. That question surely “implicates” the Commerce
Clause, but nothing in Gibbons supports remitting boundary questions about the scope of
that clause to politics.605
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Chief Justice Rehnquist’s majority opinion in Morrison rightly pointed out the distinction between that
case and Gibbons:
[Justice Souter’s] assertion that, from Gibbons on, public opinion has been the only restraint on
the congressional exercise of the commerce power is true only insofar as it contends that political
accountability is and has been the only limit on Congress' exercise of the commerce power within
that power's outer bounds. As the language surrounding that relied upon by JUSTICE SOUTER
makes clear, Gibbons did not remove from this Court the authority to define that boundary.
Id. at 616 n.7 (majority opinion) (citing Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 194-95). Justice Souter admitted as
much, acknowledging that “[n]either Madison nor Wilson nor Marshall, nor the Jones & Laughlin, Darby,
Wickard, or Garcia Courts, suggested that politics defines the commerce power.” Id. at 651 n.19. He
argued that the outer boundary is described by the extremely lenient “substantial effects” test, and that the
majority’s exclusion of non-commercial regulation that nonetheless “affects” commerce thus operated
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Justice Souter cited the Court’s endorsement of Wechsler in Garcia as support for
abstaining in Morrison,606 but Garcia actually illustrates the distinction between the latter
case and what Chief Justice Marshall most likely had in mind. Garcia, unlike Morrison,
was not case about the boundaries of the commerce power. Instead, Garcia concerned
the validity of the National League of Cities doctrine – a new, judge-made principle of
state sovereignty protecting “traditional state functions” from otherwise-valid Commerce
Clause regulation.607 Presumably, Wechsler (or Marshall) would have said that while the
Court cannot abdicate its responsibility to enforce limits on federal power that are clearly
“in” the Constitution, the political safeguards of federalism largely obviate the need to
fashion new limits through doctrinal innovation.
It is an important enough point that neither Marshall nor Wechsler nor Garcia
spoke to the right and duty of the Court to police the outer boundary of Congress’s
power. But I actually want to defend an exercise of judicial power in the class of cases
that Wechsler, Garcia, and Gibbons all render problematic. For reasons that I discuss in
Part VI, the scope of the commerce power is likely to remain so broad as to offer largely
a symbolic constraint on Congress.608 If federal power is meaningfully to be limited, it
will have to come through doctrines that restrain national action even within the scope of
the enumerated powers. The anti-commandeering doctrine, for example, operates to
check otherwise-valid exercises of the commerce power.609 “Weaker” doctrines like profederalism clear statement rules also generally operate to restrict the scope of federal
legislation even without a colorable argument that Congress has exceeded the boundaries
of its constitutional authority.610
To justify such doctrines, we might look to Justice Blackmun’s opinion in Garcia.
That opinion invoked Professor Wechsler’s idea of political safeguards, but read (or
misread) him as eschewing virtually all substantive limits on Congress’s power in favor
of a nearly exclusive focus on the process of representation.611 Blackmun argued that
within the sphere of political control. See id. That simply makes clear, however, that the disagreement
between Justice Souter and the majority was over the proper doctrinal test for defining the boundary of the
commerce power, and Justice Souter conceded that that question cannot be decided by politics.
606
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although Justice Souter in fact joined the majority in the latter case.
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doctrine); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947) (presumption against preemption of state
law).
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The “virtually” is required by Justice Blackmun’s statement, late in the opinion, that “[t]hese cases do
not require us to identify or define what affirmative limits the constitutional structure might impose on
federal action affecting the States under the Commerce Clause.” Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit
Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 556 (1985) (citing Coyle v. Oklahoma, 221 U.S. 559 (1911)). The citation to Coyle –
which held that the Federal Government may not dictate the location of a state capitol – suggests that even
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“the fundamental limitation that the constitutional scheme imposes on the Commerce
Clause to protect the ‘States as States’ is one of process rather than one of result.”612
Because of this procedural focus, “[a]ny substantive restraint on the exercise of
Commerce Clause powers must find its justification in the procedural nature of this basic
limitation, and it must be tailored to compensate for possible failings in the national
political process rather than to dictate a ‘sacred province of state autonomy.’”613
The Garcia majority is often read as completely disavowing a judicial role in the
protection of state autonomy. But whether or not Justice Blackmun intended to do so, the
opinion left the door open to a “Democracy and Distrust”614 for federalism doctrine – that
is, doctrines that would derive their justification from failures in the political process but
which might fairly aggressively limit federal incursions on state autonomy.615 John Hart
Ely’s work on process failures surely demonstrates how far-reaching such review can be
in the context of individual rights, and Andrezj Rapaczynski traced the outlines of such a
theory in the federalism area shortly after Garcia came down.616 Some of the promise of
such a jurisprudence has been realized in the anti-commandeering doctrine, which may
be justified on process grounds,617 as well as in the various “clear statement” rules that
the Garcia majority might be willing to acknowledge some very narrow affirmative limit imposed by state
sovereignty concerns on Congress’s enumerated powers. But this limit would seem to be so narrow as to
hardly be worth mentioning.
612

Id. at 554 (emphasis added). See also id. at 552:
In short, the Framers chose to rely on a federally system in which special restraints on federal
power over the States inhered principally in the workings of the National Government itself, rather
than in discrete limitations on the objects of federal authority. State sovereign interests, then, are
more properly protected by procedural safeguards inherent in the structure of the federal system
than by judicially created limitations on federal power.
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649-50 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting).
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guard against interpretations of federal statutes that encroach on state sovereignty.618
These sorts of doctrines make clear that Garcia need not be read as the “Second Death of
Federalism.”619
Others, however, have pressed the “political safeguards” theory so far as to justify
a complete abdication of judicial responsibility for enforcing the federal balance. Most
famously, Jesse Choper urged that the Court should simply declare federalism cases nonjusticiable, in order to save its political capital for the more important task of enforcing
individual rights.620 Lynn Baker and I have criticized this version of the “political
safeguards” argument elsewhere.621 The important point for present purposes is that
Professor Wechsler’s (and Madison’s) idea opens up a range of possibilities for judicial
review (or non-review) of federalism issues. I want to suggest that how we choose
among them ought to be guided by our assessment of the soundness of Wechsler’s
political theory, as well as the strengths and weaknesses of the alternative approaches to
judicial review that may be available.
It must be said that the Garcia/Wechsler theory of protection through
representation has all kinds of problems. The critical literature is extensive,622 and I will
commandeering doctrine as a means of requiring Congress to internalize the financial and political costs of
its programs); La Pierre, Political Safeguards, supra note 577, at 989.
618

See, e.g., Solid Waste Agency, Inc. v. United States Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 174 (2001)
(refusing to defer to administrative agency interpretation of statute that would push the bounds of
Congress’s Commerce Clause authority); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991) (requiring a clear
statement of Congress’s intent to subject core state functions to federal regulation); Atascadero State Hosp.
v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 243 (1985) (requiring a very clear statement where Congress wishes to abrogate
the states’ sovereign immunity pursuant to its power to enforce the Reconstruction Amendments); see also
Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 24 (1981) (holding, prior to Garcia, that Congress
must clearly state conditions on grants to states of federal funds); William N. Eskridge, Jr., & Philip P.
Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L.
REV. 593 (1992) (discussing the clear statement cases).
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Van Alstyne, supra note 288, at 1709 (criticizing Garcia as an abdication of the Court’s responsibility).
I do not mean to suggest that Professor Van Alstyne was wrong in his assessment of what Garcia meant to
the justices in the majority at the time it was decided. Justice Blackmun may very well have intended to
minimize judicial review of federalism issues across the board, and some of his subsequent votes suggest
no great enthusiasm for finding process-based limits on federal power. See, e.g., New York v. United
States, 505 U.S. 144, 189 (1992) (joining Justice White’s dissent rejecting the anti-commandeering rule).
The point is simply that Garcia – perhaps inadvertently – pointed the way toward a more rigorous doctrine
of federalism. When life gives you lemons . . . .
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hit only the high points here.623 The first has to do with Professor Wechsler’s theory of
representation. Because federal representatives are dependent upon constituents at the
state level, Wechsler assumed Members of Congress will function effectively as
ambassadors for their states in Washington, guarding their states’ interests against federal
encroachment.624 As Larry Kramer has demonstrated, however, this view conflates
representation of interests at the state level with representation of the actual institutions
of state government.625 The two are not the same; indeed, federal and state politicians are
likely to find themselves competing to provide for the needs of their common
constituents. This competition provides strong incentives for federal representatives to
expand their own responsibilities at the expense of their state-level colleagues. As
Jonathan Macey has explained, “the political-support-maximization model would seem to
predict that the federal government will always exercise its power to preempt local law –
either to regulate or to forbear from regulating – in order to obtain for itself the political
support associated with providing laws to interested political coalitions.”626
Some opponents of judicial review in federalism cases have acknowledged these
sorts of problems, but have sought to rehabilitate the Garcia/Wechsler approach by
identifying alternative political mechanisms that protect state autonomy. Larry Kramer,
for example, has argued that political parties and administrative agencies tie the fortunes
of state and federal-level politicians together, so that federal representatives and
bureaucrats are inclined to look out for the institutional interests of state government
instead of to compete with state politicians.627 This dynamic no doubt works out the way
Professor Kramer predicts at least some of the time. Yet there are also reasons to doubt
623

I have already discussed the objection that the judicial abdication called for by strong versions of the
“political safeguards” argument is inconsistent with the obligation of Courts, outside the narrow scope of
the political question doctrine, to decide constitutional issues that come before them. See supra TAN ___.
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[cite Wechsler]. Justice Blackmun’s opinion in Garcia likewise seems to have assumed an
ambassadorial or intergovernmental model when it stated that the makeup of Congress provides for “state
participation in federal governmental action.” 469 U.S. at 556.

625

See Kramer, Politics, supra note 622, at ___ [quote].
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Macey, Federalism, supra note ___, at 266. Professor Macey notes, however, that “contrary to this
prediction, we observe that the federal government willingly defers to local governments over a wide range
of issues by allowing them to continue to supply laws.” Id. He identifies three sets of circumstances in
which, under the economic theory of regulation, we would expect such federal deference, and I address
these circumstances in the next Subsection. See infra TAN ___. The important point for present purposes
is that, as Macey’s analysis makes clear, state politicians are often dependent upon federal ones, rather than
the reverse. See, e.g., id. at 291 (“Deferring regulatory matters to the state legislatures must take its place
alongside the other strategies by which federal politicians can offer wealth transfers to interest groups in
exchange for political support.”). For the notion that state and federal politicians compete with one
another, see also Clayton P. Gillette, The Exercise of Trumps by Decentralized Governments, 83 VA. L.
REV. 1347, 1357 (1997) (“Where central representatives are popularly elected, they may have a stake in
reelection that induces them to favor central intervention whenever they can thereby be perceived as
addressing an issue of interest to constituents, regardless of whether centralized attention to the issue is
required or authorized.”); Baker & Young, supra note 10, at 114-15 (arguing that the federal Gun Free
School Zones Act illustrates this dynamic); Friedman, Valuing Federalism, supra note 523, at 374-75
(noting the incentives that federal politicians have to move “‘apple pie’ issues” to the federal level).
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See Kramer, Politics, supra note ___, at ___ [quote]; Kramer, Understanding Federalism, supra note
___, at ___.
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how far the argument goes. Mutual dependence is a double-edged sword; in some
instances, it may encourage state politicians to sacrifice their own institutional interests
and the interests of their state for the good of the national party.628
Unlike Madison’s and Wechsler’s version of the interdependence argument,
moreover, Professor Kramer’s account is predicated on mechanisms – the structure of
political parties, the interlocking nature of state and federal administrative responsibilities
– that are not themselves grounded in the Constitution.629 They change with every
alteration in party nomination and campaign financing rules, executive orders
centralizing or decentralizing control within the Executive branch, and the structure of
cooperative federalism statutes and federal funding programs. In each of these settings,
protections for state autonomy are often a byproduct of a structure designed primarily to
meet other needs. Under these circumstances, we have little reason to be sanguine that
preservation of those protections will be an imperative when the structures are redesigned
for other reasons.630
Professor Kramer’s mechanisms are, in any event, no answer to a second problem
that arises when we distinguish between the classic problem of vertical aggrandizement –
that is, attempts by the national government to increase its own power vis a vis the states
for its own purposes – and horizontal aggrandizement.631 Most discussion of “political
safeguards” focuses on the vertical scenario. In the horizontal version, one group of state
governments or interests concentrated at the state level use the national government as an
instrument for imposing its preferences on other states. A good nineteenth century
example is the Fugitive Slave Law, by which the Southern states were able to use the
federal government as an instrument for enforcing their preference for a draconian regime
of recovery of escaped slaves on states in the North that preferred to give putative
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endangered important state legislation).
629

See Prakash & Yoo, supra note 226, at 1480-89 (arguing that Professor Kramer’s theory “relies on an
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point: more permanent mechanisms, such as judicial review, are necessary to safeguard federalism”); Baker
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See, e.g., Howard, supra note 173, at 793 (observing that “[t]he ‘nationalization’ of campaign finance
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On the distinction between horizontal aggrandizement, see generally Baker & Young, supra note 10, at
109-10; see also Baker, Conditional Spending, supra note ___ at 1940 (arguing that conditional federal
spending is problematic because it allows “some states to harness the federal lawmaking power to oppress
other states”).
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escapees more due process.632 Because the horizontal scenario depends on Congress’s
responsiveness to the states, it is driven by the very dynamic that Professor Wechsler and
the Garcia opinion posited. Even if the political safeguards theorists are correct, in other
words, horizontal aggrandizement would remain as a threat to the autonomy of individual
states.633
Third, political safeguards theorists often seem to downplay the many political
and economic forces that press for resolution of problems at the national level. One
factor is that “it simply [is] much easier to fight a regulatory war in one central location,
rather than in fifty state fora.”634 Interest groups seeking enactment of a particular policy
may also prefer federal law because it is “considered a higher quality product than state
law,”635 or because it is harder for those who are made worse off by the regulation to
avoid it by exiting to another jurisdiction.636 The result of these factors, according to
Professor Macey, is that “we observe interest groups exhibiting a strong preference for
federal as opposed to state law in most areas.”637 Those tendencies will not, of course, be
dispositive in all cases. But from the perspective of state regulatory autonomy, it’s fair to
say they don’t help.
Finally, it’s worth pointing out that the Supreme Court has very explicitly rejected
Garcia’s theory of representation, although the Court seems not to have realized it. In
the Term Limits case, the Court rejected the notion that the States may interpose
Justice Stevens,
themselves between the People and their federal represenatives.638
writing for the majority, stated that “the Framers, in perhaps their most important
contribution, conceived of a Federal Government directly responsible to the people,
possessed of direct power over the people, and chosen directly, not by States, but by the
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See, e.g., Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842) (holding that the federal Fugitive Slave
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people.”639 Justice Kennedy explained this point in more detail, and it is worth quoting
him at some length:
It was the genius of [the Framers’] idea that our citizens would have two
political capacities, one state and one federal, each protected from
incursion by the other. The resulting Constitution created a legal system
unprecedented in form and design, establishing two orders of government,
each with its own direct relationship, its own privity, its own set of mutual
rights and obligations to the people who sustain it and are governed by it.
...
The political identity of the entire people of the Union is reinforced by the
proposition, which I take to be beyond dispute, that, though limited as to
its objects, the National Government is, and must be, controlled by the
people without collateral interference by the States. McCulloch affirmed
this proposition as well, when the Court rejected the suggestion that States
could interfere with federal powers. “This was not intended by the
American people. They did not design to make their government
dependent on the States.” . . . The States have no power, reserved or
otherwise, over the exercise of federal authority within its proper
sphere.640
Federal representatives, then, are not ambassadors from their states to Washington, D.C.
They are not “dependent,” as Professor Wechsler and the Garcia majority thought, on the
institutions of state government. Attempts by those state institutions to “control” the
federal government – through specific instructions to representatives, perhaps, or ballot
access restrictions on representatives who vote against the state’s interests in Congress –
amount to “collateral interference” and may well be, under the Term Limits result,
unconstitutional. Instead, federal representatives have their own relationship with the
people and consequently their own incentives, in competition with state politicians, to
provide for their constituents.
Despite all of these problems, I do not mean to suggest that the Garcia/Wechsler
representational safeguards never operate to protect state autonomy. There are, no doubt,
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Id. at 821. Ironically, the Term Limits majority was primarily made up of nationalist justices who either
joined Garcia when it was initially decided (Stevens) or who have endorsed its “political safeguards”
theory in the years since (Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer). See [cites endorsing political safeguards]. Equally
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(Scalia and Thomas) who have rejected the “political safeguards” notion whenever it has been raised.
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point. See generally Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 841 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“That the States may not
invade the sphere of federal sovereignty is as incontestable, in my view, as the corollary proposition that
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situations in which they do.641 Indeed, the fact that significant state autonomy remains in
practice, despite over 50 years of judicial unwillingness to enforce significant restrictions
on federal power, suggests that something in the federal political process must act to
restrain Congress. And it is not hard to find the occasional piece of anecdotal evidence,
such as Congress’s enactment of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act,642 that points to
some concern for state institutional autonomy on the part of federal politicians.
The federal political process may protect state autonomy, however, not so much
because it represents state interests but simply because it is cumbersome. Brad Clark, for
example, has emphasized the difficult procedural gauntlet facing federal legislation under
Article I. “Each set of procedures,” he argues, “requires the participation and assent of
multiple actors to adopt federal law. This creates the equivalent of a supermajority
requirement and thus reinforces the burden of inertia against federal action, leaving states
greater freedom to govern.”643 We thus might think of the familiar but difficult process
by which legislative proposals must secure a place on the legislative agenda, navigate
both houses of the Congress, and either secure Presidential approval or a supermajority
sufficient to override a veto as the “procedural safeguards of federalism.”644
This overview of the political and procedural safeguards of federalism suggests
several conclusions for judicial review. First, we should set aside Dean Choper’s version
of the “political safeguards” argument, which dispensed with judicial review entirely out
of confidence that politics would protect federalism on its own.645 This is true for several
reasons. First, none of these political and procedural safeguards inspire complete
confidence. The representation model, as I have discussed, is significantly flawed, and
the procedural safeguards mostly limit the rate at which the federal government can make
inroads on state authority. Neither is likely, without more, to provide a sustainable
bulwark against the continued erosion of state autonomy.
Second, process-based theories of constitutional law in other contexts emphasize
the need for courts to police the rules of the game and to make sure that all relevant
interests are, in fact, represented.646 A federalism-centered “Democracy and Distrust”
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would thus emphasize a judicial role in enforcing the procedural requirements for federal
action and in ensuring that dysfunctions in the process do not effectively exclude the
institutional interests of state governments.647 A process-based approach to federalism
simply shifts the focus of judicial review; unless we think the process is perfect, however,
it is hard to see why that shift in emphasis would warrant the judicial abdication that
many propose. As I discuss further below, courts can and should enhance the operation
of political and procedural safeguards in a number of ways.
Third, a complete judicial abdication cannot be squared with traditional notions of
the judicial power. Chief Justice Marshall’s justification for judicial review in Marbury
v. Madison648 relied heavily on the obligation of courts to apply the relevant rules –
including constitutional rules – to whatever cases come before them.649 That obligation
cannot simply be declined because the court would prefer to focus on individual rights
cases. As Marshall observed in Cohens v. Virginia, the Court has “no more right to
decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given.
The one or the other would be treason to the constitution.”650 Unless we think federalism
cases fit the narrow contours of the modern political question doctrine – and few argue
that they do – then the Court must decide them.651
The better approach, I think, is to combine the Garcia and Wechsler models. As
I have discussed,652 Professor Wechsler seemed to envision judicial enforcement of the
Constitution’s textual limits on federal power without explicitly endorsing the

accessories to majority tyranny, our elected representatives in fact are not representing the interests of those
whom the system presupposes they are”).
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See id. (arguing that the two types of dysfunction that should trigger judicial intervention on behalf of
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disadvantaging” some other interest).

648
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development of new doctrines to protect and enhance the operation of political checks.
This approach might be adequate, notwithstanding the weaknesses of political checks
operating alone, if one had a great deal of confidence in substantive limits based on text.
For reasons having to do with the Court’s pre-1937 experience, however, substantive
limits also seem likely to remain a highly incomplete solution.653
The Garcia opinion, on the other hand, can be read to invite the development of
doctrines “tailored to compensate for possible failings in the national political process,”
but left no role for judicial enforcement of substantive restrictions on Congress – even
those grounded in the constitutional text.654 While the Court properly has not heeded
Garcia’s call to ignore substantive limits entirely, it has begun to develop Garcia’s
affirmative potential in several ways. I discuss the sort of directions that this sort of
process-based federalism might take in the next subsection.
B.

Competition

Self-enforcement figures prominently in the political theory of the Founders.
James Madison argued in Federalist 51 that “[i]n framing a government which to be
administered by men over men . . . you must first enable the government to control the
governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself.”655 The proposed constitution
was to achieve this through the combination of federalism and separation of powers:
In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the
people is first divided between two distinct governments, and then the
portion allotted to each subdivided among distinct and separate
departments. Hence a double security arises to the rights of the people.
The different governments will control each other, at the same time that
each will be controlled by itself.656
While the Founders probably contemplated some judicial role in maintaining these
allocations in place,657 courts are certainly not the primary mechanism. Rather, “the
constant aim is to divide and arrange the several offices in such a manner as that each
may be a check on the other—that the private interest of every individual may be a
sentinel over the public rights.”658
Applied to federalism, this self-enforcement notion holds that states can take care
of themselves through the political process – an idea that has dominated debates about
judicial enforcement of federalism in this country over the past several decades. This
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idea, adopted as the law of the land in the Garcia case659 although arguably undermined
by more recent decisions,660 is usually traced to Herbert Wechsler’s seminal article in
1954.661 But its antecedents – as Wechsler recognized – go back much further than that
to James Madison’s essays in the Federalist and John Marshall’s opinion in Gibbons v.
Ogden.662 As John Yoo has recognized, “the Federalists themselves first developed the
theory that Professors Wechsler and Choper would resurrect to such great effect.”663 It is
worth paying attention to the original version, because in many ways it is more
sophisticated and even – perhaps ironically – more relevant to our current institutional
arrangements than the Wechsler/Choper revision.
Madison laid out his “political safeguards” theory in Federalist 45 and 46. He had
defended the initial allocation of power in prior essays, arguing that good reasons
supported each individual delegation of power to the center in the proposed
constitution.664 Numbers 45 and 46 addressed the stability of this initial allocation;
hence, Number 45 considered “whether the whole mass of [powers transferred to the
federal government] will be dangerous to the portion of authority left in the several
states.”665 The question was not so much whether the Federal Government had been
granted too much power, but rather whether the proposed structure would allow that
government to draw more power to itself in the years ahead.
The answer, according to Madison, was that we should be more worried about the
States aggrandizing themselves than the Federal Government. Although he had set out to
consider the notion that “the operation of the federal government will by degrees prove
fatal to the State governments,” he concluded that “the more I revolve the subject, the
more fully I am persuaded that the balance is much more likely to be disturbed by the
preponderancy of the last than of the first scale.”666 In addition to noting that
confederacies throughout history had tended to fall apart rather than devolve into
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centralized tyranny,667 Madison identified two broad sorts of checks on central authority.
The first relied on the institutional dependence of the federal government on state
institutions. “The State governments,” he pointed out, “may be regarded as constituent
and essential parts of the federal government; whilst the latter is nowise essential to the
operation or organization of the former.”668 That relationship would cause national
officials to internalize the interests and preferences of the States; national officials, in
other words, will function more as representatives of than as competitors to state-level
politicians.669 This is the idea that Professor Wechsler emphasized and, probably as a
direct result, the mechanism on which current debates have focused.670
Madison, however, had another string to his bow. He observed that
Either the mode in which the federal government is to be constructed will
render it sufficiently dependent on the people, or it will not. On the first
supposition, it will be restrained by that dependence from forming
schemes obnoxious to their constituents. On the other supposition, it will
not possess the confidence of the people, and its schemes of usurpation
will be easily defeated by the State governments, who will be supported
by the people.671
The People’s loyalty, Madison insisted, is the key determinant of political power in a
system based on popular sovereignty. This is what he thought the Antifederalists had
forgotten in their focus on the powers allotted to the central government. “They must be
told that the ultimate authority . . . resides in the people alone, and that it will not depend
merely on the comparative ambition or address of the different governments whether
either, or which of them, will be able to enlarge its sphere of jurisdiction at the expense of
the other.”672 Because the People remain sovereign at the end of the day, “the event in
every case [of federal-state conflict] should be supposed to depend on the sentiments and
sanction of their common constituents.”673
667
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Madison explained that “[t]he prepossessions, which the members themselves will carry into the federal
government will generally be favorable to the States.” THE FEDERALIST No. 46, at 296 (Clinton Rossiter,
ed. 1961). He therefore expected that
For the same reason that the members of the State legislatures will be unlikely to attach
themselves sufficiently to national objects, the members of the federal legislature will be likely to
attach themselves too much to local objects. . . . Measures will too often be decided according to
their probable effect, not on the national prosperity and happiness, but on the prejudices, interests,
and pursuits of the governments and people of the individual States.
Id. Madison invoked the record of the Confederation Congress to bear out this prediction. See id. at 29697.
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Id. Hamilton took a similar view in Federalist 28:
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Madison argued that, in this sort of contest, it was “beyond doubt that the first and
most natural attachment of the people will be to the governments of their respective
States.”674 This was true for two major reasons. First, “[t]he number of individuals
employed under the Constitution of the United States will be much smaller than the
number employed under the particular States. There will consequently be less of
personal influence on the side of the former than of the latter.”675 The argument is
basically one of political patronage: Because there are more jobs at the state level,
“[i]nto the administration of these a greater number of individuals will expect to rise.
From the gift of these a greater number of offices and emoluments will flow.”676
The second reason arose out of the allocation of governmental responsibilities
between the States and the Union. “The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution
to the federal government,” Madison noted, “are few and defined. Those which are to
remain in the State governments are numerous and indefinite.”677 But it was not just the
number of powers allocated to each government that mattered, but the relation of these
responsibilities to the citizens’ own lives. In particular, “[t]he powers reserved to the
several States will extend to all the objects which, in the ordinary course of affairs,
concern the lives, liberties, and properties of the people, and the internal order,
improvement, and prosperity of the State.”678 As a result, “all the more domestic and
personal interests of the people will be regulated and provided for” by “the
superintending care” of the States.679 Hamilton likewise saw this “variety of more minute
interests” as “necessarily fall[ing] under the superintendence of the local administrations”
and forming “so many rivulets of influence running through every part of the society.”680
Madison expected the Federal Government to be far less involved with these
“bread and butter” sorts of issues. “The operations of the federal government will be

Power being almost always the rival of power, the general government will at all times stand ready
to check the usurpations of the state governments, and these will have the same disposition
towards the general government. The people, by throwing themselves into either scale, will
infallibly make it preponderate. If their rights are invaded by either, they can make use of the
other as the instrument of redress.
THE FEDERALIST No. 28, at 181 (Clinton Rossiter, ed. 1961).
674

Id. Hamilton agreed. See Federalist No. 17 (Cook ed.) at 107 (“Upon the same principle that a man is
more attached to his family than to his neighbourhood, to his neighbourhood than to the community at larte,
the people of each State would be apt to feel a stronger byass towards their local governments than towards
the government of the Union; unless the force of that principle should be destroyed by a much better
administration of the latter.”).

675

THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 291 (Clinton Rossiter, ed. 1961).

676

THE FEDERALIST No. 46, at 294 (Clinton Rossiter, ed. 1961).
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Id. at 292.
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THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 292-93 (Clinton Rossiter, ed. 1961).
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THE FEDERALIST No. 46, at 294-95 (Clinton Rossiter, ed. 1961).
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THE FEDERALIST No. 17, at 107 (J.E. Cooke, ed. 1961). In particular, Hamilton cited “the ordinary
administration of criminal and civil justice” as the “most universal and most attractive source of popular
obedience and attachment” because it is “the immediate and visible guardian of life and property.” Id.
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most extensive and important in times of war and danger; those of the States governments
in times of peace and security.”681 Because he hoped that “the former periods will
probably bear a small proportion to the latter,” Madison predicted that “the State
governments will here enjoy another advantage over the federal government.”682 To put
the argument more in terms of present allocations of responsibilities, Madison expected
the average citizen to care more, most of the time, for the state (and local) governments
that run his children’s local elementary school, arrest the burglar who breaks into his
house, or enforce his contract with his employer than for the distant national government
that maintains the Nation’s nuclear deterrent.683
This argument accords with modern political science’s “economic theory of
regulation.” That theory holds that politicians obtain political support – in the form of
votes and campaign contributions, for example – in exchange for providing regulation
that benefits those groups.684 The theory has a number of controversial implications,
such as its prediction that the rent-seeking activities of private interest groups will
dominate legislative outcomes.685 To support Madison, however, we need look only to
the basic “political-support- maximization” model that undergirds the theory.686 That
basic model confirms Madison’s insight that the ability of politicians to generate “the
predilection and support of the people”687 – in Madison’s phrase – depends on their
ability to “regulate[] and provide[] for” the “domestic and personal interests of the
people.”688
We would thus expect the ability of both state and federal governments to
generate political support to be largely a function of their jurisdiction and responsibilities.
Nominally, of course, it is possible for citizens to support both state and federal
681

THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 293 (Clinton Rossiter, ed. 1961).

682

Id.
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See also THE FEDERALIST No. 17, at 108 (J.E. Cooke, ed. 1961) (Alexander Hamilton) (predicting that
“[t]he operations of the national government” would “[r]elat[e] to more general interests” and therefore be
“less apt to come home to the feelings of the people; and, in proportion, less likely to inspire a habitual
sense of obligation and an active sentiment of attachment”).
684

See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, Federal Deference to Local Regulators and the Economic Theory of
Regulation: Toward a Public-Choice Explanation of Federalism, 76 VA. L. REV. 265, 269 (1990)
[hereinafter Macey, Federalism] (“[P]oliticians maximize the aggregate political support that they receive
from interest groups by supplying the legal rules that result in the highest net receipt of support.”); William
N. Eskridge, Jr., Politics Without Romance: Implications of Public Choice Theory for Statutory
Interpretation, 74 VA. L. REV. 275, 285 (1988) (“Public choice theorists typically treat legislation as an
economic transaction in which interest groups form the demand side, and legislators form the supply
side.”).
685

See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory
Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223, 229 (1986) (observing that “special
interest groups tend to dominate the legislative process”); FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 543, at 22-33
(describing and critiquing the theory).
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Macey, Federalism, supra note 684, at 265-66 (describing this model).
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THE FEDERALIST No. 46, at 294 (Clinton Rossiter, ed. 1961).
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Id. at 294-95.
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politicians; most of us vote for several of each in every election. But citizens are likely to
pay the most attention and devote their campaign contributions and participatory energies
to the level of government likely to have the greatest impact on their most central
concerns. And in the situations that Madison had in mind – that is, conflicts between
state and federal institutions in which popular sentiment holds the key to the balance of
power – the People can be expected to back the institutions that have earned their most
intensive loyalties in the past.
Although the basic dynamics that Madison identified remain plausible today,689
many of his factual assumptions are under pressure. Consider, for example, his
expectation that “the component parts of the State governments will in no instance be
indebted for their appointment to the direct agency of the federal government, and very
little, if at all, to the local influence of its members.”690 This may still be largely so,
although one does increasingly see national political parties playing an important role in
state-level electoral races, both through funding and other forms of support.691 Moreover,
state governments have become dependent upon Washington, D.C., in other important
689

Plausible, but certainly not uncontested. The economic theory of regulation has its critics. Daniel Farber
and Philip Frickey, for example, have argued that ideology is a more important factor in determining the
positions taken by legislators than the economic interests of their constituents. See FARBER & FRICKEY,
supra note 543, at 24-33; see also Mark Kelman, On Democracy-Bashing: A Skeptical Look at the
Theoretical and “Empirical” Practice of the Public Choice Movement, 74 VA. L.REV. 199, 205 (1988)
(likewise disputing the premise that government officials act based on narrow self-interest). I doubt this is
much of a problem for Madison’s model as I wish to use it, however. First, to the extent that ideology is an
important factor in explaining the votes of legislators, it seems likely that it would also be an important
factor in appealing to constituents at re-election time. If that is true, then the legislator needs to make sure
that (a) her own ideology basically reflects that of a majority of her constituents, and (b) that the legislator’s
“jurisdic tion” includes items which give her an opportunity to act on that ideology; otherwise, voters that
care about ideology will be more interested in politicians that do have jurisdiction over the ideological
issues that matter to them. The scope of legislative jurisdiction seems likely to be important to a
politician’s ability to generate political support regardless of whether ideology or economic interest is
driving decisions. See generally NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS
IN LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 58-65 (1994) (arguing that the motivation of government
officials – e.g., whether they act out of self-interest, ideology, or public spirit – is actually irrelevant to the
interest-group model of politics).
If I am wrong about the first point, that would suggest that legislators simply aren’t as tied to the
interests and preferences of their constituents as Madison and contemporary public choice-types suggest.
That would undermine any “political safeguards” approach to federalism that relied on the representation of
the states on the federal level. It would accordingly suggest that, if we do value federalism, we need to find
more direct ways to protect state autonomy. Preemption doctrine can readily do that simply by making it
less likely that existing federal legislation will be interpreted to supplant broad swaths of state authority and
more difficult for broadly preemptive legislation to be enacted in the future. See infra TAN ___.
Finally, critics like Professors Farber and Frickey do not say that there is nothing to the economic
theory of regulation – only that it is an incomplete account. “Our best picture of the political process,” they
conclude, “is a mixed model in which constituent interest, special interest groups, and ideology all help
determine legislative conduct.” FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 543, at 33. The fact that the model is
mixed doesn’t mean that Madison’s analysis isn’t an important part of the dynamic; further, it seems the
part of the dynamic most directly relevant to issues of “process federalism.”
690

THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 291 (Clinton Rossiter, ed. 1961).
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ways. Many states now depend for large portions of their budgets on federal grants, and
that dependence is only likely to increase as many states face sizeable shortfalls in the
years ahead.692 As many commentators have observed, Congress is able to translate this
financial dependence into policy control through the mechanism of conditional
spending.693
Madison’s assumptions about the relative sizes of the state and federal
governmental establishments have also not held up. In absolute terms, both layers of
governments have of course grown enormously. Relatively speaking, the differentials
between the two in terms of employment and gross spending have declined, although the
states still come out ahead.694 And in the world that many leading constitutional lawyers
inhabit, the States’ prior advantage may have flipped entirely. Most graduates of elite
law schools, for example, seem to prefer federal clerkships and posts in the federal
Justice Department to equivalent roles in state government.695
So, too, with Madison’s assumption that federal institutions would move to the
fore only during relatively infrequent crises in foreign affairs. It is no accident, if we
accept Madison’s view, that the explosion of federal power came over the course of what
my colleague Philip Bobbitt has called “the Long War.”696 Nor should it be surprising
that the advent of the War on Terrorism – which might make the “Long War” look short
before it is through – has already brought new calls to abandon concerns for state
autonomy in the name of the national need.697 We may still hope for a world in which
”periods [of war and danger] will . . . bear a small proportion to [times of peace and
security],”698 but it is not on the horizon. Traditionally federal concerns about foreign
relations and security from external attack are likely to remain highly salient for the
foreseeable future.699
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[cites on state budget crises]
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See, e.g., Baker, Conditional Spending, supra note 364, at ___.
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[cites]
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[cites]
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See PHILIP BOBBITT, THE SHIELD OF ACHILLES: WAR, PEACE, AND THE COURSE OF HISTORY 24 (2002)
(“We should regard the conflicts now commonly called the First World War, the Second World War, and
the Korean and Viet Nam Wars, as well as the Bolshevik Revolution, the Spanish Civil War, and the Cold
War as a single war because all were fought over a single set of constitutional issues that were strategically
unresolved until the end of the Cold War and the Peace of Paris in 1990.”).
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See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, Will the Court Reassert National Authority?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2001,
Week in Review Section, at 4 (calling for the Court to abandon its recent federalism jurisprudence in the
wake of the September 11 attacks).
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THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 293 (Clinton Rossiter, ed. 1961).
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See, e.g., Fred Hiatt, Challenging Bush’s World View, WASH. POST, June 9, 2003, at A21 (observing
that “Congress has accepted the idea that terrorism allied with weapons of mass destruction represents a
threat comparable to that posed by communism during the Cold War,” and concluding that “those who
hope the terrorist threat has been overstated are likely to be . . . disappointed”). But see infra TAN ___
(arguing that in a world of globalization and asymmetrical threats, these concerns cannot remain uniquely
federal).
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Significant expansions of federal power have been justified, in the past century,
on the basis of other “wars,” such as the “War on Poverty” or the “War on Drugs.”700
These metaphors seek to tie into Madison’s intuition that national activity is most
justified in response to fundamental threats to the society. They also reflect, however, the
substantial pressure that now bears on the Founders’ fundamental assumptions
concerning the state and federal roles. Hamilton, for example, thought that “[t]he
administration of private justice between the citizens of the same State, the supervision of
agriculture and of other concerns of a similar nature, . . . can never be desirable cares of a
general jurisdiction.” He therefore found it “improbable that there should exist a
disposition in the Fœderal councils to usurp the powers with which they are
connected.”701
Subsequent experience, however, has disappointed Hamilton’s
expectation; the federal government, often for very good reasons, has frequently seen fit
to concern itself with these “local” matters. In a world where the federal government
provides social security, health insurance, and civil rights protections for millions – to
name just a few examples – the states no longer have a monopoly of “the more domestic
and personal interests of the people.”702 States can thus no longer rely on the
unchallenged political support they might once have enjoyed as the exclusive guardians
of these interests.
Much of this shift has no doubt occurred on account of the States’ failure – or at
least perceived failure – adequately to perform these responsibilities.703 That was a
prospect that Madison was prepared to face. He remarked that “[i]f . . . the people should
in future become more partial to the federal than to the State governments, the change can
only result from such manifest and irresistible proofs of a better administration as will
overcome all their antecedent propensities.”704 In that event, “the people ought not surely
to be precluded from giving most of their confidence where they may discover it to be
most due.”705 These statements cannot be read, however, as condoning a wholesale shift
of state responsibilities to the center, beyond what the enumerations of the Constitution
provided. Madison insisted that even in the case just contemplated, “the State
governments could have little to apprehend, because it is only within a certain sphere that
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Federalist No. 17 (Cook ed.) at 106.
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THE FEDERALIST No. 46, at 294-95 (Clinton Rossiter, ed. 1961).
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See, e.g., John P. Dwyer, The Role of State Law in an Era of Federal Preemption: Lessons from
Environmental Regulation, 60 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 203, ___ [near n.95] (1997) (“Various failed efforts
to get states to set and enforce air and water pollution standards convinced federal policy makers in the
early 1970s that the only viable solution was federal regulation.”). Moreover, as Barry Friedman points
out, “one of the forces underlying the shift in power from the states to the national government has been
widespread discontent with the choices made by the states at some critical moments in American history.”
Friedman, Valuing Federalism, supra note 523, at 367 (involking nullification, the Civil War, and Jim
Crow laws). Many of the factors tending to press toward centralized regulation, however, have little to do
with state regulatory failure. I discuss these factors in the next section. See infra TAN ___.
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the federal power can, in the nature of things, be advantageously administered.”706 Much
like John Marshall would later assume that political safeguards would operate within the
scope of the Commerce Clause defined by courts,707 Madison’s discussion also seems to
presume an ultimate constitutional limit on political shifts.708
In any event, Madison’s analysis of the linkage between regulatory
responsibilities and popular support provides a focus for contemporary federalism
doctrine. If we (1) care about preserving state autonomy but (2) prefer for that autonomy
to be as self-enforcing as possible, Madison suggests that we should look to the States’
regulatory responsibilities. If those responsibilities remain intact and important to the
sovereign People, then the institutions of state government have little to worry about. But
if we find those responsibilities under pressure, then that pressure may also undermine
the ability of the system to police itself. Because Madison thought a wholesale shift of
policy momentum to the center unlikely, he was not forced to contemplate the
consequences of such a shift to the system as a whole. States exist for reasons other than
policy competence; they also, for example, help preserve liberty throughout the system.
Those sorts of values would be sacrificed if state policy responsibilities were allowed to
wither away.

VI.

C.

Inertia

D.

“Political Safeguards” and Doctrine

Federalism in the Courts: Judicial Experience and the Shape of Doctrine

The development of federalism doctrine should be guided not only by the values
that federalism seeks to promote but also by the institutional capacities of courts and
other governmental institutions to promote them through law. This concern has been
706

Id. Madison’s allusion to “advantageous” administration might be read to suggest that the limits on
federal jurisdiction would be set chiefly by practical policy considerations, but he had emphasized in the
preceding essay that “[t]he powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal government are
few and defined.” THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 292 (Clinton Rossiter, ed. 1961). That language suggests a
legal limit on federal authority.
Chief Justice Marshall’s version of the “political safeguards” argument seems to have contemplated a
similar limit. His statement in Gibbons v. Ogden that “[t]he wisdom and the discretion of congress, their
identity with the people, and the influence which their constituents possess at elections, are . . . the sole
restraints,” 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, ___ (1824), comes after his finding that the regulation at issue fell within
the text of the Commerce Clause. See id. at ___. Marshall synthesized the two points by stating that “the
sovereignty of Congress, though limited to specific objects, is plenary as to those objects.” Id. at ___. In
other words, political safeguards operate within the bounds set by enumerated powers.
707

See supra TAN ___.
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See also BANNING, supra note ___, at 296 (concluding that “the Constitution, as [Madison] understood
it, made the central government supreme within its sphere and strictly limited that sphere to matters that
could not be managed by the states”).
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with us from the beginning. As Jack Rakove has observed, “Madison doubted whether
adjudication alone could produce legally demonstrable and politically persuasive
solutions, given ‘the impossibility of dividing powers of legislation, in such a manner, as
to be free from different constructions by different interests, or even from ambiguity in
the judgment of the impartial.’”709 We look to a number of sources to inform our
judgments about judicial capacities, including history, political science, and the history of
political science. But in this particular corner of constitutional law the institutional
experience of the Court itself tends to play a dominant role.
The history of federalism doctrine in the Supreme Court is a story of relatively
vigorous early enforcement,710 a fall from grace followed by a period of judicial
repentance and abdication,711 and more lately a period of cautious revival.712 As the
opinions of the “Federalist Revival” demonstrate, much of the current debate is
preoccupied with the institutional lessons to be drawn from this legacy.713 Justice Souter,
for example, has argued vigorously that new decisions like Lopez and Morrison “can only
be seen as a step toward recapturing the prior mistakes”714 of the Lochner era. That era,
and the collapse of the “dual federalism” model of doctrine that helped mark the era’s
end, looms as a brooding omnipresence over any current effort to make federalism
doctrine.

A.

Confrontations with Congress

The relevant decisional history is familiar. In a series of cases like United States
v. E.C. Knight Co.715 and Hammer v. Dagenhart,716 the Court narrowly construed or
struck down federal legislation on the ground that it exceeded Congress’s authority under
709

RAKOVE, supra note 51, at 176-77 (quoting James Madison, Letter to Thomas Jefferson, Oct. 24, 1787,
in 10 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 211 (William T. Hutchinson, William M.E. Rachal, Robert Rutland,
et al., eds. 1962-91)). [get original letter]
710

By “early” I mean the entire period prior to 1937. Larry Kramer’s contention that the Court did not
enforce federalism until the late 19th century, see Kramer, Politics, supra note 222, at 234-52, seems to my
mind to improperly discount the vigorous enforcement of federalism-based limits on state power
throughout that century, see Baker & Young, supra note 10, at 95 n.100, but I do not need to pursue that
disagreement here.
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United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 643 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting).
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156 U.S. 1 (1895) (construing the Sherman Act not to reach a merger that would result in a single
company acquiring 98 percent of the nation’s sugar refining capacity, on the ground that the Commerce
Power did not reach “manufacturing,” and that a monopoly in manufacturing would have only an “indirect”
effect on interstate commerce).
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247 U.S. 251 (1918) (striking down a federal statute banning interstate shipment of goods produced by
child labor, on the ground that the law’s ban on interstate shipment was a pretextual attempt to regulate
manufacturing activity within particular states).
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the Commerce Clause. Later decisions building on these precedents placed the Court in
direct confrontation with efforts by President Franklin Roosevelt and the New Deal
Congress to dramatically expand federal regulatory power as a response to the
Depression.717 These decisions – and the institutional attacks on the Court that they
helped provoke718 – form a “brooding omnipresence”719 over current efforts to construct a
viable federalism doctrine.
Perhaps the broadest and most obvious lesson of this period is that there are limits
on the Court’s ability to confront the federal political branches over basic issues of
governance. This observation is consistent with, but not necessarily the same as, the
longstanding theory that the Court has limited “institutional capital” which it must
allocate with care among the many different areas in which it might potentially exercise
the power of judicial review.720 I have suggested elsewhere that this idea has some
intuitive appeal and that the justices may perceive it to be true – and shape their behavior
accordingly – even if such limitations are not necessary incidents of the institution.721
But one might adopt the reverse theory – that responsible exercise of the power of
judicial review generates increased public tolerance for judicial intervention722 – and still
view the Lochner-era experience as suggesting an outer limit on that tolerance. At least
the bottom line conclusion ought to be non-controversial – that is, that the Court should
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See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (strkinig down the Bituminous Coal
Conservation Act of 1936 as outside the commerce power); Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295
U.S. 495 (1935) (striking down, on both Commerce Clause and nondelegation grounds, an industry code
for the poultry industry promulgated under the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933).
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See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS ___ (___) (describing the
institutional confrontation precipitated by the Court’s decisions).
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The phrase is from Justice Holmes’ dissent in Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917), in
which Holmes observed that “[t]he common law is not a brooding omnipresence in the sky, but the
articulate voice of some sovereign . . . that can be identified.” Id. at 222 (Holmes, J., dissenting). Jensen
was itself a case about federalism and preemption, and its holding illustrates the fact that the Court’s record
during the pre-1937 period was more complicated than is sometimes thought. The Court held that the
general maritime law, produced by federal judges deciding common law cases within their admiralty
jurisdiction, is federal law in the sense that it trumps state law under the Supremacy Clause. See id. at 21718 (majority opinion); see generally Ernest A. Young, Preemption at Sea, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 273,
291-94 (1999) (discussing Jensen). The decision was thus consistent with the Court’s general activism
during this period, striking down a state statute, but strongly nationalist in its thrust. I discuss federal
maritime law and Jensen further infra at TAN ___.
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See, e.g., JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS: A FUNCTIONAL
RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT 139 (1980) (arguing that “[t]he people’s
reverence and tolerance is not infinite and the Court’s public prestige and institutional capital is
exhaustible,” so that the judiciary’s ability to strike down laws within incurring severe institutional costs “is
determined by the number and frequency of its attempts to do so, the felt importance of the policies it
disapproves, and the perceived substantive correctness of its decisions”).
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See Young, State Sovereign Immunity, supra note 184, at 58-60.
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See, e.g., Peter M. Shane, Rights, Remedies, and Restraint, 64 CHI. KENT L. REV. 531, 546 (1988)
(suggesting that, in some cases, the Court may enhance its legitimacy through opposing the political
branches).
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avoid confronting the federal political branches where it is possible to do so without
sacrificing basic constitutional values.
One can, of course, take this “lesson” too far. Federal judges – as officers of the
national government – tend to have a host of natural incentives to underenforce limits on
federal power.723 Moreover, since the federal courts are much less likely to face effective
institutional retaliation from state governments than from the federal political branches, it
is natural that federal judges should function primarily as agents of uniformity,
preempting divergent state practices through articulation of constitutional rules and
federal common law.724 If the federal system is to be preserved, then it would seem
counterproductive to add too strong a normative imperative on top of all the institutional
incentives that counsel restraint in checking national power. Most federal systems, after
all, seem to feature a central constitutional court charged with acting as a neutral arbiter
between the center and the periphery,725 and there may be times when we need the
Supreme Court to perform this function. It may not be realistic, however, to rely too
heavily on the Supreme Court in this role. The unlikelihood over the long term of serious
judicial obstacles to the determined exercise of national power thus suggests yet another
reason to prefer federalism doctrines that promote balance while minimizing such
confrontations.726
Minimizing confrontations with the political branches means forgoing a direct
judicial assault on the national administrative state. Experience suggests that, in Ronald
Dworkin’s terms, a viable federalism doctrine must “fit” most, while perhaps criticizing
some, of our existing institutional arrangements.727
Any interpretation of the
723

See Steven G. Calabresi, “A Government of Limited and Enumerated Powers”: In Defense of United
States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 752, 807-08 (1994). Professor Calabresi explains that
[T]he Justices and judges of the U.S. federal courts are national officers in every possible sense of
that term. Every good thing they have to hope for and every bad thing that they have to fear will
happen to them as a result of some national political or social institution. Such Justices and judges
are far more nationalistic in their outlooks than Members of Congress or even federal bureaucrats,
who may have to deal personally with state and local officials on a regular basis. Thus, even
national jurists who arrive on the federal bench from a state court soon may end up with a very
nationalistic perspective on the world.

Id. at 808.
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Cf. LUCAS A. POWE, THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS ___ (2000) (arguing that the
primary thrust of the Warren Court was to impose national norms in the areas of race and criminal
procedure on the Southern states). For a more recent example, see [Garamendi] (purporting to protect
federal foreign policy from state departures).
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See Martin Shapiro, The European Court of Justice, in THE EVOLUTION OF EU LAW 321 (Paul Craig &
Gráinne de Búrca eds., 1999).
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On the likelihood that the federal political branches will prevail over judicial opposition in the long
term, see also Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National PolicyMaker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279 (1957) (concluding that “it would be unrealistic to suppose that the Court would,
for more than a few years at most, stand against any major alternatives sought by a [national] lawmaking
majority”).
727

See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY ___ (___) (discussing the extent to which a theory
of law may criticize some of the existing legal materials as mistakes). Another way to think of this is in
terms of path dependence. As Richard Fallon has noted, the Court has pushed state sovereign immunity
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constitutional structure that would invalidate much of the United States Code – such as
Justice Thomas’s narrow, originalist reading of “commerce” in Lopez728 – is simply out
of court under this constraint. Federalism doctrine should thus focus, for the most part at
least, on how to resolve presently open questions in ways that foster state autonomy.
This is not to say that the existing apparatus of the federal establishment ought to be
immune to judicial criticism. But such criticism is likely to come at a high institutional
cost, and doctrines that are generally compatible with present arrangements and focus on
checking further shifts toward the center are more likely to survive.
B.

The Quest for Doctrinal Coherence

Part of the reason that subsequent courts rejected the pre-1937 Commerce Clause
jurisprudence was surely the conviction that it was doctrinally incoherent.729 If unelected
judges are going to overturn the work-product of an elected national legislature, those
judges had better have a theory that explains, in a consistent and understandable way,
why that action is grounded in constitutional principle.730 By 1937, in addition to all the
other pressures bearing on the Court, the Court’s doctrine was awash in a sea of fine
distinctions – indirect vs. direct effects, “commerce” vs. manufacturing or agriculture,
pretextual vs. sincere commercial regulation – that persuaded no one that the Court was
not just simply enforcing its own policy preferences. Similar concerns motivated the
collapse of a later, more limited judicial attempt to enforce limits on national power
under the National League of Cities doctrine.731

more aggressively than other forms of federalism doctrine precisely because that line of advance was not
blocked by established precedents or pervasive assertions of federal authority by the political branches. See
Fallon, Conservative Paths, supra note 291, at 482. Similar constraints will help direct any new directions
that the Court might wish to take in protecting the federal balance.
728

[cite]

729

See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 608 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting) (observing that, after
1937, “under commerce, as under due process, adoption of rational basis review expressed the recognition
that the Court had no sustainable basis for subjecting economic regulation as such to judicial policy
judgments”); BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT: THE STRUCTURE OF A
CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION 216-17 (1998) (arguing, based on internal court memoranda, that the
difficulty of distinguishing between appropriate and inappropriate federal regulation of economic activity
with effects on commerce under pre-1937 case law, pushed the Wickard Court strongly in the direction of
abdicating judicial limits altogether); Friedman, Valuing Federalism, supra note 523, at 370 (noting that
“doctrinal collapse itself served as a nationalizing force”); see generally Baker & Young, supra note 10, at
87-106 (discussing the “judicial competence problem” as a basis for abandoning judicial review of
federalism issues after 1937).
730

See, e.g., Wechsler, Neutral Principles, supra note 194, at 15-16.

731

See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (holding that Congress may not regulate
state governmental institutions in their performance of traditional governmental functions). For the
doctrine’s collapse, see Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (“Any rule of
state immunity that looks to the ‘traditional,’ ‘integral,’ or ‘necessary’ nature of governmental functions
inevitably invites an unelected federal judiciary to make decisions about which state policies it favors and
which ones it dislikes.”); Martha A. Field, Comment, Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
Authority: The Demise of a Misguided Doctrine, 99 HARV. L. REV. 84, 94-95 (1985) (observing that when
judges apply concepts of “state sovereignty . . . in the absence of clear guidelines,” they “must resort to
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Invoking this history, Justice Souter has warned of a “portent of incoherence”
hanging over the Court’s current attempt to revive limits on national authority.732 Justice
Souter would get out of the business altogether, leaving limits on national power to the
political process.733 It must be said that Justice Souter and his fellow dissenters in
Morrison have little problem with judge-made doctrine when it limits state power734 or
promotes individual rights.735 But just because the Court’s nationalists are inconsistent
does not mean they are wrong to worry about the coherence of federalism doctrine. I
discuss the many merits of this “process federalism” approach later in this Section,
although I believe a total abandonment of substantive review would be a mistake.736 But
we might also usefully focus on the particular failings of the Court’s prior federalism
jurisprudence as a clue to what sorts of doctrines are unlikely to work. That, in turn, may
suggest more fruitful avenues that the Court might pursue going forward.
Much of the pre-1937 case law can be filed under the heading of “dual
federalism.” I have traced the contours of dual federalism in more detail elsewhere;737 in
brief, the doctrine contemplated “two mutually exclusive, reciprocally limiting fields of
power—that of the national government and of the States.”738 The Court pursued a
variety of conceptual distinctions to define these fields: commercial vs. police

their own opinions concerning the worth of social and economic legislation” and “the Court becomes
vulnerable to a charge that it is acting as a superlegislature”).
732

United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting); see also id. at 656 (Breyer,
J., dissenting) (emphasizing “the difficulty of finding a workable judicial Commerce Clause touchstone—a
set of comprehensible interpretive rules that courts might use to impose some meaningful limit, but not too
great a limit, upon the scope of the legislative authority that the Commerce Clause delegates to Congress”).
733

See id. at 649-50 (Souter, J., dissenting).

734

See, e.g., [Garamendi]

735

See, e.g., [Lawrence] A decision like Lawrence, of course, does both: It protects the individuals rights
while eliminating the state’s autonomy to go its own way on questions of moral policy. I do not mean to
suggest the Lawrence is wrongly decided – only that it has a strong centralizing effect.

736

See Young, Two Cheers, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 1390-95.

737

See Young, Dual Federalism, supra note 94, at 142-50.

738

Alpheus Thomas Mason, The Role of the Court, in FEDERALISM: INFINITE VARIETY IN THEORY AND
PRACTICE 8, 24-25 (Valerie A. Earle, ed., 1968); see also Kincaid, supra note 75, at 29; MARTIN H.
REDISH, THE CONSTITUTION AS POLITICAL STRUCTURE 26 (1995) (contrasting “dual” and “cooperative”
federalism). “Dual federalism” should not be confused with “dual sovereignty,” the Federalists’ political
theory that both state and federal governments derive their sovereignty from delegations by the People. See
generally U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(“Federalism was our Nation’s own discovery. The Framers split the atom of sovereignty.”); Seminole
Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 151-52 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting) (“The People possessing this
plenary bundle of specific powers were free to parcel them out to different governments and different
branches of the same government as they saw fit.”); GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN
REPUBLIC 1776-1787 524-32 (1969) (discussing the Framers’ political theory). “Dual sovereignty” is
consistent with any number of strategies for allocating powers and functions, only some of which depend
on defining the mutually exclusive spheres of activity that characterize “dual federalism.” See Young,
Dual Federalism, supra note 94, at 143-46.
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regulation,739 essentially local vs. essentially national concerns,740 commerce vs.
manufacturing,741 indirect vs. direct effects.742
By 1950, Edward Corwin was able to observe that the “entire system of
constitutional interpretation” associated with dual federalism lay “in ruins.”743 The
doctrine’s demise suggests the futility of trying to divide up the world into separate and
exclusive spheres of governmental competence.744 The respective state and federal
spheres always turn out to overlap. Consider, for example, the sphere of family law – a
traditional enclave of state authority if there ever was one and an area that even the Lopez
dissenters seemed willing to concede as off limits to federal authority.745 That sphere
overlaps with traditional federal concern over interstate travel in the context of interstate
child support enforcement,746 with traditional federal foreign affairs concerns in the
context of international human rights conventions bearing on family relations,747 and
even with the federal government’s administration of federal taxes, pensions, and the like
in the context of the Defense of Marriage Act.748 Cases involving these issues cannot be
739

See, e.g., Mayor of New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102, 132 (1837) (upholding a New York statute
requiring arriving ship captains to provide information on passengers on the ground that it was “not a
regulation of commerce, but of police”).

740

See, e.g., Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 319 (1851) (“Whatever subjects of [the
commerce] powe are in their nature national, or admit only of one uniform system, or plan of regulation,
may justly be said to be of such a nature as to require exclusive legislation by Congress.”).
741

See, e.g., Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1 (1888) (upholding state prohibition on manufacture of liquor on
the ground that it did not regulate “commerce”); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 273-74 (1918)
(holding that the Commerce Clause did not confer power to regulate manufacturing on Congress).

742

See, e.g., United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895) (stating that the Commerce Clause did not
cover regulation of activities which have only an “indirect” effect on interstate commerce).
743

Edward S. Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 VA. L. REV. 1 (1950).

744

It remains a popular strategy, however. Recent efforts to place the European Union on a firmer
constitutional footing have included prominent calls for a more precise delimitation of the respective
subject-matter competences enjoyed by the Community institutions and the Member States. See Council of
the European Union, Laeken Declaration on the Future of the European Union, Dec. 15, 2001, available at
http://ue.eu.int/pressData/en/ec/68827.pdf; see generally Young, European Union, supra note 42, at 167677.

745

See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 624 (1995) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that “[t]o hold
this statute constitutional is not . . . to hold that the Commerce Clause permits the Federal Government . . .
to regulate ‘marriage, divorce, and child custody’”).

746

See Child Support Recovery Act (CSRA), 18 U.S.C. § 228; United States v. Lewko, 269 F.3d 64, 68
(1st Cir. 2001) (upholding the CSRA against a Commerce Clause challenge). Notwithstanding a few
invalidations at the district court level, see, e.g., United States v. Bailey, 902 F. Supp. 727 (W.D. Tex.
1995), rev’d, 115 F.3d 1222 (5th Cir. 1997), every circuit court to have considered the issue has upheld the
CSRA as a valid exercise of the commerce power. See Lewko, 269 F.3d at 68 (collecting cases). For
another example of the intersection of family law concerns with interstate travel, see United States v. AlZubaidy, 284 F.3d 804 (6th Cir. 2002) (upholding 18 U.S.C. § 2261A, a provision of the Violence Against
Women Act criminalizing interstate stalking, as applied to a man who crossed state lines for the purpose of
stalking and assaulting his ex-wife).

747

[cites]

748

[cites]
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classified as “family law” cases, on the one hand, or “interstate travel,” “foreign affairs,”
or “governmental administration” cases, on the other. They obviously implicate both sets
of concerns.
The failure of dual federalism strongly suggests that a revival of judiciallyenforced federalism should not be built around separate “spheres” of state and federal
regulatory jurisdiction. Garcia had this much right, at least: “Traditional state functions”
– or federal ones – and similar tests are simply too indeterminate to hold up under the
pressure of time and practical experience. But to say this is not, as Garcia suggested,749
necessarily to abdicate enforcement to the political branches. As Larry Kramer has
observed, “just because it's no longer possible to maintain a fixed domain of exclusive
state jurisdiction it's not necessarily impossible to maintain a fluid one.”750 I would go
one step further and urge that federalism doctrine generally need not try to carve out
exclusive domains at all. The central preoccupation of the present essay is thus to sketch
out meaningful protections for state autonomy that can survive in a world in which state
and federal regulatory jurisdiction is largely concurrent.
The pre-New Deal Courts were not oblivious to the difficulty of defining and
enforcing mutually exclusive spheres of state and federal activity. In decisions like the
Shreveport Rate Case,751 the Court acknowledged that Congress legitimately may
regulate within traditional state spheres, such as wholly intra-state commerce, where such
regulation is necessary to protect the federal ability to regulate inter-state commerce.752
Other decisions recognized the reverse possibility – that federal regulation of interstate
shipment might be used as a lever effectively to regulate in-state behavior, such as child
labor.753 Building on Chief Justice Marshall’s dictum in McCulloch v. Maryland,754 the

749

See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 552 (1985) (“State sovereign interests . .
. are more properly protected by procedural safeguards inherent in the structure of the federal system than
by judicially created limitations on federal power.”). This statement is most often read as a near-total
renunciation of judicial enforcement, and perhaps that is how Justice Blackmun meant it. I argue infra
TAN ___, however, that it need not be read in that way.

750
Larry Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1485, 1499 (1994). Professor Kramer’s
more recent work is less sanguine about judicial enforcement:

Theoretically, it may be possible for the Court to replace rigid lines that establish a fixed domain
of exclusive state jurisdiction with more fluid tests that turn on some notion of functionality. But
governing a modern society is much too complicated for the Court’s preferences about where or
how to draw the line to inspire much confidence.
Kramer, Politics, supra note 222, at 289. Obviously, my own view is that Professor Kramer was right the
first time.
751

Houston, East & West Texas Railway Co. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342 (1914).

752

See also Railroad Comm’n of Wisconsin v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 257 U.S. 563, 588 (1922)
(“[I]nterstate and intrastate commerce are ordinarily subject to regulation by different sovereignties, yet
when they are so mingled together that . . . the nation . . . cannot exercise complete, effective control over
interstate commerce without incident regulation of intrastate commerce, such incidental regulation is not an
invasion of state authority.”).

753

See Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
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Court sought to bar such devices by means of a purpose test that would invalidate
“pretextual” uses of the commerce power.755 Both the necessity and purpose tests had the
virtue of grappling with the reality of overlapping spheres, but the Court was able to
achieve consistency under neither rubric.756
Similar problems plague contemporary efforts to revive some form of necessity
test. A number of commentators have noted the disconnect between the Rehnquist
Court’s federalism doctrines – which involve a set of essentially formal tests757 – and the
values that federalism is supposed to serve.758 Some have suggested that the Court
should employ an analysis more directly rooted in those values; Donald Regan, for
example, has urged that “in thinking about whether the federal government has the power
to do something or other, we should ask what special reason there is for the federal
government to have that power. What reason is there to think the states are incapable or
untrustworthy?”759 Such a test might look much like the European concept of
“subsidiarity,” which was written into the European Union’s governing structure in the
Maastricht Treaty. Under that principle, “the Community shall take action . . . only if and
in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the
Member States and therefore by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be
better achieved by the Community.”760

754

17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 422 (1819) (“[S]hould Congress, under the pretext of executing its powers, pass
laws for the accomplishment of objects not intrusted to the government; it would become the painful duty
of this tribunal . . . to say, that such an act was not the law of the land.”)

755

See Hammer, 247 U.S. at ___ [quote]

756

[find cites on Shreveport]; see also CUSHMAN, supra note ___, at 217 (quoting a memo from Justice
Jackson to his law clerk in conjunction with Wickard, to the effect that “legal standards for weighing
economic effects and for applying them to the commerce power” under Shreveport were “neither consistent
nor well defined”). On the inconsistent application of the purpose test, see, e.g., Hoke v. United States, 227
U.S. 308 (1913) (upholding the Mann Act, which prohibited the transportation of women in interstate
commerce for immoral purposes); Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903) (upholding the Federal Lottery
Act, which banned interstate shipment of lottery tickets). In both cases, Congress’s purpose was evidently
to make life difficult for in-state businesses that it considered immoral.

757

The Court’s opinion in Morrison strongly suggests that the Commerce Clause inquiry boils down to
whether the regulated activity is “commercial” or not. See [Morrison]; see also [Lessig]. Likewise, the
bright line rules against commandeering and abrogating state sovereign immunity are formal in character.
[cites]; see also Donald H. Regan, How to Think About the Federal Commerce Power and Incidentally
Rewrite United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 554, 562 (1995) (arguing that the Commerce Clause law
prior to Lopez was also “a new formalism”).
758

See, e.g., Friedman, Valuing Federalism, supra note 523, at 410, 412 (criticizing the Lopez Court for
“fail[ing] to support its doctrinal analysis regarding the substantiality of the effect of [the Gun Free School
Zones Act] on commerce with any understanding of the values of federalism,” and urging that “[t]here has
got to be a way to bring arguments about the scope of national authority to bear on constitutional
doctrine”).
759

Regan, supra note 757, at 557; see also [Althouse].

760

EC Treaty art. 5 (ex art. 3b); see also George A. Bermann, Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in
the European Community and the United States, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 331 (1994); Reimer von Borries &
Malte Hauschild, Implementing the Subsidiarity Principle, 5 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 369 (1999); Young,
European Union, supra note 42,a t 1677-82.
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These sorts of tests make a great deal of sense as a standard for when the federal
government ought to act. But they have obvious liabilities as a template for judicial
doctrine. Whether there are sound reasons for federal action – whether they be the
existence of a collective action problem at the state level, a need for uniform standards, or
the like – will almost always be at bottom a policy judgment, and often a highly political
one. Not surprisingly, the European literature on subsidiarity generally seems to have
concluded that that principle should guide the Community political and administrative
institutions but should generally not be enforced directly by courts.761 While it certainly
makes sense to take account of the values underlying federalism in constructing doctrine,
it seems likely that judges will have to find more formal proxies for those values rather
than attempting simply to weigh them in each individual case.762
Purpose tests have been less broadly mooted in contemporary discourse about
federalism,763 and they may bear further exploration. Conventional wisdom typically
disparages legislative purpose or motive tests, based on familiar arguments about the
difficulty of ascertaining the motivation of collective bodies and the possibility that the
same enactment might be constitutional in some scenarios and yet unconstitutional in
others, depending on the mental states of the enacting legislature.764 This may not be an
altogether satisfactory answer. As both Mitch Berman and Elena Kagan have shown, the
use of purpose tests is considerably more common than many people seem to think.765
A more fundamental problem in this particular area, however, has to do with the
circumstances of the commerce power under Article I. That Article defines both
particular ends that Congress may pursue, with the Necessary and Proper Clause granting
broad discretion as to means,766 and particular means that Congress is generally allowed
to employ for any end that it likes.767 The problem is that the Commerce Clause has
traditionally been employed as both an end and a means, and it is often hard to tell the
difference.768 If Congress regulates the price of wheat, is the end to protect commerce in
an important commodity, or to preserve the viability of a rural lifestyle for cultural

761

[cites] Many have argued that courts can play a role in encouraging deliberation about subsidiarity
concerns, [cites], and I return to this sort of option under the heading of “process federalism.” See infra
TAN ___.

762

See Lessig, Translating Federalism, supra note ___, at ___ (suggesting that courts should develop
federalism doctrines characterized by “sophisticated formalism”).

763

[Berman & Baker]

764

See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Economics, Politics, and the Reading of Statutes and the Constitution, 49
U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 272 (1982) (“Courts do not have the research tools that they would need to discover
the motives behind legislation.”). [other cites]
765

See Mitchell N. Berman, Coercion Without Baselines: Unconstitutional Conditions in Three Dimension,
90 GEO. L. J. 1, 23-27& n.100 (2001); Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of
Governmental Motive in First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413 (1996).
766

See, e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland [cite].

767

[cites on Madisonian and Hamiltonian views of the Spending Power; Engdahl]

768

Cf. Regan, supra note 757, at 578 (observing that it is very difficult to distinguish between “moral” and
“economic” purposes for federal laws).
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reasons? If Congress requires that proprietors of public accommodations open their
restaurants and hotels to African-Americans and other minorities, is it to protect the
ability of these people to engage in commercial transactions or to promote broader ideals
of racial equality? Perhaps a workable test could be constructed to weed out those
regulatory enactments with no commercial purpose at all, but I doubt whether such a test
would catch enough extensions of federal power to be worth the candle. Anything more
rigorous would not only run strongly against the grain of current doctrine,769 but would
seem likely to encounter the same sorts of indeterminacy troubles that plagued earlier
incarnations of the doctrine.
To sum up, the experience of judicial activism under the Commerce Clause – as
well as under the more amorphous doctrine of freedom of contract770 – cautions against
frequent confrontations with the political branches, and especially against aggressive
efforts to overturn existing institutional arrangements. It also suggests two more
particular dangers that future developments in federalism ought to do their best to avoid.
On the one hand, attempting to construct formal subject-matter categories in which either
the States or the Nation would have primacy seems doomed to failure. On the other,
trying to manage a world of concurrent jurisdiction by direct application of values
associated with federalism by political economy and democratic theory would almost
surely embroil the judiciary in unmanageable policy judgments. Given these lessons, one
can understand how many judges and commentators have thrown up their hands and
urged that federalism be left almost entirely to the political process.771 I explore the
foundations and implications of that notion – that federalism ought basically to be “selfenforcing” – in the next two Subsections.
C.

Process Failures and Judicial Review

Given the imperfections of both political and procedural protections for safe
autonomy, one might advocate a more aggressive judicial role than I have just outline.
That is, one might insist that the Court develop “hard” constitutional limits on
congressional power. The pre-1937 experience, of course, suggests that this would be
difficult.
There are good reasons to eschew hard constitutional rules that go beyond
historical experience. One is that national action sometimes loosens, rather than tightens,
the constraints on state autonomy. As David Barron has observed, sometimes national
action is justified on the ground that values of uniformity or efficiency simply trump
those associated with state-by-state diversity; other times, however, action at the national
level is designed to help states overcome collective action problems and other
impediments to realization of preferred policies at the state level.772 Much of the
literature developing this latter argument deals with Europe, where individual nations
769

See, e.g., [Darby; more recent cites]

770

See, e.g., Lochner v. New York [cite]

771

See, e.g., [Kramer; Souter in Morrison].

772

Barron, supra note ___, at 382-90.
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have found themselves increasingly constrained in regulating a pervasively integrated
market. Those nations have thus chosen to cede certain forms of authority to the
European Union as a means of achieving their substantive policy goals.773 The federal
law at issue in New York v. United States,774 however, provides a domestic example.
That law reinforced state-level efforts to agree on shared responsibilities for radioactive
waste disposal by providing a federal enforcement mechanism.775 In this sense, federal
action reduced constraints on state autonomy by removing collective-action impediments
to state-level policymaking.
Outright constitutional prohibitions on certain forms of national action are
relatively blunt instruments for distinguishing between national acts that undermine and
those that enhance state autonomy. Certainly the sort of doctrines the Court articulated in
the past – such as that between valid federal regulation of “direct” effects and invalid
federal regulation of “indirect” ones776 – fail to track these considerations in any
meaningful way. The obvious alternative is a far more flexible analysis that would focus
explicitly on whether a given national initiative furthers or injures state autonomy. But
that sort of analysis would share all the institutional liabilities of the subsidiarity-type
inquiries that I have already discussed.777
By and large, the constitutional rules that the Court has articulated avoid this
hard-and-fast quality without wandering into outright policy judgments. The most
absolutist of these rules, as I have suggested, are the Court’s bright-line prohibitions
against federal “commandeering” of state institutions and congressional abrogation of
state sovereign immunity. But Congress may avoid these prohibitions in any number of
ways. The States may always voluntarily implement federal programs, for example, and
Congress may encourage such agreement by way of conditional spending or conditional
preemption.778 Roderick Hills has argued convincingly that this regime of state-option
commandeering will generally capture the potential benefits of state implementation
without allowing Congress to exploit state institutions in ways detrimental to the system
as a whole.779 Likewise, state governments may waive their sovereign immunity, and
Congress can use similar tools to induce such waivers; Congress may also authorize suits
by the United States itself to recover damages from state governments.780 While I do not
773

See, e.g., [Moravcsik; De Burca or Nicolaidis?]
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505 U.S. 144 (1992).

775

See id. at 189-94 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

776

See, e.g., United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
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See supra TAN ___.

778

See New York, 505 U.S. at 167-68.

779

See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political Economy of Cooperative Federalism: Why State Autonomy
Makes Sense and “Dual Sovereignty” Doesn’t, 96 MICH. L. REV. 813, 893-900 (1998).
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See, e.g. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 755 (1999) (noting that immunity waivers may be induced
through the conditional spending power). For a full – some might say exhausting – discussion of
Congress’s options in getting around state immunities, see Mitchell N. Berman, R. Anthony Reese, and
Ernest A. Young, State Accountability for Violations of Intellectual Property Rights: How to “Fix” Florida
Prepaid (And How Not To), 79 TEXAS L. REV. 1037 (2001).
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argue here that this structure is optimal, it does allow Congress to overcome the states’
immunity in cases where it feels that the benefits strongly outweigh the costs.
The Court’s Commerce Clause jurisprudence is similarly accommodating. First
of all, it is remarkably modest. The cases appear to require only that Congress identify
some aspect of the regulated activity that is “commercial” in nature.781 In most cases,
that is not a very high barrier.782 The Court has, moreover, accepted the unity of the
national market; it has defined “commercial” activity generously to include travel as well
as non-profit activity; and it seems even to have accepted Wickard v. Filburn’s notion
that Congress may regulate particular instances of non-commercial activity if most
instances of the regulated activity are commercial in nature.783 Finally, the limits that
have been imposed on the Commerce Power remain subject to evasion through
conditional spending in much the same fashion as the anti-commandeering doctrine and
state sovereign immunity.784
The Court’s “hard” limits on federal power are thus unlikely to unduly constrain
federal authority; they are also unlikely to do much to protect state autonomy. That
brings us back to the prospects for process federalism. As I have suggested, any judicial
attempts to buttress the political and procedural safeguards of federalism should take
heed of several criteria generated by the Court’s institutional experience and by Federalist
political theory. First, it should minimize the need for direct confrontations between the
courts and the political branches. Second, it should avoid rules that place too much
weight on subject matter categories, on the one hand, or direct value-application, on the
other. Third, it should seek to guarantee and enhance three separate aspects of the
constitutional structure: the political representation of the of the States in Congress; the
procedural hurdles and burdens of inertia that impede the creation of federal law; and
underlying ability of the States to generate loyalty by providing meaningful services and
regulation to their citizens. Finally, we can add one more criterion to this list based on
my discussion of the limits of hard constitutional restrictions on Congress’s power: Any
rules that the Court develops must be designed to operate in a world where state and
federal power are largely concurrent.

781

See, e.g., Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613 (“While we need not adopt a categorical rule against aggregating
the effects of any noneconomic activity in order to decide these cases, thus far . . . our cases have upheld
Commerce Clause regulation of intrastate activity only where that activity is economic in nature.”).

782

See, e.g., Fallon, Conservative Paths, supra note 291, at 476 (“[T]his is by no means a trivial limitation,
but neither is it one that appears to threaten the great bulk of federal regulatory legislation.”)
783

See Young, Dual Federalism, supra note 94, at 159-60. See also Adrian Vermeule, Does Commerce
Clause Review Have Perverse Effects? 46 VILL. L. REV. 1325 (2001) (noting that Congress may regulate
noncommercial activity so long as such regulation is part of an integrated regulatory scheme bearing on
commercial activity); Fallon, Conservative Paths, supra note 291, at 432 (“Although the Court has imposed
limits on Congress’s general regulatory powers, its decisions in that domain have displayed a cautious
tentativeness. Notably, the Court has not overruled a single case upholding congressional power to regulate
commercial activities.”).
784

See Baker, Conditional Spending, supra note ___, at ___. I discuss the prospects for protecting state
autonomy through Commerce Clause limitations further infra at TAN ___.
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The Rehnquist Court’s efforts on the process federalism front have taken two
primary forms. The Court has articulated a number of “clear statement rules” requiring
that Congress legislate with particular clarity if it wishes to encroach on various aspects
of state autonomy. Such rules apply, for example, when Congress wishes to regulate the
traditional operations of state government,785 subject the states to liability,786 impose
conditions on the receipt of federal funds,787 or press the limits of its Commerce Clause
authority.788 The Court has also (arguably) imposed a strong deliberation requirement,
enforced through review of the legislative record, when Congress acts in certain ways.789
In particular, the Court has suggested that the validity of legislation enacted under
Congress’s power to enforce the Reconstruction Amendments will turn on the sort of
findings made by Congress in support of such legislation.790
There may well be a place for both these strategies in a sound federalism
jurisprudence. But the first – the clear statement strategy – fits my criteria better. It is,
for instance, more likely to avoid confrontations with Congress, because clear statement
cases are statutory construction cases while failure to supply adequate legislative findings
generally results in invalidation of the statute in question. While Congress may well
disagree with the Court’s interpretation of a statute and, in some cases, acts to overrule
the Court’s decision,791 these confrontations seem less, well, confrontational than where
the Court issues a constitutional holding that the political branches perceive as
illegitimate. Indeed, the obvious option of simply amending the statute in question may
divert political forces from more damaging forms of retaliation.792
Moreover, the Court has thus far applied deliberation rules primarily when
Congress acts under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment.793 In this context, such
rules do little to safeguard the state regulatory autonomy that I have identified as crucial
785

See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
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See Will v. Michigan Dept. of St. Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65 (1989); Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon,
473 U.S. 234, 243 (1985).
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See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 24 (1981).
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See Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848, 857-58 (2000); United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349
(1971).
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We could also describe the anti-commandeering doctrine as a process rule, since its best justification is
that it forces the federal government to internalize the financial and political costs of its actions. See
Young, Two Cheers, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 1360-61. But cases of pure
commandeering – as opposed to cooperative federalism programs induced by conditional spending or
conditional preemption – are rare.
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See, e.g. Bd. of Trus. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, ___ (2001); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of
Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000). But see Young, Sky Falling, supra note 332, at ___ (arguing that neither the
state of the legislative record nor the quality of Congress’s deliberations is actually critical in the Court’s
Section Five cases).
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See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overruling Statutory Precedents, 76 GEO. L. J. 1361 (1988).
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These might include attacks on the Court’s operational funding or its jurisdiction, for example. [cites on
calls for such measures in response to federalism decisions]
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Compare, e.g., Garrett, 531 U.S. at ___; Kimel, 528 U.S. at ___, with United States v. Morrison [cite]
(downplaying importance of congressional findings in Commerce Clause cases).
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to self-enforcement of federalism. The reason is that power to regulate per se under
Section Five is generally redundant with the Commerce Clause; in most instances, the
only reasons that Congress wishes to use the Section Five power instead of the
Commerce Power is that the former will allow it to abrogate the states’ sovereign
immunity from private damages suits.794 The Section Five deliberation rules, then,
primarily guard the states’ sovereign immunity; they do not limit the scope of Congress’s
power to preempt state regulatory authority over private individuals.795
The clear statement strategy, on the other hand, is likely to minimize
confrontations with Congress and avoid the need either to draw categorical lines or to
apply federalism values directly. These rules enhance the States’ political representation
in Congress by providing notice when federalism values are threatened. The ability of
any interest group – including state governments – to protect its interests is powerfully
affected by the costs of information, and, as Neil Komesar has observed, “one important
form of information is the basic recognition of the existence of an interest. The most
dormant groups are those whose members do not even recognize a need for political
action.”796 This difficulty increases with the complexity of governmental activity,797 and
many important issues are mind-numbingly complex.798 Clear statement rules thus serve
an important function by easing the States’ task of monitoring congressional activity for
threats to state autonomy.
Clear statement rules also raise procedural hurdles to intrusive federal enactments
by imposing additional drafting or amendment costs on proponents.799 Rules requiring a
clear statement by Congress, moreover, may be extended to further buttress political and
procedural safeguards by demanding that particular sorts of decisions not be farmed out
to other federal actors, such as administrative agencies and courts. This is an important
point, since the States have no direct representation in these bodies, and courts and
agencies are often able to act more easily than Congress.
The remaining criteria highlight the importance of one particular clear statement
rule – the traditional “presumption against preemption.”800 That presumption is the only
794

[cites]
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A further problem is that the deliberation arguably required by cases like Kimel and Garrett may impose
unrealistic requirements on Congress. See Philip P. Frickey & Steven S. Smith, Judicial Review, the
Congressional Process, and the Federalism Cases: An Interdisciplinary Critique, 111 YALE L. J. 1707
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See, e.g., Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (“[W]e start with the assumption
that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was
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one of the Court’s pro-federalism doctrines that directly implicates the survival of state
regulatory authority.801 It is therefore the doctrine most nearly relevant to Madison’s
competition for loyalty between state and federal politicians. Preemption is also the
classic problem of concurrent power. Preemption doctrine starts from the proposition
that the States and the Nation share power in an area; its central preoccupation is the
management of conflicts that inevitably arise in such situations.802 To the extent that
virtually all regulatory authority is concurrent now – Lopez and Morrison
notwithstanding – then preemption ought to emerge as the central preoccupation of
constitutional federalism.
Why it has not done so is something of a puzzle.803 Part of the problem may be
that preemption cases do not seem to raise questions of high constitutional principle. As
Justice Breyer has pointed out, preemption doctrine emphasizes “the practical importance
of preserving local independence, at retail, i.e., by applying pre-emption analysis with
care, statute by statute, line by line, in order to determine how best to reconcile a federal
statute’s language and purpose with federalism’s need to preserve state autonomy.”804
This “retail” federalism, however, may well be both more “doable” for the courts and
more important for the states than the attempt to construct hard limits on national power.
D.

Hard and Soft Rules

A focus on preemption also has the virtue of responding to a central question in
the debate over federalism’s underlying values. Edward Rubin and Malcolm Feeley have
claimed that all the values I have discussed – regulatory competition and
experimentation, for example, or citizen participation – are products of decentralization,
not federalism. Both involve shifting decisions to the state and local level; under
decentralization, however, the decision to do so lies in the policy discretion of the central
authority, whereas under federalism at least some such shifts are mandated as a matter of
constitutional principle.805 Most of the advantages usually ascribed to federalism,
Professors Rubin and Feeley argue, stem simply from shifting authority downward, not
from any constitutional rule requiring such a shift.806 Moreover, since regulatory
diversity and citizen participation will be more helpful in some contexts than others,
Rubin and Feeley argue that a constitutional rule forcing devolution without regard to the
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Professors Rubin and Feeley concede that some values often associated with federalism – such as the
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circumstances of particular policy areas frustrates the ability of national authorities to
respond to these variations.807
A number of scholars have responded to Professors Rubin and Feeley.808 Vicki
Jackson, for example, has argued that their critique “fails to appreciate the degree to
which decentralization in the United States is a function of, and bound up with,
federalism . . . . [P]resent realities are conditioned by the existence of the states, and by a
belief, shared by many, that their existence and functioning as governments are
constitutionally secured.”809 One cannot simply assume that Texas or Oregon or New
Hampshire would provide the same degree of viable regulatory diversity and citizen
participation if they were transformed, from the standpoint of constitutional autonomy,
into “Administrative Districts 1, 2 and 3.” Thus, as Professor Jackson points out,
“abandoning constitutional federalism has potentially high costs for values Rubin and
Feeley attribute to mere ‘decentralization.’”810
I want to focus, however, on a somewhat different answer. The dichotomy
postulated by Professors Rubin and Feeley assumes a bright line between decentralization
as a policy choice and federalism as a matter of constitutional right. This assumption is
evident in the definition of “federalism” that Professors Rubin and Feeley propose: “[I]n
a federal system, the subordinate units possess prescribed areas of jurisdiction that cannot
be invaded by the central authority, and leaders of the subordinate units draw their power
from sources independent of that central authority.”811 The first half of this definition –
focusing on “prescribed areas of jurisdiction” – seems to describe the old doctrine of
“dual federalism” that I discussed earlier. That doctrine, however, is long since dead.812
More modern forms of constitutional federalism rely considerably less on judicial
definition and enforcement of mutually-exclusive spheres of regulatory jurisdiction. The
Court’s cases on anti-commandeering and state sovereign immunity, for example, limit
the means by which Congress may enforce federal law but do not confine that law to
807
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See, e.g., Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law: Printz and Principle? 111
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Some have argued that the Rehnquist Court’s recent Commerce Clause decisions have revived “dual
federalism,” see, e.g., Peter M. Shane, Federalism’s “Old Deal”: What’s Right and Wrong with
Conservative Judicial Activism, 45 VILL. L. REV. 201, 215 (2000), and there is some language in the
opinions to support this, see United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617 (2000) (“The Constitution
requires a distinction between what is truly national and what is truly local.”). My own view is that, stray
language aside, the holdings and operative analysis of these cases do not attempt to define an exclusive
sphere of state activity. See Young, Dual Federalism, supra note 94, at 157-63; accord Pettys, supra note
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Federalism, supra note 94, at 177-85.
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particular areas.813 These contemporary doctrines blur the bright line between federalism
and decentralization by conceding a large – virtually unlimited, even – realm of
concurrent regulatory jurisdiction. Congress may regulate virtually any subject it
chooses, so long as it does not require states to implement federal policy or subject them
to private suits for money damages. That means that the decentralization decision – that
is, the decision to regulate at either the state or federal level that Professors Rubin and
Feeley argue is critical – remains primarily a policy choice even under the Rehnquist
Court’s constitutional doctrine.
But to the extent we think decentralization is a good thing, we may want to foster
it as a matter of interpretive policy in the construction of federal statutes. Professors
Rubin and Feeley provide little legal basis for doing this. If decentralization is merely a
policy question like any other, then courts engaged in statutory interpretation have little
justification for construing statutes to protect regulatory diversity unless they can find
evidence that the enacting legislature intended them to do so. As I develop in Part III,
however, viewing federalism as a constitutional imperative provides a legitimate basis for
normative, decentralizing canons of construction.814 That is what the Court’s clear
statement rules – and particularly the presumption against preemption – are designed to
do.
Process federalism thus can blunt much of the Rubin and Feeley critique by
softening the dichotomy between federalism as a constitutional requirement and
decentralization as a policy choice. Process rules will often allow Congress to centralize
policy in areas where the public interest seems to require it. At they same time, they
foster decentralization by strengthening the forces – both political and interpretive – that
push against national uniformity. Rubin and Feeley are right to seek more flexibility in
federalism doctrine; they are wrong to the extent that they assume that constitutional
values cannot be an important part of a flexible analysis.

VII.

Strong Autonomy and the Future of Federalism Doctrine

Predictions from the legal academy about federalism doctrine have often bordered
on hysteria. Here is Mark Killenbeck, for example, writing just after the Court decided
Alden v. Maine815 in 1999:
[The Rehnquist Court’s majority] has embarked on a course of
constitutional reformation whose ultimate boundaries are becoming
increasingly clear. The opinions themselves speak in largely measured
terms, stressing the need for “great restraint” and averring respect for
“established federalism jurisprudence.” There is, nevertheless, every
reason to believe that in their single-minded quest to protect the
“‘residuary and inviolable sovereignty’” of the states, these Justices
813
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contemplate substantial revision, perhaps even wholesale reversal, of
many of the assumptions that have guided American constitutional
doctrine and public policy this century.816
Likewise, in a widely-noted book, Judge John T. Noonan, Jr., asserted that the Court
“has, by its own will, moved the middle ground [between federal and state authority] and
narrowed the nation’s power.”817 Sandy Levinson and Jack Balkin even viewed Bush v.
Gore818 as a sinister maneuver designed to perpetuate the current pro-States majority and
allow it to wreak greater havoc on national authority.819
It is hard to square these predictions with actual results on the ground. The Gun
Free School Zones Act is no more820 – but it has been replaced with a nearly identical

816

Killenbeck, supra note 417, at 81-82 (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 568 (1995)
(Kennedy, J., concurring); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Fla., 517 U.S. 44. 64 (1996); and Printz v. United
States, 521 U.S. 898, 919 (1997) (quoting, in turn, Federalist 39 (Madison)).
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Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional Revolution, 87 VA. L. REV. 1045
(2001). The enormity of the charge requires a somewhat extended quotation to show I am not making it up.
Professors Balkin and Levinson argue that “[i]n the past ten years, the Supreme Court of the United States
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if fully successful, will redraw the constitutional map as we have known it.” Id. at 1052-53. Although
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federalism doctrine. See id. at 1053 (discussing Bd. of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett,
531 U.S. 356 (2001) (11th Amendment); Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (same);
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misconduct” amounting to a “constitutional coup.” Id. at 1049-50.
This is a spectacularly bold claim. It doesn’t look so good now, of course, in light of the surprisingly
liberal – but in some cases quite revolutionary – holdings at the end of the 2002 Term. See, e.g., Lawrence
v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003) (striking down the Texas sodomy statute and overruling Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)); Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003) (upholding affirmative action
policy at the University of Michigan law school); Wiggins v. Smith, 123 S. Ct. 2527 (2003) (invalidating
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show just how revolutionary many legal academics have expected the Rehnquist Court’s “federalist
revival” to be.
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provision sporting legislative findings of a substantial effect on interstate commerce,821
and it was, in any event, redundant with state law in over forty states.822
Sylvia Law has asserted that “the Supreme Court has diminished the power of Congress
to address national problems in ways that we have not seen since the Taft Court Era and
the constitutionally disastrous period when the Court denied the New Deal Congress and
president the power to adopt federal responses to the Great Depression.”823
A.

The Centrality of Preemption

Preemption shifts the focus firmly back onto what state governments do. Federal
preemption eliminates state-by-state regulatory diversity and generally forecloses
competition and experimentation. By removing whole policy areas from the state
governmental agenda, moreover, preemption reduces the importance of state
governments as an arena for political participation and competition. Doctrines limiting
federal preemption of state law thus go straight to the heart of the reasons why we care
about federalism in the first place.
A jurisprudence that sought to limit federal preemption of state law, on the other
hand, would address these concerns directly. Preemption, as Candice Hoke has observed,
“is inherently ‘jurispathic’; it kills off one line, perhaps even an entire scheme, of a
particular community's law.”824 The whole point of preemption is generally to force
national uniformity on a particular issue, stifling state-by- state diversity and
experimentation. And preemption removes issues within its scope from the policy
agenda of state and local governments, requiring that citizen participation and
deliberation with respect to those issues must take place at the national level.
“Given the broad range of issues over which Congress has undoubted power to regulate,
the failure of the Court to apply preemption doctrine sparingly, and with real attention
both to Congress's intent and the values of federalism, will in the long run prove
disastrous to perpetuation of the very real values underlying the diffusion of power
inherent in federalism.”825
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B.

Against Dormant Preemption

C.

Other Process-Forcing Rules
1.

Clear Statements

a.

Regulation of Governmental Functions.

b.

Private Causes of Action Against State Institutions.

c.

Conditions on Federal Grants.
2.

Anti-Commandeering

The anti-commandeering rule has been criticized as a formalism,826 and formal it
is. The question is whether that is such a bad thing. Sometimes the adoption of a formal
judicial rule can prompt functional analysis by the political branches. In the
commandeering context, for instance, the anti-commandeering rule simply forces
Congress to consider whether its interests are sufficiently important to justify taking
further action either to persuade state institutions to enforce federal law, or to override
state resistance by mandating federal enforcement. [maybe this goes later on] There is
no reason to think a court would do a better job of this analysis up front.
Critics of Printz are in the habit of accusing the Court of “ignoring” the relevant history.
See, e.g., Werhan, supra note ___, at 1278. But Justice Scalia’s opinion in Printz
discusses the history for ___ pages; he simply reaches a different conclusion than the
dissent and Printz’s critics do. Perhaps that conclusion is wrong, but it does no one any
good to “ignore” the extent to which the majority grappled with that history in reaching
its decision. This phenomenon in the commandeering debate seems representative of a
broader pathology, whereby participants in legal debates seem driven to paint their
opponents as completely mistaken, absolutely wrong, etc. It is rarely the case, however,
that something intelligent cannot be said on both sides of most of our constitutional
debates, and that is certainly true of debates about federalism.
D.

A Zone of Guaranteed Autonomy?

E.

The Very Limited Utility of Immunity

[rebut Pettys, who thinks anti-abrogation enhances states’ ability to compete for popular
affection]
826

See, e.g., Werhan, supra note ___, at 1281.
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